The influence of group membership on cross-contextual imitation

Research on mimicry has demonstrated that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. In the present study, we tested whether such top-down modulation also applies for more extreme forms of direct mapping, such as for cross-contextual imitation settings, in which individuals imitate others' movements without sharing a common goal or context. Models on self-other control suggest that top-down modulations are based merely on a direct link between social sensory processing and imitation. That is, perceived similarities between oneself and another person is sufficient to amplify a shared representation between own and others' actions, which then trigger imitation. However, motivational accounts explain such findings with the assumption that individuals are motivated to affiliate with others. Because imitation is linked to positive social consequences, individuals should imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. We tested these two theoretical accounts against each other by applying a cross-contextual imitation paradigm. The results demonstrate that in-group members are more strongly cross-contextually imitated than out-group members the higher individuals' motivation to affiliate with the in-group is. This supports motivational models but not self-other control accounts. Further theoretical implications are discussed

Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others' behavior

Free will is a cornerstone of our society, and psychological research demonstrates that questioning its existence impacts social behavior. ;In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias, which reflects people's automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others' behavior. All studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the strength of the belief in free will and the correspondence bias. Moreover, in two experimental studies, we showed that weakening participants' belief in free will leads to a reduction of the correspondence bias. Finally, the last study demonstrates that believing in free will predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior, and that this relation is mediated by the correspondence bias. Overall, these studies show that believing in free will impacts fundamental social-cognitive processes that are involved in the understanding of others' behavior

An empirical comparison of different implicit measures to predict consumer choice

While past research has found that implicit measures are good predictors of affectively driven, but not cognitively driven, behavior it has not yet been tested which implicit measures best predict behavior. By implementing a consumer context, in the present experiment, we assessed two explicit measures (i.e. self-reported habit and tastiness) and three implicit measures (i.e. manikin task, affective priming, ID-EAST) in order to test the predictive validity of affectively versus cognitively driven choices. The results indicate that irrespective of whether participants chose affectively or cognitively, both explicit measures, but not the implicit measures, predicted consumer choice very strongly. Likewise, when comparing the predictive validity among all measures, the explicit measures were the best predictors of consumer choice. Theoretical implications and limitations of the study are discussed

The effect of money priming on self-focus in the imitation-inhibition task : a registered report

The self-sufficiency hypothesis suggests that priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than on others. However, recently, research supporting this claim has been heavily criticized and some attempts to replicate have failed. A reason for the inconsistent findings in the field may lay in the common use of explicit measures, because they tend to rely on one or just a few items and are thus prone to demand effects and low reliability. In the present research, we administered, in two experiments, the imitation-inhibition task – a robust, unobtrusive, and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. A pilot study found an increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with money. Building on this finding, a preregistered high-powered experiment replicated this effect, suggesting that money primes may indeed increase a focus on the self. An additionally carried out meta-analysis indicates that automatic imitation is modulated by self-other focus and that money primes lead to a smaller focus on the self than conventional methods. Overall, the found effects are rather small and several limitations, such as order effects, call for a cautious interpretation of the findings

Mimicry and automatic imitation are not correlated

It is widely known that individuals have a tendency to imitate each other. However, different psychological disciplines assess imitation in different manners. While social psychologists assess mimicry by means of action observation, cognitive psychologists assess automatic imitation with reaction time based measures on a trial-by-trial basis. Although these methods differ in crucial methodological aspects, both phenomena are assumed to rely on similar underlying mechanisms. This raises the fundamental question whether mimicry and automatic imitation are actually correlated. In the present research we assessed both phenomena and did not find a meaningful correlation. Moreover, personality traits such as empathy, autism traits, and traits related to self- versus other-focus did not correlate with mimicry or automatic imitation either. Theoretical implications are discussed

Anticipating actions and corticospinal excitability : a preregistered motor TMS experiment

Past research on action observation and imitation suggests that observing a movement activates a corresponding motor representation in the observer. However, recent research suggests that individuals may not only reflexively simulate the observed behavior but also simulate and engage in anticipated action without another person actually engaging in it. For example, it has been demonstrated that observing a triggering event (i.e., nose wrinkling) that potentially leads to the anticipation of an action (i.e., nose scratching) increases the likelihood that the observer will perform that action. In the present research, we applied motor Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to investigate such anticipated social action effects at the neurophysiological level within a trial-by-trial measure. While a pilot study suggests that observing nose wrinkling elicits stronger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants' biceps muscles than observing control events, this effect could not be fully replicated in a preregistered study. Although a post hoc meta-analysis across both studies supports the general hypothesis, these results need to be taken cautiously. Implications of the results reported in the manuscript are discussed. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Recognition and approach responses toward threatening objects

Previous research suggests that positive stimuli are often approached as well as recognized faster than negative stimuli. We argue that this effect does not hold if negative stimuli are associated with threat. Based on fear module theory ( Öhman &amp; Mineka, 2001 , 2003 ), we argue that individuals recognize threatening stimuli faster than positive stimuli because of a constant monitoring of the environment for threatening objects. Moreover, based on the assumption of a motivational account underlying approach-avoidance responses ( Krieglmeyer &amp; Deutsch, 2010 ), we assume the recognition then directly evokes a careful and slow approach of threatening objects. Applying a response time task that measures approach movement and recognition times within the same task, we found that individuals recognize threatening pictures faster than positive pictures, but approach the threatening pictures slower than the positive pictures. </jats:p

Sujetos culturales en disputa en Manèges / La casa de los conejos de Laura Alcoba

The article analyzes the autofictional novel of Laura Alcoba (2007) through the concepts of cultural subject and ideologeme. It looks at the copre- sence of two cultural subjects: 1) the generation of the parents, participants of the armed organization Montoneros, and 2) the children, who were affected by the militancy of the parents. The novel is legible thus as an attempt to confront the past marked by a language and an ideology that were assumed as “natural”, but disappeared due to the repression of the military dictatorship – and to find a language to express both this disapparition and a subjectivity of her own.El artículo analiza la novela autoficcional de Laura Alcoba (2007) mediante los conceptos de sujeto cultural e ideologema y constata la copresencia de dos sujetos culturales: 1) la generación de los padres, militantes de la organi- zación armada Montoneros, y 2) la generación de los hijos que se vio afectada por la militancia de los progenitores. La novela es legible como un intento de confrontar el pasado marcado por un lenguaje y una ideología que se asumieron como “naturales”, pero hoy desaparecidos como consecuencia de la represión de la dictadura militar –y de encontrar una forma de enunciar tanto esa desaparición como una subjetividad propia.L’article analyse le roman d’autofiction chez Laura Alcoba (2007) en s’appuyant sur les concepts de sujet culturel et d’idéologème. Il étudie la coprés- ence de deux sujets culturels : 1) celui de la génération des parents, activistes de l’organisation armée Montoneros et 2) celui des enfants touchés spécifiquement par le militantisme de leurs parents. On peut alors lire le roman comme une tentative de confronter son propre passé marqué par un langage et une idéologie pensés comme «naturels» mais aujourd’hui disparus, à la suite de la répression de la dictature ‒ et de trouver une langue pour parler de cette disparition aussi comme d’articuler une subjectivité à elle