How we are morally equal and how we ought to respect each other

The article is a critical discussion of Andrea Sangiovanni's book: "Humanity without dignity". The critical remarks are focused on two points of the first part of the book, namely the notion of the "integral sense of self" and the view of respect as opacity respect. In my view, the greatest good of the integral sense of self does not necessarily follow from the intolerability of social cruelty and of inferiorizing treatments. I do not see why the sense of self be cannot be the sense of one’s worth, hence of one’s dignity.Sangiovanni wants to avoid basing moral equality in a property, but I argue that despite his effeort the issue resurfaces and can be solved if we use the concept of range property. As for the conception of respect as opacity respect, itseems to me that distance and non-exposure cannot be the only dimensions of recognition-respect, especially concerning minorities, who are odten disrespected by being kept invisible

Rescuing Toleration

Toleration has been recently attacked both on practical and on theoretical grounds. On practical grounds, confronting religious terrorism, many commentators have asked whether toleration can remain the general policy toward cultural and religious diversity. Theoretically, toleration has been questioned as to its analytical capacity in the realm of partisan politics. This paper aims at countering such criticisms, by means of a conceptual clarification especially focused on the notion of intolerance, intolerable and response to intolerance. The controversial cases arising in contemporary democracy are usually focused on the limits of toleration, hence on the intolerable, by stretching the interpretation of the self-defense and of the harm principle. The author argues that the stretching is often excessive and the resulting interpretations too contentious to provide solid grounds for the intolerable. Alternatively, issues of toleration can be examined from the point of view of tolerance/intolerance. This viewpoint can clarify issues at the descriptive level, sorting out who was tolerant and who was intolerant and what was intolerable, while disagreement may persist at the normative level, according to the favored justification of toleration

Straight and Twisted Self-Deception

The paper analyzes the two types of self-deception, usually labeled straight and twisted self-deception. In straight cases the self-deceptive belief coincides with the subject\u2019s desire. In twisted cases, by contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject\u2019s desire as in the example of Othello\u2019s conviction of Desdemona\u2019s infidelity. Are both these contrasting types of deceptive beliefs cases of SD? The argument of this paper shall answer this question in the positive, yet in different way from the unitary explanation of straight and twisted SD proposed by Alfred Mele. The causal account of SD claims to provide a unitary and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary explanation as a specific virtue of the causal view. Within the same causal model, the difference between straight and twisted self-deception is explained by a difference in the motivational state that in twisted cases is dominated by emotions. The paper will critically examine this claim, and advance an alternative explanation based on a different view of self-deception where emotions play a role alongside wishes both in straight and in twisted case

A European issue of toleration: why purposer-built mosques are so contested.

The first section of this paper tries to demonstrate that the mosque conflict is a veritable issue of toleration within contemporary pluralism. This argument requires a preliminary reassessment of the theory of toleration concerning: (a) the reassessment of the private/public divide as a useful boundary for toleration; (b) the intersection of the horizontal and the vertical notions of toleration, namely the social attitude and the political dimension; (c) the politicization of cultural issues by the democratic process, which tends to transform the cultural dialectic between majority and minority into a political one. In the case of mosques, the author argues that the problematic difference engendering the conflict is not the Muslim religion per se, nor its practices of worship which are allegedly incompatible, offensive and unacceptable by democratic society. It is rather that the Muslim religion provides a unifying label to group together many immigrant communities whose growing number and presence are perceived as threatening the orderly stability of the social standards of the cultural majority. This argument is pursued through the analysis of some comparable European cases concerning mosque building. Showing that resistance to mosques, as well as to other Muslim practices and customs, is not produced by a clash of civilization will help to fight the thesis of \u201cIslamic exceptionalism\u201d, meaning the specific difficulty tied to the reception of Islam and its manifestations in European countries

The Attribution of Responsibility to Self-Deceivers

This paper analyzes the moral implications of self-deception with reference to the issue of responsibility. favoring an intentional, though partly unconscious, account usually have no problem attributing responsibility to the agent for his irrationality and weakness of character. The special pressure which the agent is under and the non-wholly conscious nature of self-deception may occasionally call for extenuating circumstances in the assignment of blame. The issue of responsibility instead arises in the context of a non-intentional account, where the agent has no control over the production of self-deceptive beliefs. In that case it is not clear whether there is any agent involved, hence whether there is anyone to attach responsibility to. In general, supporters of the causal view solve the problem by singling out a moment in the self-deception process when the agent can be in control, and consequently responsibility can be attributed. An alternative way to the attribution of responsibility is adopted in this paper, by reference to a view of responsibility not focused on control as the key condition. Following this different view of responsibility, the author argues that it applies to cases of self-deception. The paper concludes by examining the possibility of prevention of self-deception by indirect strategies

Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy

The paper investigates whether analytic philosophers who are not native English speaking are subject to linguistic injustice, and in case what kind of injustice that is and whether it is different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a wolrd where English is rapidly becoming the lingua franca

La difficile convivenza di verit\ue0 e inganno

L'articolo discute il saggio principale del numero sui diritti aletici e sostiene che seppure la preoccupazione per la verit\ue0 nel foro pubblico sia importante, la richiesta di specifici diritti relativi alla verit\ue0 \ue8 ridondante o difficilmente implementabile

Straight and Twisted Self-Deception

The paper analyzes the two types of self-deception, usually labeled straight and twisted self-deception. In straight cases the self-deceptive belief coincides with the subject’s desire. In twisted cases, by contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desire as in the example of Othello’s conviction of Desdemona’s infidelity. Are both these contrasting types of deceptive beliefs cases of SD? The argument of this paper shall answer this question in the positive, yet in different way from the unitary explanation of straight and twisted SD proposed by Alfred Mele. The causal account of SD claims to provide a unitary and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary explanation as a specific virtue of the causal view. Within the same causal model, the difference between straight and twisted self-deception is explained by a difference in the motivational state that in twisted cases is dominated by emotions. The paper will critically examine this claim, and advance an alternative explanation based on a different view of self-deception where emotions play a role alongside wishes both in straight and in twisted case

Introduction: Democracy, Diversity

The article introduces a collection of essays which represents the final outcome of a research project (Urbanitas) carried out by the authors on the theme of cultural diversity and on the political response e to the tensions and conflicts produced by the encounter of so many differences in the same democratic space