A note on selecting maximals in finite spaces

Given a choice problem, the maximization rule may select many alternatives. In such cases, it is common practice to interpret that the final choice will end up being made by some random procedure, assigning to any maximal alternative the same probability of being chosen. However, there may be reasons based on the same original preferences for which it is suitable to select certain maximal alternatives over others. This paper introduces two choice criteria induced by the original preferences such that maximizing with respect to each of them may give a finer selection of alternatives than maximizing with respect to the original preferences. Those criteria are built by means of several preference relations induced by the original preferences, namely, two (weak) dominance relations, two indirect preference relations and the dominance relations defined with the help of those indirect preferences. It is remarkable that as the original preferences approach being complete and transitive, those criteria become both simpler and closer to such preferences. In particular, they coincide with the original preferences when these are complete and transitive, in which case they provide the same solution as those preference

Building and Using Models as Examples

Sometimes, theoreticians explicitly state that they consider their models as examples. When this is not the case, it is fairly common for theoreticians to attribute to their models the characteristics and objectives of illustrative examples. However, this way of understanding models has not received enough attention in the methodological literature focused on economics. Given that didactic examples and their properties are extremely familiar in practice, considering theoretical models as examples can offer a useful perspective on models and their properties. On the basis of both explanatory and exemplifying role played by the deductive arguments by which results are proved, the paper emphasizes also the importance of understanding in theoretical work, the analogical and tentative character of the application of models, the central role played by the above mentioned arguments in such application, the didactic function of theory, and the transmision of plausibility from those arguments to the results obtained.models; examples; explanatory arguments; theoretical understanding; analogical application

A non-proposition-wise variant of majority voting for aggregating judgments

Majority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue by issue, and satisfies a salient property of JA rules—independence. This paper introduces a variant of majority voting called holistic majority voting (HMV). This new variant also meets the condition of independence. However, instead of aggregating judgments issue by issue, it aggregates individual judgments en bloc. A salient and straightforward feature of HMV is that it guarantees the logical consistency of the propositions expressing collective judgments, provided that the individual points of view are consistent. This feature contrasts with the known inability of PMV to guarantee the consistency of the collective outcome. Analogously, while PMV may present a set of judgments that have been rejected by everyone in the group as collectively accepted, the collective judgments returned by HMV have been accepted by a majority of individuals in the group and, therefore, rejected by a minority of them at most. In addition, HMV satisfies a large set of appealing properties, as PMV also does. However, HMV may not return any complete proposition expressing the judgments of the group on all the issues at stake, even in cases where PMV does. Moreover, demanding completeness from HMV leads to impossibility results similar to the known impossibilities on PMV and on proposition-wise JA rules in genera

A pooling approach to judgment aggregation

The literature has focused on a particular way of aggregating judgments: Given a set of yes or no questions or issues, the individuals’ judgments are then aggregated separately, issue by issue. Applied in this way, the majority method does not guarantee the logical consistency of the set of judgments obtained. This fact has been the focus of critiques of the majority method and similar procedures. This paper focuses on another way of aggregating judgments. The main difference is that aggregation is made en bloc on all the issues at stake. The main consequence is that the majority method applied in this way does always guarantee the logical consistency of the collective judgments. Since it satisfies a large set of attractive properties, it should provide the basis for more positive assessment if applied using the proposed pooling approach than if used separately. The paper extends the analysis to the pooling supermajority and plurality rules, with similar result

Protection of traditional knowledge from an economics perspective

El artículo se centra en la propuesta de protección de los conocimientos tradicionales (CCTT) plasmada en los documentos elaborados por la secretaría del Comité Intergubernamental sobre Propiedad Intelectual y Recursos Genéticos, Conocimientos Tradicionales y Folclore, de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual. En un primer momento, se destacan los rasgos de esa propuesta de protección que pueden resultar más determinantes desde el punto de vista económico. En segundo lugar, se analiza cómo pueden desarrollarse los distintos tipos de intercambios bajo esa protección. Respecto de los intercambios en los que la transferencia de conocimientos desempeña un papel destacado, el artículo subraya los problemas de asimetrías informativas que pueden operar en contra de los intereses de las comunidades. De donde se desprende que puede ser muy conveniente por lo general que las comunidades cuenten con algún apoyo externo, preferentemente público. Respecto de los intercambios de productos derivados de los CCTT se argumenta que otras medidas de desarrollo más directas que la protección pueden ser más efectivas. Y se subraya la ayuda que los signos distintivos como las marcas colectivas, las denominaciones de origen protegidas y las indicaciones geográficas protegidas pueden prestar. En una sección posterior, se compara, contraponiéndolas, la orientación y justificación de la protección propuesta en la documentación mencionada con la visión que la Economía del Bienestar ofrece de la propiedad intelectual e industrial. El artículo finaliza sugiriendo que, no obstante lo anterior, el proceso de internacionalización del sistema de la propiedad intelectual e industrial puede justificar, por razones de reciprocidad, medidas o sistemas de protección de los CCTTThis article focuses on the proposal of the protection of traditional knowledge expressed in documents prepared by the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. Firstly, the characteristics of this protection proposal that could result in more determining factors from an economics point of view are highlighted. Secondly, an analysis is made of how the different types of exchanges covered by this protection may be developed. As regards the exchanges in which the transfer of knowledge plays an important role, the article underlines the problems of informational asymmetry that can work against the interests of the community. From where it emerges that it may be generally more advisable that the communities have some external, preferably public, support. As regards exchanges of products arising from traditional knowledge, it is argued that the protection may be more effective by other more direct means. The help of distinctive signs, such as collective marks, is underlined, as well as protected denominations of origin, and protected geographic indications that may be used. In a later section, a comparison is made by contrasting the orientation and justification of the protection proposal in the previously mentioned documents with the justifi cation that Welfare Economics offers to intellectual and industrial property. The article ends by suggesting that, notwithstanding the aforementioned, the internationalisation process of the intellectual and industrial property may justify, for reasons of reciprocity, measures or protection of traditional knowledgeEste trabajo ha sido realizado en el marco del proyecto FONCICYT 95255, titulado ‘Conservación, desarrollo, aprovechamiento social y protección de los conocimientos y recursos tradicionales en Méxic

“Aggregating judgments by the majority method”

“Judgement aggregation has been receiving increasing attention over recent years. Some typical impossibility results have been proved, about majority and other similar aggregation methods. Those results depend essentially on certain logical constraints borrowed from standard two- valued deductive logic. Nevertheless, the adequacy of these constraints is doubtful. In this paper, we show that by weakening the consistency conditions in a plausible way, such impossibility theorems can be reversed. We also show that the formalism habitually employed in social choice theory may convey a richer setting for analysing this sort of aggregation.”Judgement aggregation; majority method; logical constraints on judgment aggregation; discursive dilemma

Afirmaciones teóricas y modelos económicos

El artículo tiene tres partes. La primera se dedica a las razones esgrimidas por Daniel Hausman para defender la tesis de que los modelos teóricos no constituyen afirmaciones sobre el mundo y que, en consecuencia, no deben ser evaluados por su verdad o su falsedad. Se argumenta que para mantener la postura de Hausman pueden emplearse medios más sencillos que los que él utiliza, medios que son, además, mucho más cercanos al uso del término "modelo" en la práctica científica en Economía. ¿Cuáles son entonces las afirmaciones que se pretende hacer al trabajar con un modelo? La segunda parte pretende responder esta pregunta, subrayando que las afirmaciones buscadas en un ejercicio teórico son los teoremas que se obtienen en él, una vez interpretados, teoremas que presentan habitualmente la forma de proposiciones condicionales formalmente válidas. El artículo temina con unos comentarios acerca del problema de la evaluación de los conceptos de racionalidad y de equilibrio, sosteniéndose que no deberían ser considerados exclusivamente como hipótesis de comportamiento.The present essay is divided in three parts. The first one is devoted to the reasons why Daniel Hausman mantains that (theoretical) models assert nothing about the world and that they should not be assessed in terms of beeing true or false. This essay aims to show that in order to sustain Hausman's position, one can use means simpler than those that he employs and much closer to the ordinary usage of the term •model· in scientific economic practice. Which are; then, the intended claims or assertions when working with a model? The second part tries to answer chis question, pointing ouc that the assertions sought in a theoretical exercise are the (interpreted) theorems obtained, that usually take the form of formally valid conditional propos1tions. The paper concludes with sorne comments on the assessment problem of rationality and equilibrium notions, which should not be regarded only as behavioral hypotheses

¿Son compatibles los ideales científicos con los intereses personales? Una aplicación de la teoría de juegos

Is the reward system efficient to achieve that scientists take the research decisions that contribute most to the epistemic growth of their discipline? This paper approaches this question with regard to a wide class of games. By means of some very simple examples, it shows how easily it may happen that incentives get distorted, even if all members of the scientific community share a common epistemic point of view, every obtained result is published, there are not redundant results, contributions are evaluated by direct inspection, and scientists are rewarded according to their relative performance.