The Brain Drain. A Survey of the Literature

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on Brain Drain (BD). We propose an ideal path that links the first studies with the most recent ones. In this development, the literature on BD focuses on a variety of economic and social issues and recalls to national and international debates. This paper uses more than 350 articles from a variety of sources. The sources are specialized professionals journals, internet research engines, governmental publications and newspapers. In the first section we analyse the main motivations of the researchers to study the BD and we propose an ideal path to interpret this literature. In the second section we analyse the different definitions of the BD and we show that the BD is a wide and complex phenomenon. In the third section we analyse the historical roots of the BD by identifying the BD “ante litteram”. In the fourth section we analyse the “geography” of the BD. Finally, in the fifth section we analyse both some important topics linked to the BD (International Organizations, Population and Research), both the economics models that study the BD.Brain Drain, International Migration, Human Capital, Growth, Economic Methodology and History of Economic Thought

Brain Drain and Fiscal Competition: a Theoretical Model for Europe

In this paper we study Brain Drain (BD) and Fiscal Competition (FC) in a unified framework for the European Union (EU) specific context. Potential mobility of educated workers can increase the degree of FC through taxation or the provision of public education. An increase in FC can be caused by competition among different jurisdictions that aim to attract educated workers. When the importance of FC increases, then the European States may employ FC as a new policy tool. We propose a simple model in which is possible describe different scenarios: Brain Gain (when BD may increase average productivity in the source economy); Brain Drain (when there is unidirectional flow of highly skilled workers that is welfare-deteriorating in the source economy); Migration Competition (when the regions have not high differences in the productivity and they compete attracting educated workers); Fiscal Competition (when jurisdictions compete either to attract a mobile tax base), This simple model help us to explain several policies implemented by European regions.Brain Drain; Fiscal Competition; Migration Competition; Growth.

"Brain Drain Competition" Policies in Europe: a Survey

To obtain the "1.2 million additional research personnel, including 700.000 additional researchers" necessary to "irrigate" the industries science-based, The EU stresses that it is not sufficient increase the investment in Research. We have to stop the European Brain Drain. We have to reverse it; "Europeans who have moved abroad would love to come home". We have to remember that the "Brain Drain should work in both directions", then we have to attract foreign brilliant scientists and compete to the US A. In this paper we give a survey of the principal “Brain Drain Competition” policies implemented in Europe. The key strategies and mechanisms found are: making the academic system more open and flexible; improving the regulatory conditions particularly on immigration; better sign-posting and information at national level; dedicated grants for foreign researchers; adapting income situations to market forces; providing tax reductions specifically for researchers and knowledge workers; more active international marketing and support for international researchers. Finally, we analyse the effects of these policies on the Brain Drain in Europe by giving examples of countries (i.e. UK, France, Germany, Belgium, etc) that that effectively reverse the Brain Drain and attract foreign researchers, and the exemplum of the Italy that it is “a countries that supplies talent to Europe and the Americas”.Brain Drain, Migration policies, Human Capital, High skilled workers.

Migration, fiscal competition and brain drain

In this paper I present a simple model in which I analyse the impact of labor mobility on redistributive policies and the provision of education as a publicly provided good. I’ve analysed different extensions of the model (Maximin objective function of the government and utilitarian function, symmetric and asymmetric population, one generation and two generation model) for check the results in different specifications of the world. The results obtained are in agreement to the literature: less redistribution and less provision of public good with respect to the efficient value (which could be obtained in the absence of mobility or in the presence of coordination among jurisdictions) The aim of this work is to underline this particular aspect of the fiscal competition: when we add up the two negative effects due to the absence of coordination among jurisdictions, the loss of efficiency is more accentuate. This result is important in the European contest because we have an increase of labor mobility. For this reason the possibility of brain drain added to fiscal competition and to an increase of the mobility can be more dangerous for the European jurisdictions and a coordination is necessary in the education policies and in the redistribution policies within the European Union

Strategic Urban Development under Uncertainty

Aim of this paper is to analyse the equilibrium strategies of two developers in the real estate market, when demands are asymmetric. In particular, we are able to consider three key features of the real estate market. First, the cost of redevelop a building is, at least partially, irreversible. Second, the rent levels for different building vary stochastically over time. Third, demand functions for space are interrelated and may produce positive or negative externalities. Using the method of option pricing theory, we address this issue at three levels. First, we model the investment decision of a firm as a pre-assigned leader as a dynamic stochastic game. Then, we solve for the non-cooperative (decentralised) case, and for the perfectly cooperative case, in which redevelopment of an area is coordinated between firms. Finally, we analyse the efficiency/inefficiency of the equilibria of the game. We find that if one firm has a significantly large comparative advantage, the pre-emptive threat from the rival will be negligible. In this case, short burst and overbuilding phenomena as predicted by Grenadier (1996) will occur only as a limiting case.Duopoly Game, Real Options, Preemptive Strategies, Asymmetric Demands

Brain drain competition policies in Europe: a survey

To obtain the “1.2 million additional research personnel, including 700.000 additional researchers” necessary to “irrigate” the industries science-based, the EU stresses that it is not sufficient increase the investment in Research. We have to stop the European Brain Drain. We have to reverse it; “Europeans who have moved abroad would love to come home”. We have to remember that the “B rain Drain should work in both directions”, then we have to attract foreign brilliant scientists and compete to the USA. In this paper we give a survey of the principal “Brain Drain Competition” policies implemented in Europe. The key strategies and mecha nisms found are: making the academic system more open and flexible; improving the regulatory conditions particularly on immigration; better sign-posting and information at national level; dedicated grants for foreign researchers; adapting income situations to market forces; providing tax reductions specifically for researchers and knowledge workers; more active international marketing and support for international researchers. Finally, we analyse the effects of these policies on the Brain Drain in Europe by giving examples of countries (i.e. UK, France, Germany, Belgium, etc) that that effectively reverse the Brain Drain and attract foreign researchers, and the exemplum of the Italy that it is “a countries that supplies talent to Europe and the Americas”

The brain drain a survey of the literature

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on Brain Drain (BD). We propose an ideal path that links the first studies with the most recent ones. In this development, the literature on BD focuses on a variety of economic and social issues and recalls to national and international debates. This paper uses more than 350 articles from a variety of sources. The sources are specialized professionals journals, internet research engines, governmental publications and newspapers. In the first part we analyse briefly the BD, its different definitions and the historical roots of the BD. This part shows that the BD is a wide and complex phenomenon. In the second part, we propose an ideal path to interpret the literature. This part analyses how BD is linked to political and social events, according to the Economy

A Note on Mountford's manuscript "Can a Brain Drain be good for growth in the source economy?"

In this briefly note we extend the Mountford.s article "Can a Brain Drain be good for growth in the source economy?" by introducing an active role of the government in the education decisions of the agent by public education, taxes and subsidies. First, we demonstrate that the main results obtained by Mountford do not disappeared. Second, we argue that the model, by these new assumptions, help us to extend the Mountford.s results to a greater range of economic scenarios and in particular, to the new enlarged European Union

Migration Competition in Enlarged European Union: A Theoretical Model

In this article, we propose a theoretical model which help us to define two possible settings where the European “migration competition” could be analysed. First, we analyse the scenario in which there are two regions: a receiving country and a net sending country. In this scenario we introduce the possibility for each country to increase, by investing resources, the level of integration between countries which consequently reduces the level of migration costs. Thus it is possible to capture the receiving country’s trade off between investing resources in order to attract foreign high skilled workers or investing on educational incentives for his citizens. Second, we analyse the scenario in which there are three regions. Starting from the first scenario’s framework, we could analyse either the case in which a new country is able to intercept a significant quota of the flow of skilled migrants, either the effect of migration competition between the two regions in order to attract the skilled workers of the sending country. In both case analysed, the presence of a central authority which coordinates the migration and fiscal policies is determinant to obtain better results

The formation of share market prices under heterogeneous beliefs and common knowledge

Financial economic models often assume that investors know (or agree on) the fundamental value of the shares of the firm, easing the passage from the individual to the collective dimension of the financial system generated by the Share Exchange over time. Our model relaxes that heroic assumption of one unique "true value" and deals with the formation of share market prices through the dynamic formation of individual and social opinions (or beliefs) based upon a fundamental signal of economic performance and position of the firm, the forecast revision by heterogeneous individual investors, and their social mood or sentiment about the ongoing state of the market pricing process. Market clearing price formation is then featured by individual and group dynamics that make its collective dimension irreducible to its individual level. This dynamic holistic approach can be applied to better understand the market exuberance generated by the Share Exchange over time.Comment: 22 pages, 9 figure