Ohne Fleiß kein Preis? : Über Leistungsgerechtigkeit

»Ohne Fleiß kein Preis«, heißt es. Und der nachfolgende Beitrag wäre zumindest teilweise entbehrlich, wenn dieses Sprichwort uneingeschränkt stimmen würde. Aber auch wenn man die Redewendung beim Wort nimmt, bleibt Erklärungsbedarf: Für »Preis« kann man wohl ohne Weiteres Geld oder Einkommen einsetzen. Was aber meint »Fleiß« genau? Man kann auch durch Erbschaft, Spezialbegabungen oder pures Glück zu viel Geld kommen, ohne sich sonderlich anzustrengen. Und in einer freien Marktwirtschaft scheinen ohnehin vor allem Angebot und Nachfrage den Preis zu bestimmen. So direkt und gerecht scheint der Zusammenhang vom Fleiß zum Preis also nicht zu sein

Gerechtigkeit über Generationen – geht das? : Komplexer als es scheint – ein Blick in die politisch-philosophische Grundlagenforschung

Vielleicht gibt es irgendwann Wanderungsbewegungen in den Weltraum. Je später die zukünftigen Generationen leben, umso geringer ist unser Wissen um ihre Lebenssituation, ihre Möglichkeiten und ihre daran wohl angepassten Interessen. Die zentrale moralische Rücksicht auf die Interessen der Betroffenen bleibt also mit Bezug auf zukünftige Generationen wenn nicht unbestimmt, so doch unterbestimmt

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: a Critique

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, i.e., reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of the reasonable that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive and a duty of justification to meet RGA fails to be agent transparent. This negative result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I then suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires to downgrade RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have

Do público e do privado: uma perspectiva de género sobre uma dicotomia moderna

Neste texto propomos uma interpretação crítica da dicotomia histórica entre público e privado como dinâmica fundamental da modernidade. A partir de uma perspectiva de género, discutimos as fronteiras construídas entre espaço coletivo de cidadania e de sociabilidade e espaço individual de intimidade e desigualdade. Argumentamos a favor de uma relação de cumplicidade, ainda que tensa, entre as duas esferas, observando que a vida privada foi, em grande medida, moldada pelas mudanças operadas na vida pública. Recorrendo a diferentes definições de "público", notamos que, à medida que as sociabilidades tradicionais, essencialmente masculinas, estudadas entre outros por Ariès ou Sennett, sofriam uma erosão, crescia o sentimento de intimidade, aumentando igualmente a inclusão do privado no público através do alargamento da cidadania, em consequência das lutas travadas na esfera pública por vários movimentos de emancipação, como o operário ou o feminista. À medida que a pessoa era retirada da comunidade, do clã, do grupo de parentesco, em que eram "naturais" as desigualdades, no sentido aristotélico do termo, ia-se reencontrando progressivamente como indivíduo portador de cidadania. Se o espaço privado se tornou central na definição de uma identidade, ele é também crescentemente atravessado por mecanismos públicos de regulação. Nesse sentido, o movimento de ascensão do privado, que nas últimas décadas tem ocupado espaço de debate, deve ser cuidadosamente reinterpretado

Deprivation and Institutionally Based Duties to Aid

In order to at least begin addressing the extensive the problem of moral clarity in aiding the deprived to some degree, I first argue that the duty to aid the deprived is not merely a charitable one, dependent on the discretion, or the arbitrary will, of the giver (1). Then, before further analysing the individual duty to aid, I critically examine whether deprivation is better alleviated or remedied through the duties of corrective justice. I argue that the perspective of corrective justice is important, but not sufficient when it comes to dealing with deprivation (2). I then argue that non-domination cannot serve as a first-order principle of justice. It is too minimalistic, since it would not require duties of justice where deprivation exists, but dominating relations and institutions do not. (3). Going back to the individual duty to help, I argue that the duties to aid the needy must be assessed according to the situation at hand (4). In order to avoid meaninglessness and morality’s excessive demands, one should be able to identify the responsible agents by constructing a shared and, in the last resort, institution-based duty to help (5). The institutional approach in this paper argues that we should create and reform institutions in order to realize the pre-existing requirement to alleviate global deprivation. This is a form of “global political justice” that does not start with politics, but ends with global political institutions