Review of \u3ci\u3eReservation Capitalism : Economic Development in Indian Country\u3c/i\u3e by Robert J. Miller

I don\u27t know how many times I\u27ve heard someone say, Capitalism doesn\u27t work in Indian Country ... it\u27s just not compatible with their way of life. While I\u27ve often attempted to counter such misconceptions with my own anecdotal knowledge and experience, Robert J. Miller\u27s excellent Reservation Capitalism thoroughly eviscerates that persistent myth. The opening chapters offer a comprehensive critique of the antiquated notion of Indians as forest-dwelling socialists, detailing how private property rights, wealth accumulation, and entrepreneurial acumen were commonplace throughout Indian Country prior to European contact. Miller proceeds to recount how reservation economies were devastated by European interactions and how the yoke of the Great White Father\u27s paternalism continues the suppression. He then introduces his core thesis that capitalism and economic activity are consistent with tribal values and culture, although both exogenous and endogenous factors unnecessarily suppress reservation economies. Finally, Miller provides a roadmap for overcoming those deleterious factors and moving Indian Country forward towards self-sustaining reservation economies

Not Because They are Brown, But Because of Ea*: Why the Good Guys Lost in \u3cem\u3eRice V. Cayetano\u3c/em\u3e, and Why They Didn\u27t Have to Lose

Part II of this Article therefore reviews the history of Native Hawaiians in the broader context of the history of federal Indian law, focusing on the vacillating congressional policies regarding Indians and how those policies almost always treated Indian tribes as political entities rather than ethnic communities. Part III reviews and analyzes the procedural history of the Rice case and its resolution by the Supreme Court. Part IV concludes with the argument that constitutionally-permissible alternative methodologies exist for accomplishing the same objective of self-determination for Native Hawaiian

Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market

Indian Country is America’s domestic emerging market, and as in a number of emerging markets, many successful businesses in Indian Country are starving for expansion capital. The US Treasury estimates that the private equity deficit in Indian Country is $44 billion. While the handful of wealthier tribes might be logical investors in private equity funds deploying capital in Indian Country, the existing securities laws present a significant impediment. In particular, Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 does not treat tribes as “accredited investors,” thus denying those tribes the ability to participate in the private equity market. Since there is no principled reason to exclude tribes from the list of accredited investors, this article makes the case for extending accredited investor status to tribes

Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market

Indian Country is America’s domestic emerging market, and as in a number of emerging markets, many successful businesses in Indian Country are starving for expansion capital. The US Treasury estimates that the private equity deficit in Indian Country is $44 billion. While the handful of wealthier tribes might be logical investors in private equity funds deploying capital in Indian Country, the existing securities laws present a significant impediment. In particular, Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 does not treat tribes as “accredited investors,” thus denying those tribes the ability to participate in the private equity market. Since there is no principled reason to exclude tribes from the list of accredited investors, this article makes the case for extending accredited investor status to tribes

Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development

Upwards of $50 billion in capital needs go unmet each year in Indian Country in such vital sectors as infrastructure, community facilities, housing, and enterprise development, in part due to the restrictions imposed on tribal access to the capital markets, specifically the ability of tribal governments to issue tax-exempt debt. Section 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code requires tribal tax-free bond proceeds to be used only for “essential governmental functions,” a restriction not applicable to state and municipal bonds, and Section 7871(e) further limits the scope of available tax-exempt bonding to activities “customarily performed by State and local governments with general taxing powers” without providing any guidance as to when a particular activity becomes “customary” for a non-tribal government. These restrictions have severely limited tribal abilities to access the capital markets, and although American Indians make up more than 1.5$50 billion capital needs deficit. Tribal governments are also victims of a disproportionate number of enforcement actions by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The IRS audits less than 1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are 30 times more likely to be audited within four years of issue than cities and states. In addition, 100% of tribal conduit issuances have been or are currently being challenged by the IRS. The ambiguity of the statute has led to a number of IRS enforcement actions that simply would not have happened had the issuer not been a tribe. In each of these cases, the tribes financed activities that had previously been routinely financed by state and local governments without any challenge from the IRS. This article argues that tribal governments should have the same tax-exempt bonding authority as their state and local counterparts, and that expansion of tribal bonding authority would increase federal revenues

Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty for Economic Opportunity: A Strategic Negotiations Perspective

Part II of this Article discusses the sovereign nature of tribal governments and reviews the history of tribal sovereignty, concluding with an examination of tribal-state compacting outside of the gaming context. Part III examines the origins of Indian gaming, focusing on the development of the legal framework which governs tribal gaming activities and necessitates the negotiation of tribal-state gaming compacts. Given the need for tribal-state negotiations, Part IV presents a framework for structuring and analyzing negotiations. Part V applies that framework in the retelling of the first part of the Foxwoods story, the negotiations regarding the original gaming compact. The story of Foxwoods, however, has a second chapter involving the subsequent negotiations over installing slot machines at the casino, and Part VI uses the same analytic framework. Part VII evaluates the change in the negotiation landscape in response to the Foxwoods negotiations and assesses the impact of technological changes on Indian gaming. Part VIII concludes by arguing that, although the relative tribal-state positions may have changed, much of the fundamental negotiation dynamic remains the same, and thus many of the lessons of Foxwoods are applicable today