Dependence in Private Values and Efficiency in Bilateral Trade.

In a bargaining model with dependent private information, I extend the result on existence of efficient mechanisms allowing any distribution of the surplus among traders. This generalization introduces flexibility into the model since full surplus extraction by one trader is incompatible with ex post individual rationality.Bilateral Trade

The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence

This paper explores, through a series of experiments, the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions. We study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that, if bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction, shill bidding lowers profits on average. Shill bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner's curse by lowering the price and it can, thus, provide benefits to the bidders. Finally, even though there were too many bidders that submitted bids in these auctions, the number of entrants was not affected by the possibility of seller participation, which is also consistent with the theory.Auctions, Experiment, Shill Bidding, Entry

The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change a¤ects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer, while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.Entry; Survival; Information Release; Procurement Auctions

The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation.Multi-unit auctions, Procurement auctions

The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller’s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state’s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.Information Release, Procurement Auctions

Disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting: an analysis of bidding behavior and costs

Programs that encourage the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises (DBE) as subcontractors have been a part of government procurement auctions for over three decades. In this paper, we examine the impact of a program that requires prime contractors to subcontract out a portion of a highway procurement project to DBE firms. We study how DBE subcontracting requirements affect bidding behavior in federally funded projects. Within a symmetric independent private value framework, we use the equilibrium bidding function to obtain the cost distribution of firms undertaking projects either with or without subcontracting goals. We then use nonparametric estimation methodsto uncover and compare the cost of firms bidding on a class of asphalt projects related to surface treatment in Texas. The analysis shows little differences in the cost structure between auctions that have subcontracting goals and those that do not.Auctions ; Government purchasing

Understanding A+B bidding patterns and policy implications for ODOT project lettings

We first surveyed all Transportation Agencies on their rules of implementation of A+B and incentive/disincentive designs. A complete survey of A+B and I/D letting practice is presented. Policy details such as application, scope and parameter choice are included in the report.We utilized program evaluation techniques to assess the performance of A+B bidding in comparison to the standard contracting low bid practice. Using our statistical knowledge and information on alternative contracting methods adopted by ODOT and other state Departments of Transportation, we conducted economic evaluation of contracting practices. The end goal was to prepare guidelines for distinguishing between costly projects andthose that are economically practical to speed up, and help ODOT to improve efficiency in highway construction.We found evidence that item bids respond to the time incentive asymmetrically. As an example, items 202(C)0184 (Unclassified Borrow) and 619(B)2500 (Removal of Bridge Items) display especially favorable reactions to time incentives and hence projects that prescribe such items more heavily are desirable candidates for A+B letting consideration. There is evidence suggesting that bids (and the underlying cost) rise less steeply than for other items when time is a constraint. Naturally, acceleration on such items may be achieved at a relatively lower cost to the state department.A key challenge for Departments of Transportation around the country is to keep the cost of construction low while ensuring that projects will be completed in a timely manner. Those goals can often be conflicting. The purpose of this research project was to investigate the empirical relationship between project cost and project duration to offer recommendations to the Department of Transportation on the optimal use of time incentives in the procurement process.Final report, October 2013-September 2014N

The impact of regional competition on the health care industry

We investigate factors that determine firm markups by employing data on prices and quantities of various medical procedures at major hospitals in the United States. We focus on the impact of hospital quality, rival competition and the number of medical procedures upon the health care demand. Our analysis covers health-care markets across the United States with the market definition based upon the hospital referral regions. Our findings highlight potential implications of the relationship between hospital markups and market structure

The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change a¤ects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer, while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition

Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry:a panel quantile regression analysis

This paper investigates how subcontracting parts of contracted work shapes entrants’ success and survival. We find that newly developed quantile regression approaches can be adapted to study survival of firms competing for government contracts in road construction. The method is applied on a data set that includes patterns of firm entry, exit and auction related information. We find an apparent increase in the business life of firms who subcontract out part of their projects. In Texas, these subcontracting effects appear to be more pronounced for firms with few or no options outside the industry, and among firms who contract out part of their work to Disadvantaged Business Enterprises