Mutual Rescue: Disabled Animals and Their Caretakers

In this paper, we explore how caretakers experience living with disabled companion animals. Drawing on interviews, as well as narratives on websites and other support groups, we examine ways in which caretakers describe the lives of animals they live with, and their various disabilties. The animals were mostly dogs, plus a few cats, with a range of physical disabilities; almost all had been rehomed, often from places specializing in homing disabled animals. Three themes emerged from analysis of these texts: first, respondents drew heavily on the common narrative of disabled individuals as heroes, often noted in disability rights literature – while simultaneously drawing on, and challenging, ideas of disability as incapacity. The second theme was love and empathy. Several of our interviewees spoke of empathy being enhanced thro We discuss these caretakers\u27 stories of animal disability in relation to both studies of human-animal relationships, and to disability rights, as well as to ideas about what constitutes care. What these narratives emphasize is a particular sense of sharing and reciprocity, felt through the body, especially when caretakers spoke of their own ill-health. They saw disability – the animals\u27 or their own – not as limiting, but as enabling both to flourish within caring relationship

Empathy in Other Apes

A number of scholars have offered behavioral and physiological arguments in favor of the existence of empathy in other species (see Bekoff & Pierce 2009, Flack & de Waal 2000, Plutchik 1987). While the evidence is compelling, claims about empathy in nonhuman apes face two different challenges. The first challenge comes from a set of empirical findings that suggest great apes are not able to think about other’s beliefs. The argument here is based on a view that empathy is associated with folk psychological understanding of others’ mental states, or mindreading, and the existence of mindreading among the other apes is a matter of some dispute. The second worry comes from a host of recent experiments suggesting that nonhuman great ape communities lack certain social norms that we might expect empathic creatures to have, namely cooperation norms, norms of fairness, and punishment in response to violations of norms (especially third party punishment). If apes are empathetic, yet they do not use this capacity to help or punish, what is the role of empathy? We think that both these challenges can be answered by getting clearer about what empathy is and how it functions as well as considering the nature of empathic societies. We also believe that this analysis will clarify the relationship between being empathetic and being ethical

Veganism as an Aspiration

iven the violence, objectification, domination, commodification, and oppression inherent in industrialized food production, some conscientious consumers have adopted vegan practices. This chapter discusses two conceptions of veganism, lifestyle/identity veganism, VI, and veganism as a goal/aspiration, VA. It argues that due to conceptual and practical flaws with VI, conscientious consumers should adopt VA. It considers and rejects the so-called compassionate carnivore movement. It then explores arguments denying the casual efficacy of adopting any form of veganism. It concludes that VA can make a difference, and those in consumer cultures are obligated to adopt and practice it

Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson

Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics: A Conversation Against Speciesism

It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual\u27s species membership rather than on that animal\u27s individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual\u27s characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one\u27s understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans

The Ethical Limits of Domestication: A Critique of Henry Heffner’s Arguments

Henry E. Heffner argues that “animals bred for research are properly viewed as animals who have successfully invaded the laboratory niche, relying heavily on kin selection to perpetuate their genes.” (1999, p. 134). This view of human–animal interactions is the cornerstone of his defense of animal experimentation in two widely-distributed papers (Heffner 1999, 2001). We argue that Heffner’s defense lacks adequate attention to ethical distinctions and principles