Rapid internationalization and long-term performance: The knowledge link

Drawing on the knowledge-based view and organizational learning theory, we develop and test a set of hypotheses to provide a first attempt at analyzing the effect of speed of internationalization on long-term performance. Using a panel-data sample of Spanish listed firms (1986-2010), we find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between speed of internationalization and long-term performance. We also find that whereas technological knowledge steepens this relationship, the diversity of prior international experience flattens it. Our results contribute to the existing IB literature on the performance of FDI, cross-country knowledge transferability, and nonsequential entry

Unemployment duration among immigrants and natives: unobserved heterogeneity in a multi-spell duration model

This paper studies whether the unemployment dynamics of immigrants differ from those of natives, paying special attention to the impact of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. Using a large administrative data set for Spain, we estimate multiple-spell discrete duration models which disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from duration dependence. Specifically, we estimate random effects models assuming that the distribution of the effects is discrete with finite support, and fixed effects models in which the distribution of the unobserved effects is left unrestricted. Our results show the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and that mistaken policy implications can be derived due to improper treatment of unmeasured variables. We find that lack of control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to the conclusion that immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemployment than natives and that the negative effect of unemployment benefits for immigrants lasts longer than for natives. Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for unobserved heterogeneity show the opposite results

Characterization of reward functions in networks with costs

In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities for cooperation are restricted and can not be described by a cooperative game. The benefits of a group of players depend on how these players are internally connected. One way to represent this type of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the profits obtainable by the total coalition if links can be used to coordinate agents' actions. The starting point of this paper is the work of Vilaseca et al. where they characterized the reward function. We concentrate on those situations where there exist costs for establishing communication links. Given a reward function and a costs function, our aim is to analyze under what conditions it is possible to associate a cooperative game to it. We characterize the reward function in networks structures with costs for establishing links by means of two conditions, component permanence and component additivity. Finally, an economic application is developed to illustrate the main theoretical result.En aquest article s'estudien les estructures de xarxa en què les possibilitats de cooperació són restringides i no poden ser descrites mitjançant un joc cooperatiu. Els beneficis d'un grup de jugadors dependran de com aquests jugadors estan internament connectats. Una forma de representar aquest tipus de situacions és l'anomenada funció reward, que representa els beneficis obtinguts per la coalició total quan les connexions poden ser utilitzades per coordinar les accions dels agents. El punt de partida d'aquest article és el treball de Vilaseca et al. on es caracteritza la funció reward. Nosaltres ens centrem en aquelles situacions on hi ha costos per a l'establiment d'enllaços de comunicació. Donada una funció reward i una funció de costos, el nostre objectiu és analitzar sota quines condicions és possible associar un joc cooperatiu a la funció reward. Nosaltres caracteritzem la funció reward en estructures de xarxa amb costos per a l'establiment d'enllaços mitjançant dues condicions, la component permanència i la component additivitat. Finalment, es desenvolupa una aplicació econòmica per il·lustrar el resultat teòric principal.En este artículo se estudian las estructuras de red en la que las posibilidades de cooperación están restringidas y no pueden ser descritas por medio de un juego cooperativo. Los beneficios de un grupo de jugadores dependerán de cómo estos jugadores están internamente conectados. Una forma de representar este tipo de situaciones es la llamada función reward, que representa los beneficios obtenibles por la coalición total cuando los enlaces pueden ser utilizados para coordinar las acciones de los agentes. El punto de partida de este artículo es el trabajo de Vilaseca et al. donde se caracteriza la función reward. Nosotros nos centramos en aquellas situaciones donde existen costes para el establecimiento de enlaces de comunicación. Dada una función reward y una función de costes, nuestro objetivo es analizar bajo qué condiciones es posible asociar un juego cooperativo a la función reward. Nosotros caracterizamos la función reward en estructuras de red con costes para el establecimiento de enlaces por medio de dos condiciones, la componente permanencia y la componente aditividad. Por último, se desarrolla una aplicación económica para ilustrar el resultado teórico principal

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Multi-Spell Discrete Time Duration Models

This paper considers the estimation of discrete time duration models. We highlight the enhance identification opportunities embedded in multiple spell data to separately identify the effect of duration dependence and individual time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We consider two types of models: (i) random effects models specifying a mass point distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity; and (ii) fixed effects models in which the distribution of the effects is left unrestricted. The availability of multiple spell data allows us to consider this type of models, in the spirit of fixed effects discrete choice panel data models. We study the finite sample properties of different estimators for previous models by means of Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, as an empirical illustration, we estimate unemployment duration models using Spanish administrative data with information on the entire labor history of the individuals.Duration models; Discrete choice; Multiple spells; Unobserved heterogeneity; Unemployment.

Unemployment Duration among Immigrants and Natives: Unobserved Heterogeneity in a Multi-Spell Duration Model

This paper studies whether the unemployment dynamics of immigrants differ from those of natives, paying special attention to the impact of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. Using a large administrative data set for Spain, we estimate multiple-spell discrete duration models which disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from duration dependence. Specifically, we estimate random effects models assuming that the distribution of the effects is discrete with finite support, and fixed effects models in which the distribution of the unobserved effects is left unrestricted. Our results show the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and that mistaken policy implications can be derived due to improper treatment of unmeasured variables. We find that lack of control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to the conclusion that immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemployment than natives and that the negative effect of unemployment benefits for immigrants lasts longer than for natives. Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for unobserved heterogeneity show the opposite results.Duration models; Discrete choice; Multiple spells; Unobserved heterogeneity; Unemployment; Immigration.

Unobserved heterogeneity in multi-spell discrete time duration model

This paper considers the estimation of discrete time duration models. We highlight the enhance identification opportunities embedded in multiple spell data to separately identify the effect of duration dependence and individual time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.Duration models, Discrete choice, Multiple spells, Unobserved heterogeneity, Unemployment.

Unemployment duration among immigrants and natives: unobserved heterogeneity in a multi-spell duration model

This paper studies whether the unemployment dynamics of immigrants differ from those of natives, paying special attention to the impact of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. Using a large administrative data set for Spain, we estimate multiple-spell discrete duration models which disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from duration dependence. Specifically, we estimate random effects models assuming that the distribution of the effects is discrete with finite support, and fixed effects models in which the distribution of the unobserved effects is left unrestricted. Our results show the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and that mistaken policy implications can be derived due to improper treatment of unmeasured variables. We find that lack of control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to the conclusion that immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemployment than natives and that the negative effect of unemployment benefits for immigrants lasts longer than for natives. Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for unobserved heterogeneity show the opposite results.Duration models, Discrete choice, Multiple spells, Unobserved heterogeneity, Unemployment, Immigration

Salidas y llegadas: mujeres, movilidad y escritura de viajes. Introducción

This volume is part of the ATLAS research project (GRE18-14), funded by the Research and Development Office of the University of Alicante

Mauritania tras el golpe de Estado de agosto de 2008: continuidades y cambios

El proceso de democratización abierto en Mauritania tras el golpe de Estado de agosto de 2005 representó un cambio sustancial con respecto al régimen del anterior presidente Uld Taya. La valoración positiva de ese período de transición comenzó a quedar en entredicho tras la remodelación gubernamental de mayo de 2008. El golpe de Estado militar, perpetrado el 6 de agosto de 2008, plantea un escenario político en el que se pone fin a la vía democrática iniciada en 2007. El nomadismo político y la vertebración de los intereses a través de las tribus son algunas de las características que persisten en la vida política de Mauritania. En este ARI se analizan los principales cambios acontecidos en Mauritania desde el golpe de Estado de agosto de 2005, incluidas las implicaciones internas de las remodelaciones gubernamentales de mayo y junio de 2008. Asimismo, se estudian las causas del golpe de Estado del 6 de agosto de 2008, así como las primeras reacciones nacionales e internacionales. El período abierto tras el incruento golpe de Estado de 2005 supuso una transformación con respecto al régimen político instaurado por el anterior presidente, Maauiya Sid Ahmed Uld Taya. La victoria de Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdellahi en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales, celebradas en marzo de 2007, y el nombramiento del tercer candidato más votado, Zein Ould Zeidán, como primer ministro crearon muchas expectativas entre la población. Sin embargo, sólo había transcurrido poco más de un año cuando Ould Zeidán presentó su dimisión el 6 de mayo de 2008. El período de inestabilidad política parece haberse cerrado con el golpe de Estado del 6 de agosto de 2008, y con él se han desvanecido las esperanzas de consolidar un régimen democrático en Mauritania