A Short Note on the Infinite Decision Puzzle

This work draws on the Supertask literature1 in order to better understand the conceptual and physical possibility of an infinite decision puzzle presented by Barrett and Arntzenius (1999, 2002). The first section presents the puzzle and two possible objections documented in the literature. The next section argues that cardinality and tracking considerations play a key role in understanding the puzzle. The work concludes with a discussion about some implications for the decision theory.supertask infinite decision puzzle

Political Uncertainty and the Peso Problem

This paper analyses the relation between political uncertainty and the Peso Problem in emerging markets. Initially, it is assumed that the country has a hard peg system (the present government will never devalue). As for the political opposition, however, it is open to the possibility of leaving the fixed regime when it comes to power. Assuming that the change of government follows a Poisson distribution, our model shows that the expectations of a devaluation under the subsequent new government may drive up country risk premium under the first government. Sovereign spreads in Argentina in 2001 are used to illustrate the argument.Peso problem;political uncertainty

Mercado de carbono internacional: Introducción al diseño experimental

El mercado de carbono internacional se ha ido desarrollado en el transcurso de los últimos años y se ha observado que requiere de lineamientos propios de diseño. Ciertos defensores a ultranza del mercado, sostienen que éste permite la iniciativa privada, regula la escasez de recursos y logra mediante innovaciones satisfacer las necesidades de la sociedad en el largo plazo. Pero este planteo no aborda una cuestión fundamental: ¿Qué tipo de mercados se deben diseñar y cuál debería ser su organización socio-técnica? (Callon 1998, 2009). Este trabajo se propone describir ciertos lineamientos del diseño de nuevos mercados y su aplicación al mercado de carbono internacional. Asimismo se analiza el rol de las instituciones, de los agentes y su impacto en la sociedad. Las experiencias de diseño de mercados concretos en los últimos años han demostrado que las operaciones y las instituciones son más importantes que lo que anteriormente se suponía (Roth 2008). Como consecuencia, se ha ido reemplazando la tarea tradicional del análisis estilizado de los mercados por el desafío de diseñar los mismos desde una aproximación interdisciplinaria. En la década de los ‘90, la teoría de juegos comenzó a ocupar un papel muy importante en el diseño del mercado, dando lugar a una nueva disciplina que Alvin Roth (2002) propuso denominar “design economics”. Si bien la teoría de juegos proporciona un contexto desde el cual abordar el diseño, es fundamental incorporarle la necesidad de detalle requerida por los mercados concretos. El diseño del mercado exige un enfoque ingenieril que complemente la teoría de juegos con experimentos y la resolución de modelos computacionales (Roth 2002). El resultado del trabajo es una descripción inicial de los lineamientos del diseño del mercado de carbono internacional que incluye el rol de las instituciones, de los agentes y su impacto en la sociedad; dicha descripción puede servir como referencia para el mercado que se está desarrollando.The international carbon market has been developed over recent years and has been noted that requires its own design guidelines. Certain market zealots argue that it allows private initiative, regulates the scarcity of resources and innovations achieved by meeting the needs of society in the long run. But this pose does not address a fundamental question: What kind of markets should be designed and what should be its sociotechnical organization? (Callon 1998, 2009). This paper intends to describe certain design guidelines for new markets and its application to the international carbon market. It also examines the role of institutions, agents, and their impact on society. The experiences of designing specific markets in recent years have shown that the operations and institutions are more important than previously assumed (Roth 2008). As a result, the task has been replacing traditional stylized market analysis by the challenge of designing them from an interdisciplinary approach. In the early '90s, game theory began to occupy an important role in the design of the market, leading to a new discipline that Alvin Roth (2002) proposed to call "design economics". While game theory provides a context from which to approach the design, it is essential to incorporate the need detail required for specific markets. The market design requires an engineering approach to complement game theory with experiments and computational model resolution (Roth 2002). The result of this study is an initial description of the design guidelines of international carbon market including the role of institutions, agents and their impact on society, such a description can serve as a reference for the market that is developing.Fil: Garcia Fronti, Javier Ignacio. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Cs.económicas. Cent D/inv de Met Cuant Aplicados A Econ. y Gest; ArgentinaFil: Garcia Fronti, Ines Mercedes. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Cs.económicas. Cent D/inv de Met Cuant Aplicados A Econ. y Gest; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires; Argentin

A Short Note on the Infinite Decision Puzzle

This work draws on the Supertask literature1 in order to better understand the conceptual and physical possibility of an infinite decision puzzle presented by Barrett and Arntzenius (1999, 2002). The first section presents the puzzle and two possible objections documented in the literature. The next section argues that cardinality and tracking considerations play a key role in understanding the puzzle. The work concludes with a discussion about some implications for the decision theory

Diseño y constitución de mercados nanotecnológicos

The dynamic nano is a new market where different actors interact: the technoscientific practice, the government, the investors and the users. This work use the literature on market design to analyse the specific market of “nanocarriers”

Diseño y constitución de mercados nanotecnológicos

The dynamic nano is a new market where different actors interact: the technoscientific practice, the government, the investors and the users. This work use the literature on market design to analyse the specific market of “nanocarriers”

Modelo estocástico para la valuación de una inversión nanomédica.

This paper develops a model of valuation of investment projects which includes nano-medical scientific and industrial dynamics, and its regulation. First critically analyzes the literature on valuation of investments, arguing that the methodology of real options is the most appropriate. It is a model that overcomes the major limitations of valuation tools of traditional investment projects and reflects the complexity of the economics involved

A Short Note on the Infinite Decision Puzzle

This work draws on the Supertask literature1 in order to better understand the conceptual and physical possibility of an infinite decision puzzle presented by Barrett and Arntzenius (1999, 2002). The first section presents the puzzle and two possible objections documented in the literature. The next section argues that cardinality and tracking considerations play a key role in understanding the puzzle. The work concludes with a discussion about some implications for the decision theory

Project Valuation Using fuzzy Real Options

This paper is an example of project valuation using fuzzy real options methodology. It is based on the previous work by Carlsson y Fullér (2000).fuzzy real options

Political Uncertainty and the Peso Problem

This paper analyses the relation between political uncertainty and the Peso Problem in emerging markets. Initially, it is assumed that the country has a hard peg system (the present government will never devalue). As for the political opposition, however, it is open to the possibility of leaving the fixed regime when it comes to power. Assuming that the change of government follows a Poisson distribution, our model shows that the expectations of a devaluation under the subsequent new government may drive up country risk premium under the first government. Sovereign spreads in Argentina in 2001 are used to illustrate the argument