Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU: Postponement, Safeguards and the Rule of Law. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 102, 15 May 2006

The accession stories of Bulgaria and Romania are an excellent illustration of the EU being caught unawares when making important (legal and political) commitments to two future members while taking in good faith the commitments pledged by the same members-to-be

From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues. CEPS Working Documents No. 220, 1 March 2005

The Barcelona process so far has been a valuable systemic/institutional advance in Euro-Med relations and a confidence-building measure on a large scale. But it has not been a sufficient driving force to have created a momentum of economic, political and social advance in the partner states. It is therefore quite plausible that the EU should seek some new advance – through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – to build on the positive features of Barcelona and so try to introduce some new driving force. The Action Plans currently being adopted seek to make the often vague intentions of the Association Agreements of the Barcelona process more operational by linking them to either domestic policy programmes of the partner state or to EU policy norms and standards as an external anchor. In this paper we first crystallise alternative approaches for the ENP to become a real driving force under the headings of ‘conditionality’ and ‘socialisation’. The conditionality concept would mean that the EU sets out i) what incentives it offers, and ii) the conditions on which these incentives would be delivered. The socialisation concept relies essentially on a learning process that comes from the extensive interaction between actors in the partner states and the EU, which induces the partner states to engage in policy reforms that are to a degree modelled on EU norms or derive some inspiration from them. For the EU to become a driving force for reform in the region also requires that it does not have to face an uphill struggle against negative tendencies, for example in the widening and deepening of radical Islam – and here the issue of coherence in the approaches of the EU and US together is paramount

Unintended consequences of EU external action

This book offers a conceptualisation of unintended consequences and addresses a set of common research questions, highlighting the nature (what), the causes (why), and the modes of management (how) of unintended consequences of the European Union’s (EU) external action. The chapters in the book engage with conceptual and empirical dimensions of the topic, as well as scholarly and policy implications thereof. They do so by looking at EU external action across various policy domains (including trade, migration, development, state-building, democracy promotion, and rule of law reform) and geographic areas (including the USA, Russia, the Western Balkans, the southern and eastern European neighbourhood, and Africa). The book contributes to the study of the EU as an international actor by broadening the notion of its impact abroad to include the unintended consequences of its (in)actions and by shedding new light on the conceptual paradigms that explain EU external action. This book fills the gap in IR and EU scholarship concerning unintended consequences in an international context and will be of interest to anyone studying this important phenomenon. It was originally published as a special issue of The International Spectator (Italian Journal of International Affairs). Chapters 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 are available Open Access at https://www.routledge.com/products/9780367346492

Political and Economic Governance in the Balkans and Eastern Europe Compared. CEPS Working Document No 2018/06, July 2018

This paper seeks to compare the quality of governance of the non-EU member states of the Western Balkans and certain states of Eastern Europe, namely Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which share Association Agreements with the EU. Both groups of states aspire to full membership of the EU. While the EU differentiates between the two groups, acknowledging the ‘European perspectives’ (i.e. future EU membership) of the former but not of the latter, the commitments to achieve EU political and economic standards and to adopt or approximate to EU law and policies made by both groups are similar. This makes comparisons between the two groups both feasible and politically significant. Numerous political and economic indicators are used to make these comparisons, from which an overall pattern emerges. The EU now ranks the Balkan states in three tiers according to their accession prospects: Montenegro and Serbia are frontrunners in tier one; Macedonia and Albania in tier two; and Bosnia and Kosovo in tier three. Combining the political and economic indicators, Georgia is comparable and slightly ahead of the Balkan tier one, while Moldova and Ukraine are roughly comparable to the Balkan tier 2, and more advanced than the Balkan tier three. The paper discusses three alternatives for how the EU should adapt its enlargement and neighbourhood policies to these realities. In the first case, the EU would become more consistent and extend the membership perspective to Georgia. In the second case the EU would stick to its current political positions, notwithstanding their obsolescence, yet quietly continue to develop the commonality of the actual policy instruments being applied to both groups. Third, the EU would choose to give strategic profile to this set of common policy instruments by creating a new tier of European integration in the spirit of a multi-speed Europe, which might be called the Wider European Economic Area, or Space, or Community

Serbia and Montenegro

Die Verfasser untersuchen die Auswirkungen der Europäisierung auf das Verhältnis zwischen Serbien und Montenegro. Die Aussicht auf eine zukünftige EU-Mitgliedschaft und die aktive Vermittlungstätigkeit der EU führten mit der Unterzeichnung des Belgrader Abkommens im März 2002 zur Schaffung einer prekären gemeinsamen Staatsformation. Die 'Staatenunion Serbien und Montenegro' ist ein hybrides Modell mit föderalen wie konföderalen Elementen und hat bisher in keiner der beiden Teilrepubliken politische Begeisterung wecken können. Politische Gruppen in Serbien wie in Montenegro bezweifeln ihre Überlebensfähigkeit, Befürworter nationaler Unabhängigkeit haben nach der Schaffung des gemeinsamen Staates Zulauf erfahren. Die Zukunft der 'Staatenunion' hängt entscheidend davon ab, in wie weit die EU fähig und willens ist, die Umsetzung des Belgrader Abkommens zu überwachen und Zwistigkeiten zwischen den beiden Republiken über Fragen im Zusammenhang mit deren gemeinsamem Antrag auf Aufnahme in die EU zu schlichten. (ICEÜbers)'This chapter analyzes the impact of Europeanization on the Serbia - Montenegro relationship. The EU framework through the prospect of future membership and the EU active mediation through conditionality and socialization converged to put in place a precarious common state structure with the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a hybrid institutional model combining federal features and confederal elements. It has failed to generate consensual political support in either of the republics. Its viability has been questioned by political formations in both Serbia and Montenegro while pro independence forces have been strengthened after the creation of the common state. The future of the State Union depends critically on the capacity and willingness of the EU to supervise the implementation of the Belgrade Agreement and arbitrate the disagreements between the two republics on issues related to their joint EU membership bid.' (author's abstract

EU Conditionality and Balkan Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter?

The Balkan states have all responded to the EU's conditional offer of membership with domestic institutional and policy changes in line with the EU requirements. Yet, there is a remarkable variation among the countries from the region in terms of their formal sovereignty, both with regard to domestic governance independent of external actors (internal sovereignty) and internationally recognized status (external sovereignty). Does sovereignty affect the conditionality-compliance dynamic? The dissertation offers an explanation of how the statehood of a prospective EU member affects the policy and politics of conditionality at EU level and the politics of compliance at domestic level. It argues that in semi-sovereign countries, the EU conditionality can incur higher compliance costs as it can intervene in the sovereignty of an aspiring candidate suggesting a redefinition of internal and/or external statehood structures. The security nature of such interventions has an effect on the EU foreign policy behavior involving two agents of conditionality - the European Commission and the Council - and creating risks for inconsistency in EU policy execution. Domestic politics hold the key to compliance with sovereignty-sensitive conditions as the political space tends to be very fragmented and political opposition to EU conditions may arise. In countries where sovereignty is not contested, the EU conditionality prioritizes democratic and economic reforms, the politics of conditionality hides less dangers for incoherence as the EU is inclined to speak with one voice and the politics of compliance are more consensual rendering the compliance trend more sustainable. The dissertation employs the comparative method of analysis and examines the compliance patterns of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and Bulgaria as cases representing the full variation along the sovereignty variable. The argument is situated at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics. It extends the sovereignty debate in the International Relations (IR) literature to the specificity of the EU relations with the Balkan countries. In so doing it links the IR debate to the Europeanization literature exploring the EU's impact on domestic changes in EU candidate countries. Sovereignty as a variable is neglected in the Europeanization literature and this dissertation is an attempt to address this gap

Time to Re-engage with Kosovo and Serbia: Strengthening EU Foreign and Security Policy amidst Internal Contestation

With the 15th year anniversary of Kosovo’s independence approaching in 2023, the status quo of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict looks increasingly untenable. For more than two decades, the European Union and its member states have heavily invested in bringing this conflict to a close through initiatives, such as the facilitated dialogue and the EULEX rule of law mission along with the accession process for both countries. Sidestepping internal disagreement on the status of Kosovo and relying heavily on the creativity of EU institutions, EU member states have pursued technical and “status-neutral” policies in the hope that these would bring about normalisation between the two countries. This approach no longer suffices in the wake of increasing multipolar competition with Russia and China and continued regional fragmentation of the Balkan area. Following the Russian war in Ukraine, geopolitical considerations require the EU and its member states to increase their efforts and re-engage with the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. These geopolitical challenges generate a (short-term) window of opportunity for the EU to work towards an end-state, mitigate internal contestation and get both countries firmly back on their paths of European integration and regional reconciliation