Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs

Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such scenarios, we supplement the classical Fisher model of a market by introducing {\em transaction costs}. For every buyer $i$ and every good $j$, there is a transaction cost of \cij; if the price of good $j$ is $p_j$, then the cost to the buyer $i$ {\em per unit} of $j$ is p_j + \cij. This allows the same good to be sold at different (effective) prices to different buyers. We provide a combinatorial algorithm that computes $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium prices and allocations in $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}(n+\log{m})mn\log(B/\epsilon)\right)$ operations - where $m$ is the number goods, $n$ is the number of buyers and $B$ is the sum of the budgets of all the buyers

Oscillatory Tunnel Splittings in Spin Systems: A Discrete Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin Approach

Certain spin Hamiltonians that give rise to tunnel splittings that are viewed in terms of interfering instanton trajectories, are restudied using a discrete WKB method, that is more elementary, and also yields wavefunctions and preexponential factors for the splittings. A novel turning point inside the classically forbidden region is analysed, and a general formula is obtained for the splittings. The result is appled to the \Fe8 system. A previous result for the oscillation of the ground state splitting with external magnetic field is extended to higher levels.Comment: RevTex, one ps figur

Solvent Extraction & Spectrophotometric Determination of Ru(III), Rh(III) & Pd(II) using 1-(2' -Pyridylazo)-2-phenanthrol

367-36

Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of indivisible goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond the simple case of two agents with subadditive valuations, some good approximations of EFX are known to exist, namely $\tfrac{1}{2}$-EFX allocation and EFX allocations with bounded charity. Nash welfare (the geometric mean of agents' valuations) is one of the most commonly used measures of efficiency. In case of additive valuations, an allocation that maximizes Nash welfare also satisfies fairness properties like Envy-Free up to one good (EF1). Although there is substantial work on approximating Nash welfare when agents have additive valuations, very little is known when agents have subadditive valuations. In this paper, we design a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs an allocation that satisfies either of the two approximations of EFX as well as achieves an $\mathcal{O}(n)$ approximation to the Nash welfare. Our result also improves the current best-known approximation of $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ and $\mathcal{O}(m)$ to Nash welfare when agents have submodular and subadditive valuations, respectively. Furthermore, our technique also gives an $\mathcal{O}(n)$ approximation to a family of welfare measures, $p$-mean of valuations for $p\in (-\infty, 1]$, thereby also matching asymptotically the current best known approximation ratio for special cases like $p =-\infty$ while also retaining the fairness properties

Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna

We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone likes and bads that everyone dislikes, as well as items that some like and others dislike. The seminal work of Bogomolnaia et al. [Econometrica'17] argue why allocating a mixed manna is genuinely more complicated than a good or a bad manna, and why competitive equilibrium is the best mechanism. They also provide the existence of equilibrium and establish its peculiar properties (e.g., non-convex and disconnected set of equilibria even under linear utilities), but leave the problem of computing an equilibrium open. This problem remained unresolved even for only bad manna under linear utilities. Our main result is a simplex-like algorithm based on Lemke's scheme for computing a competitive allocation of a mixed manna under SPLC utilities, a strict generalization of linear. Experimental results on randomly generated instances suggest that our algorithm will be fast in practice. The problem is known to be PPAD-hard for the case of good manna, and we also show a similar result for the case of bad manna. Given these PPAD-hardness results, designing such an algorithm is the only non-brute-force (non-enumerative) option known, e.g., the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm (1964) for computing a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player game is still one of the most widely used algorithms in practice. Our algorithm also yields several new structural properties as simple corollaries. We obtain a (constructive) proof of existence for a far more general setting, membership of the problem in PPAD, rational-valued solution, and odd number of solutions property. The last property also settles the conjecture of Bogomolnaia et al. in the affirmative

Spectrophotometric Determination of Os(VIII) Using 2,3-Dihydroxypyridine & 5-Chloropyridine-2,3-diol

1004-100

Private Outsourcing of Polynomial Evaluation and Matrix Multiplication using Multilinear Maps

{\em Verifiable computation} (VC) allows a computationally weak client to outsource the evaluation of a function on many inputs to a powerful but untrusted server. The client invests a large amount of off-line computation and gives an encoding of its function to the server. The server returns both an evaluation of the function on the client's input and a proof such that the client can verify the evaluation using substantially less effort than doing the evaluation on its own. We consider how to privately outsource computations using {\em privacy preserving} VC schemes whose executions reveal no information on the client's input or function to the server. We construct VC schemes with {\em input privacy} for univariate polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication and then extend them such that the {\em function privacy} is also achieved. Our tool is the recently developed {mutilinear maps}. The proposed VC schemes can be used in outsourcing {private information retrieval (PIR)}.Comment: 23 pages, A preliminary version appears in the 12th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2013