The World Health Organization, Corporate Power, and the Prevention and Management of Conflicts of Interest in Nutrition Policy:Comment on "Towards Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest in Nutrition Policy? An Analysis of Submissions to a Consultation on a Draft WHO Tool"

The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) draft Decision-Making Process and Tool to assist governments in preventing and managing conflicts of interest in nutrition policy marks a step-change in WHO thinking on large corporations and nutrition policy. If followed closely it stands to revolutionise business-government relations in nutrition policy. Ralston and colleagues outline how the food and beverage industry have argued against the decision-making tool. This commentary expands on their study by setting industry framing within a broader analysis of corporate power and explores the challenges in managing industry influence in nutrition policy. The commentary examines how the food and beverage industry’s collaboration and partnership agenda seeks to shape how policy problems and solutions are interpreted and acted on and explores how this agenda and their efforts to define conflicts of interest effectively represent non-policy programmes. More generally, we point to the difficulties that member states will face in adopting the tool and highlight the importance of considering the central role of transnational food and beverage companies in contemporary economies to managing their influence in nutrition policy

Controlling Tobacco Industry Interference in Tobacco Control Policy in Jamaica

The new comprehensive Tobacco Control Bill tabled in December 2020 contains several measures aimed at preventing tobacco industry interference in health policy. Such interference has long been recognised as the key cause of weak laws and regulation governing the sale and use of tobacco. In this brief we summarise the findings of research into the government’s record of regulating industry interference in health policy. Previous attempts to control industry influence in health policy have failed. We also look in depth at how the Bill stands to change things and where it can be strengthened

Submission to the Joint Select Committee of Parliament on the Tobacco Control Bill:Tobacco Industry Interference in Health Policy Making

In this submission, we discuss the Jamaican Tobacco Control Bill’s provisions covering tobacco industry interference in health policy. We begin by describing the importance of comprehensive implementation of the Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which seek to prevent tobacco industry interference in health policy making. We then go on to discuss the strengths and weakness of the Bill in implementing the Guidelines based on research conducted with the Jamaica Coalition for Tobacco Control. Finally, we present recommendations on how the Bill can be strengthened to ensure strong implementation of the Guidelines

Corporations' use and misuse of evidence to influence health policy:A case study of sugar-sweetened beverage taxation

Background: Sugar sweetened beverages (SSB) are a major source of sugar in the diet. Although trends in consumption vary across regions, in many countries, particularly LMICs, their consumption continues to increase. In response, a growing number of governments have introduced a tax on SSBs. SSB manufacturers have opposed such taxes, disputing the role that SSBs play in diet-related diseases and the effectiveness of SSB taxation, and alleging major economic impacts. Given the importance of evidence to effective regulation of products harmful to human health, we scrutinised industry submissions to the South African government's consultation on a proposed SSB tax and examined their use of evidence. Results: Corporate submissions were underpinned by several strategies involving the misrepresentation of evidence. First, references were used in a misleading way, providing false support for key claims. Second, raw data, which represented a pliable, alternative evidence base to peer reviewed studies, was misused to dispute both the premise of targeting sugar for special attention and the impact of SSB taxes on SSB consumption. Third, purposively selected evidence was used in conjunction with other techniques, such as selective quoting from studies and omitting important qualifying information, to promote an alternative evidential narrative to that supported by the weight of peer-reviewed research. Fourth, a range of mutually enforcing techniques that inflated the effects of SSB taxation on jobs, public revenue generation, and gross domestic product, was used to exaggerate the economic impact of the tax. This "hyperbolic accounting" included rounding up figures in original sources, double counting, and skipping steps in economic modelling. Conclusions: Our research raises fundamental questions concerning the bona fides of industry information in the context of government efforts to combat diet-related diseases. The beverage industry's claims against SSB taxation rest on a complex interplay of techniques, that appear to be grounded in evidence, but which do not observe widely accepted approaches to the use of either scientific or economic evidence. These techniques are similar, but not identical, to those used by tobacco companies and highlight the problems of introducing evidence-based policies aimed at managing the market environment for unhealthful commodities

Policy Brief: Who Won? Who Lost? The Distributional Impact of COVID-19 Government Support for Business.

Government support to business during the pandemic represented an unprecedented peacetime transfer of capital from the public to the private sector. Schemes to support businesses were consistently justified on the basis of broader interests, such as ‘protecting jobs and livelihoods’, but these rather abstract, universal goals potentially gloss over important questions about how government supports to business have been used, and to whose benefit.In this brief we summarise research examining how different stakeholders at the UK’s largest businesses – board executives, shareholders, and workers – fared during and after the peak of the pandemic. Among other things, the research explored how FTSE 350 companies in receipt of government supports adjusted executive compensation packages and payments to shareholders, how this compared to businesses that did not take government money, and how pay differences between chief executives and ordinary workers changed going into and coming out of the pandemic. In addition, the research looked at government support scheme restrictions on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders (dividend payments) and examined the challenges involved in tracking which companies had taken advantage of government supports and by how much.Our findings indicate the existence of a post-pandemic restitution culture in executive pay, in which companies across the FTSE 350 have sought to make up losses in executive pay experienced during the peak of the pandemic. This restitution culture has reversed a longer run decline in executive pay and, significantly, is particularly apparent in companies that participated in government support schemes, which have seen substantial executive pay increases.In a narrow sense, our findings underline the importance of policymakers attaching clear conditions to government support on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders, with appropriate transparency enforcement mechanisms. However, they also raise bigger questions about the relationship between corporations and society, and the potential role that government assistance, grants, and public procurement can play in ensuring companies and our broader economy are managed in the long-term interests of society

Controlling Corporate Influence in Health Policy Making?:Implementation of Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Residual Opportunity Structures for Policy Influence, and Political Adaptation

The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures. However, the extent to which states have implemented the Convention varies considerably. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, is intended to insulate policy-making from the tobacco industry’s political influence, and aims to address barriers to strong implementation of the Convention associated with tobacco industry political activity. This working paper summarises the results of an ongoing project which quantitatively assesses implementation of Article 5.3’s Guidelines for Implementation, evaluates the strength of Parties’ efforts to implement specific recommendations, and explores how different approaches to implementation expose the policy process to continuing industry influence. Despite a majority of parties reporting some action in accordance with the Article, our findings indicate that its implementation creates a wide range of residual opportunities for policy influence

Executive Summary. Who Won? Who Lost? The Distributional Impact of COVID-19 Government Support for Business.

Government support to business during the COVID-19 pandemic was consistently justified on the basis of general interests, such as ‘protecting jobs and livelihoods’ and helping to ‘ease the financial burden for businesses and the UK population’. But these rather abstract, universal goals potentially gloss over important questions about the redistributive effects of government subsidies. Given present efforts to tackling public sector debt, how money under government support schemes has been used, and to whose benefit, are key questions. In this report we examine how different stakeholders at the UK’s largest businesses – board executives, shareholders, and workers – fared during and after the peak of the pandemic. Among other things, we explore how FTSE 350 companies in receipt of government supports adjusted executive compensation packages and payments to shareholders, how this compared to businesses that did not take government money, and how pay differences between chief executives and ordinary workers changed going into and coming out of the pandemic. In addition, we look at government support scheme restrictions on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders (dividend payments) and examine the challenges involved in tracking which companies had taken advantage of government supports and by how much. Our findings indicate the existence of a post-pandemic restitution culture in executive pay, in which companies across the FTSE 350 have sought to make up losses in executive pay experienced during the peak of the pandemic. This restitution culture has reversed a longer run decline in executive pay and, significantly, is particularly apparent in companies that participated in government support schemes, which have seen substantial executive pay increases. In a narrow sense, our findings underline the importance of policymakers attaching clear conditions to government support on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders, with appropriate transparency enforcement mechanisms. However, they also raise bigger questions about the relationship between corporations and society, and the potential role that government assistance, grants, and public procurement can play in ensuring companies and our broader economy are managed in the long-term interests of society

Who Won? Who Lost? The Distributional Impact of COVID-19 Government Support for Business.:Aston Centre for Health and Society Policy Brief.

Government support to business during the pandemic represented an unprecedented peacetime transfer of capital from the public to the private sector. Schemes to support businesses were consistently justified on the basis of broader interests, such as ‘protecting jobs and livelihoods’, but these rather abstract, universal goals potentially gloss over important questions about how government supports to business have been used, and to whose benefit. In this brief we summarise research examining how different stakeholders at the UK’s largest businesses – board executives, shareholders, and workers – fared during and after the peak of the pandemic. Among other things, the research explored how FTSE 350 companies in receipt of government supports adjusted executive compensation packages and payments to shareholders, how this compared to businesses that did not take government money, and how pay differences between chief executives and ordinary workers changed going into and coming out of the pandemic. In addition, the research looked at government support scheme restrictions on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders (dividend payments) and examined the challenges involved in tracking which companies had taken advantage of government supports and by how much. Our findings indicate the existence of a post-pandemic restitution culture in executive pay, in which companies across the FTSE 350 have sought to make up losses in executive pay experienced during the peak of the pandemic. This restitution culture has reversed a longer run decline in executive pay and, significantly, is particularly apparent in companies that participated in government support schemes, which have seen substantial executive pay increases. In a narrow sense, our findings underline the importance of policymakers attaching clear conditions to government support on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders, with appropriate transparency enforcement mechanisms. However, they also raise bigger questions about the relationship between corporations and society, and the potential role that government assistance, grants, and public procurement can play in ensuring companies and our broader economy are managed in the long-term interests of society

Who Gained, who Lost? The Distributional Impact of COVID-19 Government Support for Business

Government support to business during the COVID-19 pandemic was consistently justified on the basis of general interests, such as ‘protecting jobs and livelihoods’ and helping to ‘ease the financial burden for businesses and the UK population’. But these rather abstract, universal goals potentially gloss over important questions about the redistributive effects of government subsidies. Given present efforts to tackling public sector debt, how money under government support schemes has been used, and to whose benefit, are key questions. In this report we examine how different stakeholders at the UK’s largest businesses – board executives, shareholders, and workers – fared during and after the peak of the pandemic. Among other things, we explore how FTSE 350 companies in receipt of government supports adjusted executive compensation packages and payments to shareholders, how this compared to businesses that did not take government money, and how pay differences between chief executives and ordinary workers changed going into and coming out of the pandemic. In addition, we look at government support scheme restrictions on executive pay and capital distributions to shareholders (dividend payments) and examine the challenges involved in tracking which companies had taken advantage of government supports and by how much. Our findings indicate the existence of a post-pandemic restitution culture in executive pay, in which companies across the FTSE 350 have sought to make up losses in executive pay experienced during the peak of the pandemic. This restitution culture has reversed a longer run decline in executive pay and, significantly, is particularly apparent in companies that participated in government support schemes, which have seen substantial executive pay increases