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## Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy

*Francesco Chiesa and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti*

**Abstract:** This paper investigates whether analytic philosophers who are non-native English speakers are subject to linguistic injustice and, if yes, what kind of injustice that is and whether it is different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a world where English is rapidly becoming the *lingua franca*. The paper begins with a critical review of the debate on linguistic justice, with a particular focus on the emergence of a *lingua franca* and the related questions of justice, both in terms of the disadvantages suffered by those groups who bear the cost of learning another language and in terms of forms of discrimination due to accents and language improprieties. We argue that being at a relative disadvantage compared to others does not necessarily translate in a proper injustice if fundamental civil, political and social provisions are in place. We suggest that a circumstance of injustice arises when such disadvantage affects those who are not yet members of such academic community such as prospective students, thus contributing in keeping the non-native group a minority. We qualify this case of disadvantage as a matter of structural injustice.

This paper raises the two following questions: (1) Are analytic philosophers who are non-native English speakers subject to linguistic injustice? (2) If yes, what kind of injustice that is and is it different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a world where English is rapidly becoming the *lingua franca*?

In order to answer the two questions, a preliminary understanding of what is meant by linguistic justice is in order. In the first section of this paper, we shall review the debate on linguistic justice critically. Considering languages both as collective goods and as individual assets, injustice may lurk both in the process of collective good production, and in the disadvantage, in terms of opportunity and in terms of identity, suffered by individuals as members of a linguistic minority.

In the second section, we shall focus on the emergence of a global *lingua franca* and the related questions of justice. First the emergence of a dominant

language in a territory or in a specific area of interaction will be explained in terms of a coordination equilibrium, where the common interest for communication is served by unequal costs of members of the community. This consideration may impact on the disadvantages suffered by those groups who bear the cost of learning another language. Whether or not such disadvantage can be considered injustice depends on which conception of justice is picked. Subscribing to a conception of justice as fairness, communicative disadvantages can be considered matters of justice. Yet, when a *lingua franca* prevails in a specific area, speakers of minority languages suffer other kinds of disadvantages too, for they may become subject to forms of discrimination due to their strange accents and language improprieties. Such discrimination may not only be explicit and direct, but also grounded on implicit biases. As a result, non-native speakers are burdened not only with the cost of learning another language, but also with negative attitudes of disrespect for their imperfect mastering of the dominant language.

In the third section, the analysis of linguistic injustice previously developed will apply to the area of analytic philosophy. Within this area, the non-native speakers of English are uncontroversially at a disadvantage, yet in a way similar to all other areas of social, political and economic interaction. The point under discussion is rather whether analytic philosophy constitutes a domain of a specific and thematic injustice for non-native English speakers. We do not investigate the empirical dimension of the phenomenon; we rather ask whether there are reasons why analytic philosophy is different from other comparable academic areas and such that it induces a specific kind of injustice in the case of non-native English speakers. Standardly, we think of justice as what we owe to each other and of injustice as the failure to give others their due. More precisely, we think of justice as characterizing the coercively regulated relations between the holders of certain rights and the bearers of the corresponding duties so that injustice implies that someone is not given what she is entitled to claim against others. So, within this justice framework, the question would be: what citizens' rights exactly are violated by the kind of linguistic disadvantage that comes with being a non-native English speaker in analytic philosophy?

The issue will be faced both from the viewpoint of the disadvantage of becoming fluent in another language and of being subject of (direct or implicit) discrimination due to an imperfect use of English and of accents. The argument will conclude that, generally speaking, we do not have reasons to think that analytic philosophy is different from other academic disciplines insofar as scholars have to become fluent in the *lingua franca*. We shall argue that being at a relative disadvantage compared to some others does not necessarily entail having been *wronged* in a way that is relevant to justice and in a way that, thus, requires the implementation of enforceable institutional remedial measures. Yet, within philosophy, non-native English speaking analytic philosophers are slightly more disadvantaged compared with non-native English speaking continental philosophers, since the former constitute a minority and may suffer from prestige bias besides linguistic bias. In particular, we shall argue that such unfavorable biases may discourage young people to access this discipline, contributing in keeping the non-native group a minority. We shall conclude that this specific case can be characterized as a matter of structural injustice. Such injustice is structural because it is not easily directly attributable to specific individuals but to structural political, social and ideological conditions. There is no simple breach of perfect obligations but the disadvantage is rooted in more systematic (structural) reasons. We do not envisage direct actions of remedial justice, yet we believe that acknowledging the problem may contribute to its solution in perspective, and we also propose some minor adjustments in research policy at the European or national level which may help to reduce the gap between native and non-native speakers in the analytic philosophy community.

### **1. Linguistic Rights and Linguistic Justice**

The research on language policy has expanded to normative issues in the last two decades. The normative turn on language studies is related to three different phenomena: (a) the unprecedented immigration waves across countries from East to West, and from South to North, (b) the

demands for autonomy of national minorities within democratic states, and (c) the increasing affirmation of English as the global *lingua franca* (Riera Gil 2016). The first two phenomena, namely immigration and the demands of national minorities, have led political theorists to consider linguistic differences just like other cultural differences, deserving to be protected by linguistic rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003). The expansion of English as the global *lingua franca* in many economic, social and cultural areas is instead at the origin of the reflection on linguistic justice. The two discussions are connected and in many respects overlapping, yet their focus is somewhat different.

The claim for linguistic rights is grounded on the crucial interest of being able to speak and use one's own language and on a specific fact about language. Language is in a unique relation with the state, considering that language cannot be politically disestablished as religion can, for example. Consequently, state neutrality cannot be invoked as a policy with reference to linguistic minorities, since which language or languages are officially used in public offices, services and education cannot simply be left to individual preferences. Once a language becomes the official language of the area, only the linguistic majority has the crucial interest of speaking one's own language protected. So linguistic rights are meant to reverse the unfair asymmetry between majority and minorities. Yet, which kind of rights are language rights? Do they pertain to individuals or to collectives? Are they personality rights or rather territorially located? (Léger and Lewis 2016).

The discussion on linguistic rights and on the protection of linguistic minorities is well summarized in the recent study by Elvira Riera Gil (2016) which provides a very useful topography of the issue, organized along three dichotomies, namely (a) universality/particularity; (b) individual/collective; (c) communication/identity. The first dichotomy relates to the dimension of language divided between its being a universal human capacity and its being necessarily practiced 'in the vernacular'. The second concerns the fact that language is an individual skill and a means for individual autonomy and flourishing, but it is also a public good. The third dichotomy relates to the two functions of language: as a means of

communication, and as a marker of identity. The communication function stresses the instrumental value of language; by contrast, the identity function stresses its intrinsic or constitutive value. The scholars who privilege the communication function generally adopt an instrumentalist approach to language issues focused on a cost-benefit analysis of alternative policies (De Schutter 2008). Those who stress the identity function generally view language as a fundamental, constitutive human interest and adopt a right-based view on language policies (Reaume and Pinto 2012).

The three dichotomies intersect with different ontological conceptions of spatial language distribution. Some view languages in a *transparent* relation with a demos and a territory, and consequently hold a *monist* position with regard to the territorial dominance of a language, emerged out of an assimilation process driven by the interest of easing communication. This view is represented by the Language Territoriality Principle (LTP), namely by the principle affirming that any given territory, corresponding to a state or to a region, must have an official language organizing the public life and the institutions of the territory (Van Parijs 2011). The monist position is criticized as being a reflection of an outdated Westphalian view of the world, the one endorsed and pursued by nation-states, which is said to be utterly out of tune with the reality of multicultural society in a globalized world (De Schutter 2008). The alternative is instead the pluralist view, according to which if there are more languages spoken in a territory, the convergence to a single language cannot be achieved without injustice and oppression. Henceforth, linguistic rights should be attributed to individual speakers who bring them along with them in their daily social intercourse. The pluralist view implies the endorsement of the Linguistic Personality Principle (LPP), respectful of the choices and preferences of individuals (De Schutter 2008; Patten 2014; Riera Gil 2016). According to the LPP, individuals bring along their language skills and preferences through regions and territories, while institutions ought to be organized on a bilingual or multilingual basis. Just in passing, the LPP principle, which is claimed to be an alternative to the Westphalian view of the world, is in reality strictly linked to nation-states. Only within a territorially

defined political unit can in fact institutions be organized on a bilingual or multilingual base, so as to let citizens free to use their favored language wherever and yet within the borders of that state. If the objection to the territoriality principle to be strictly dependent on a dated nation-state view of the world holds for the personality principle as well, then the territoriality principle has the advantage of being far more feasible and also fairer, as it will become apparent in the next paragraph, discussing linguistic justice.

As we shall see, the discussion of linguistic justice is much more relevant for the topic of this paper than the discussion on linguistic rights. The expression 'linguistic justice' is mainly linked to the work of Philippe Van Parijs (2003, 2011), whose primary focus is the expansion of English as the global *lingua franca* and the effect that such a phenomenon has on global justice: if the availability of a *lingua franca* is likely to be an advantage for many in the long run; in the short run, the process of its affirmation bears a clear burden for those people who are not English native speakers. Language matters for justice in two respects: first because sharing a language is a public good, and the unfair distribution of its costs and benefits is a matter of distributive injustice. Second, languages provide individuals with opportunities in terms of social life, jobs, political participation and access to services, but such opportunities are not equal if one does not speak the dominant language of a certain place or of a certain professional domain. Besides, such distributive disadvantages usually go hand in hand with forms of misrecognition and disrespect for less than proficient speakers, which may induce discrimination, and hence further disadvantages.

The growing affirmation of English as the global *lingua franca* overcomes a complex situation of multilingual societies due either to the presence of traditional national minorities or to a new linguistic diversity resulting from migrations and people's movements, or both. Van Parijs explains the rise and rapid diffusion of English as a *lingua franca* in the background of globalization, as the joint result of two micro-mechanisms, namely the probability-driven learning and the maxi-min dynamics. Briefly, the probability-driven learning is the tendency of individuals to learn languages which have more probability of being used. Maxi-min dynamics is instead

people's tendency in multilingual contexts to use the language more generally known in that context, even if it is not the language they are most proficient in. These two mechanisms reinforce each other, and tend to favor one language as the medium of communication in a multilingual context. Van Parijs does not deny that other causes are at work in the emergence of a *lingua franca*, such as colonialism, economic forces and political factors, but such general factors operate through these micro-mechanisms. His explanation of how a given language becomes a *lingua franca* shows also that the emergence of a *lingua franca* corresponds to a principle of rationality, and it is therefore a process to be welcomed in general. To have a common language is indeed a public good, for it enlarges the possibility of cooperation in a wider community. The problem, however, is that while it is a general advantage to have a common medium of communication, (a) the costs of its production are unequally shared, (b) the opportunities linked to linguistic competence are unequally distributed, (c) the respect between linguistically defined identities is unequal. Linguistic justice, he says, requires fair terms of cooperation in the production of a shared language, which is instead entirely carried by non-English speakers. Moreover, it requires the equalization of opportunities linked to linguistic competence while at present English speakers have an advantage concerning job competition in an increasingly global market. Finally, the unfair primacy given to *lingua franca* compared to national or local languages ought to be addressed for it impacts on equal respect of all speakers.

The measures Van Parijs suggests to remedy the linguistic injustice concerning the rising of *lingua franca* look rather meager compared to the complexity of his analysis. Yet, this is mainly due to the global perspective of Van Parijs' study, and to the lack of an institutional structure for taxing unfair benefits at the international level. The more English spreads, the less is the burden to learn it and to practice it, hence reducing the unfairness in the cooperation. Van Parijs relies on spontaneous processes more than on active policies, partly for lack of realistic alternatives, and partly for he is confident that the process is speeding up and sufficient resources to counter the unfair burden have become available in the long run. There is, however, an



aspect where he assumes a more proactive position, and that concerns the third kind of injustice above mentioned, i.e. the unjust precedence of English over national language impacting on the equal respect, or as he says, on the parity of esteem of speakers. In order to defend the identity dimension of language and the equality of respect which each speaker deserves, Van Parijs supports the principle of linguistic territoriality, where one language is the institutional language for schools, governments, services in that state or region. The adoption of this principle is justified by: (a) the pragmatic consideration that state and public institutions cannot be neutral toward language and that a political decision must be made about which language regime to adopt in public communication and education; (b) the principled consideration that LTP is the best way to advocate the parity of esteem between non-dominant languages and dominant languages (or *lingua franca*). If a language is made to be the ‘queen of a territory’, there is no risk that the mechanisms of probability driven learning and maxi-min dynamics will take over the local language, while the risk is present if the personality principle is instead adopted. We must stress that the defense of national or local languages, by the LTP, is meant as a defense of the rights of individual speakers, rather than of the collective right of each language and community to have a fair chance of survival. As mentioned above, the territoriality principle is amply criticized by the supporters of the alternative personality principle (De Shutter 2008; Patten 2014; De Shutter and Robichaud 2015; Carey 2016). The main criticism of the LTP is based on the consideration that no language convergence in a territory obtains without oppression and dominance. Van Parijs, however, has explained that the convergence can be spontaneously produced through two mechanisms operating at the individual level. In a bilingual society, these two mechanisms will tend to promote the language of the majority, thus pushing the minority language out of use after a certain period of time. This hypothesis seems to find confirmation in a work studying language regimes by a game-theoretical approach (Laitin 1993), whose analysis shows that the language survival, against socio-economic odds, depends on specific efforts sustained by coercive means. In conclusion,

that the territoriality principle is the best defense of a language against the two spontaneous mechanisms which will be operative in a linguistic regime ruled by the personality principle seems to be the stronger argument here. Yet, such principle, aiming at parity of esteem among speakers of different languages, in a way counteracts the spreading of the *lingua franca*, contributing to the persistence of unequal opportunities in specific areas, such as academia, between native and non-native speakers of English.

To sum up: questions of justice, with reference to language, lie in: (a) the unequal costs borne by different agents in the production of the public good of a common language; (b) the unequal opportunities of native and non-native speakers of a *lingua franca*; (c) the unequal respect linked to the imperfect and accented use of the *lingua franca*.

## **2. *Lingua Franca* as a Coordination Game and Biases Connected to Its Imperfect Use**

In order to understand what the injustice in the spreading of a *lingua franca* is, we must firstly focus on the mechanisms at work in its *production*. We have mentioned the two micro-mechanisms: the probability drive of language learning and the maxi-min dynamics in the choice of the medium of communication used among speakers of different languages. Both mechanisms are triggered by the twin interest of maximizing one's opportunity and of expanding the communication in a given social domain. In a multilingual context, these mechanisms jointly work for a spontaneous convergence on a regional *lingua franca*. Following Laitin's (1993) suggestion, the convergence process may be represented as the solution of a coordination game, where each participant would prefer to use one's own language, but the paramount interest in communication leads the speakers in the less shared languages to be willing to learn another one, provided it will serve their communication purposes. Thus, their choice will favor the relatively most spoken language, hence enlarging the community of speakers in that language and its strength in that area. Moreover, for any communicative context, where participants have diverse linguistic skills, the most

widely spoken language will be used, even though many or even the majority of participants is not proficient in its usage. A coordination game is a mixed game, for the coordination interest trumps the interest in speaking one's language. Even if the different participants have opposed interests for picking language  $x$  over  $y$ , their potential conflict is overcome by the general preference for coordination. Being a coordination game, in principle any equilibrium of coordination will do, hence in principle any language can be picked to become the *lingua franca*, but the probability drive will orient individuals to learn the language that maximizes the probability of communication, that is the most widely spoken language in that place and in that time. Thus the public good of having a common language, which would in principle be satisfied by any of the languages spoken in that area or by an artificial language, will spontaneously be produced by the joint work of the two micro-mechanisms described above, favoring the most widely spoken language in the area. Given, however, that individuals have also contrasting interests concerning which language they would prefer to have as the common language, its establishment will cost differently, and the speakers of minority languages will bear the cost, while the speakers of the dominant language will share the common benefit at no cost whatsoever. Here is precisely where the question of justice arises, but it is not beyond controversy that the unequal cost of the public good production is a matter of justice. The convergence on this coordination equilibrium is in fact the spontaneous product of the free choices of individuals, and on a libertarian interpretation, no injustice has been committed, for none of the steps is due to any unjustified interference or coercion, and no individual right has been violated (Nozick 1974). In order to consider the disadvantage of having to learn another language as unjust, one has to adopt the principle of fairness saying that the benefits and the costs produced by social cooperation ought to be distributed fairly among participants and that is precisely what distributive justice consists in (Rawls 1999). In the Rawlsian perspective, subscribed by Van Parijs as well, the native speakers in the *lingua franca* are in fact free riding on the members who supported the costs of learning and have to use a language different from one's own which they

do not easily master as well as the native speakers. The possibility of a remedial justice lies in making the free-riders contribute to the benefits of the public good, through a tax which may fund the learning of the *lingua franca* by non-native speakers. However, this possibility is drastically curtailed if there is no common institutional framework capable of imposing taxes and distributing their revenues. If, for example, the native speakers of a *lingua franca* belong to different countries, it is very unlikely that any form of remedial justice may be devised.

The injustice derived from the unfair process of production of the *lingua franca* is not the only element of linguistic injustice to be remarked on. Having some competence in the *lingua franca* may serve the purpose of communication but it does not entail equal opportunities in the job market for language-related and also for language-unrelated jobs. We want here to stress the situation of the language-unrelated job market, for here is where forms of unjustified discrimination may be found. Language-related jobs, such as translators and interpreters, obviously require a proficiency in the *lingua franca*, and they certainly represent an unfair advantage for native speakers, but also a relatively circumscribed subset of the job market. The fact is that also for non-strictly language-related jobs, proficiency in the *lingua franca* represents a clear advantage which translates into unequal opportunities. And the unequal opportunity of access to language-unrelated jobs constitutes a much wider subset and thus a much wider concern for justice.

In the market of language-unrelated jobs, not only linguistic skills in the *lingua franca* matter, but also accents. There is in fact empirical research showing the impact of non-native accents (namely non-standard American-English or British-English) on the ways one is treated by others. Even if one is adequately competent in English, she may still be discriminated against because of her accent, and here the suspicion is that accent is more than a sign of language inadequacy, being associated to social class or different ethnicity too. For example, a study found that individuals are more likely to buy a product or a company when its advertising message is read in standard American-English than when the message is delivered

with a Mandarin Chinese or a French accent (Livingston, Schilpzand, and Erez 2017). Other studies showed how foreign-accented speech decreases positive affective valence of the speaker (Hatzidaki, Baus, and Costa 2015). Different levels of linguistic mastery and variation of accents can lead to biases resulting in the speaker's receiving more (say, Oxford English) or less (in case of working class or foreign accent) credibility, than she otherwise would have. This corresponds to what Miranda Fricker (2007: 17) has called 'credibility excess' and 'credibility deficit'. People endowed with social privilege give shape to what is considered the standard and exemplary use of language and accent. As a consequence, stereotypes, or what Virginia Valian (1998) calls 'schemas' and Cecilia Ridgeway (2011) calls 'frames', often unconsciously shape how people are perceived (Hundleby 2016). We acquire and learn schemas —non conscious shared hypothesis about different characteristics relative to languages, accents, professional roles, age, sex, race, social class and so on (Valian 2016). Through schemas we respond automatically to what we take to be a successful professional or a competent citizen. Being attuned to the prevailing 'schemas' means to be provided with habitual responses to certain stimuli, that affect social interaction and social judgments (Haslanger, 2012: 415).

Deviations from the standard speech norms can trigger unfavorable explicit and implicit biases towards speakers and writers perceived as non-native, while favorable biases are displayed towards those with the 'right' accent, respectively. Biases can cause us to have feelings, attitudes and behaviors about other people based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, appearance, language and accents. The bias is implicit whenever a stereotype, either favorable or unfavorable, about a certain group is automatically associated to members belonging to that group, and affects one's understanding, actions and decisions in a way that typically takes place below our introspective radar (Blair 2002; Rudman 2004; Beattie 2013). Implicit bias can be expressed into actual outward behaviors despite one being a genuine egalitarian (Nosek et al. 2007; Dasgupta 2013). Such biases tend to be learned from the social structures in which we live and, to some extent, track existing cultural stereotypes, ideologies, social

tendencies, and existing patterns of privilege and disadvantage (Saul 2013; Banaji and Greenwald 2013). These biases are different from explicit biases that individuals acknowledge, but may prefer to conceal due to social desirability purposes or to what they take to be prevailing political correctness norms. Empirical research shows how implicit bias influences behavior in a variety of subtle and troubling ways including, for example, CV selection for jobs applications: the same CV tends to be more successful when it has a typically white rather than a typically black name, or a typically male rather than a typically female name, and so on (Dovidio and Gaertner 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Krieger 1995; Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke 1999). Studies of the so-called ‘shooter bias’ show how implicit bias can influence visual recognition: the very same ambiguous object is more likely to be visually recognized as a gun if held by a black man and as something innocent (like a phone) if held by a white man (Unkelbach, Forgas, and Denson 2008; Correll, Urland, and Ito 2006). There is evidence that implicit biases affect the grading of student work (Bradley 1993); while prestige bias has been detected in the evaluations of submissions to academic journals (Peters and Ceci 1982).<sup>1</sup> Languages and accents, as we said, are not exempt from the potential discriminatory effects of such biases. The main difference in the case of languages and accents is that stereotypes in this area often go unnoticed because they are not generally perceived to be as problematic as racial, religious and gender prejudices, despite the evidence on the impact of non-native accents on employment opportunities, housing options, healthcare services and treatment in courts (Deprez-Sims and Morris 2013; Gluszek and Dovidio 2010; Bestmeyer, Belin, and Ladd 2015). Even though people with non-native

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<sup>1</sup> Among social psychologists there is some controversy over the literature on implicit bias, especially on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). On the degree to which IAT can be considered as a predictor of actual discriminatory behaviour see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003); Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009); Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005); Lane, Kang, and Banaji (2007); Oswald et al. (2015). We do not explore this methodological debate here. However, IAT is just one amongst a number of implicit measures which attempt to grasp individuals’ implicit associations and many studies such as those recalled in the text do not rely on such test.

accents tend to be considered as less competent, intelligent, loyal and of lower status (Matsuda 1991), language-related discrimination has not received the same degree of attention and has not been publicly declared unacceptable in the same way as race and gender discrimination have. The relative lack of public awareness of such a problem makes language-related biases implicit in a different and special way, for they influence behavior without people noticing and without people understanding that there is an issue of public concern there.

Stereotypes and prejudices in the case of being a non-native speaker and writer of English may lead to the twofold effect of discriminating and affecting people's sense of self-worth. Typically, it is difficult to adjudicate whether one is a victim of discrimination due to implicit bias. Although we know the discriminatory implications of implicit bias at a statistical level, it is actually hard to locate the behavior following the implicit bias in specific individual behaviors outside the lab. One might obviously be aware of living in a society whose social structures and prevailing standards and values nourish certain automatic responses to how she speaks and to how she writes because, say, her accent triggers further implicit stereotypes about her class or ethnicity. But even though the discrimination from implicit bias is not always obvious, the effect on the self-worth and self-esteem of targeted individuals is present. Self-esteem is fundamentally an attitude which needs interpersonal support from the social world, and which is dependent on the social standards.

Thus, although one may not be able to detect any particular instance of discrimination which takes place, the feeling of potentially being the victim of explicit or implicit bias can reduce one's self-efficacy over time (Aronson and Inzlicht 2004), and can cause self-doubt and have lowering effects on aspiration and motivation (Steele and Aronson 1995), due to experiencing structurally barred access to certain social goods (say, job positions in prestigious universities). One's self-esteem is in peril when one is subjected to what Steele, Spencer and Aronson (2002) call 'social identity threat', which has been defined as 'the psychological state that occurs when people are aware that they have the potential to be viewed negatively or devalued because of their membership in a particular social group'

(Townsend et al. 2011: 151)—in our case, because of their accent or language improprieties. Even if and when the discrimination is covert (not apparent), it may well have harmful effects on one's self-esteem.

To sum up the argument so far: the creation of English as the global *lingua franca* engenders issues for justice at different levels: (a) at the level of the production of the public good of a common language, we have the unfair share of the costs, exclusively borne by the non-native speakers of English. Moreover, such unfair cost is not evenly distributed through non-Anglophone societies, for it strikes more in certain professions and economic areas: academia is definitely one of such areas. (b) At the level of opportunities for jobs and careers, non-native speakers are at a disadvantage compared with native English speakers. (c) To the unequal opportunities related to linguistic skills in the *lingua franca*, the effect of prejudices and biases concerning an imperfect mastery of the language and a non-standard accent must be added. They further reduce the opportunity of a non-native speaker, for her accent and language imperfections may be taken as sign of incompetence and less intelligence. (d) Like other form of biases, linguistic and accent biases, leading to a credibility deficit, may impact on people's self-esteem, lowering the level of their aspirations and motivations to pursue given paths.

### **3. Analytic Philosophy and Non-Native English Speakers**

In the academic world, the establishment of English as a *lingua franca* for scientific and scholarly communication is a fact. This process took place first in scientific disciplines, but in the last few decades it has also accelerated in the social and human sciences. In this respect, analytic philosophy is no different from other humanities disciplines, for the student in analytic philosophy, as well as in anthropology or literary criticism, must learn English if she wants to pursue an academic career and be part of the global academic community. That is, going to international conferences, publishing in prestigious journals, getting research funding and commenting on colleagues' works.



Nevertheless, some specificity of this area may be pointed out. Analytic philosophy is a tradition in philosophical thinking which mainly originated in Great Britain; it was thus born as an Anglophone discipline from the start. Its expansion outside English, American and Australian universities is relatively recent. Hence non-native English speaking analytic philosophers are still a minority, and the most prestigious journals and academic institutions belong to the English-speaking part of the world (Schwitzgebel et al. 2018). In this respect, a non-native English speaker practicing analytic philosophy compared to one practicing continental philosophy has a specific disadvantage, for her language imperfections are measured and valued against a majority of native speakers. Moreover, as a rule, she was educated in institutions whose name is not linked to analytic philosophy. Thus we can hypothesize that the predominant schema in this academic domain, concerning both the language skills, the accent and the academic provenance jointly concur to a more or less implicit attribution of a credibility deficit. In other words, she may have to work harder to get the credits that other colleagues are just presumed to possess as a default. In the domain of continental philosophy, instead, though the use of English has steadily increased in the last decade or so, a non-native English speaking philosopher may encounter the disadvantage of having to express himself in an imperfectly mastered foreign language. But, in such an area (a) he is in good company for the majority is still non-native; (b) he does not suffer from the credibility deficit, for continental philosophy was in fact born outside the English-speaking world and European universities enjoy a good name for it. Hence, he may be assumed to be as competent as his English speaking counterpart if not more, and to have something original to say. Given these two conditions, editors of journals might be more understanding of his imperfect English prose, and more willing to help him out to polish it; moreover, in any conference, even if English is now the *lingua franca*, he will find himself as one among the many non-native and imperfect speakers. Yet, the relative disadvantage of the non-native English speaking analytic philosopher compared to her continental counterpart is partly balanced by the fact that while for the former the language to learn is

only English, the latter often must study other European languages, German, French or Italian, depending on one's research subject. The lesser cost of having to learn only one language beside one's own does not probably even out the disadvantages of being a minority in a community of native English speakers, where linguistic biases and related prestige biases are spread.

In sum, the scholar of analytic philosophy, who is a non-native English speaker, seems to face the same disadvantage as any other non-English native scholars in academia insofar she has to become fluent in English. Yet, the disadvantages of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers are altogether probably stronger compared to their continental counterparts, because non-English speakers represent a minority in the analytic philosophy community, which is not the case with continental philosophers, and this situation makes their linguistic imperfections more conspicuous. To this fact, we can add the prestige bias which is likely to be triggered by their accent, contributing to make it harder to pursue an international career in the analytic philosophy community than it does for their continental colleagues. Such disadvantages, however, can hardly be translated into questions of distributive justice to be addressed in a political agenda. Not all social disadvantages or asymmetries are a matter of distributive justice, but only those affecting what John Rawls (1999) has called the basic structure of society, obstructing civil, political and basic social rights, and affecting fair equality of opportunity. The basic structure of society is what Rawls considers to be the legitimate scope of justice. Rawls (1999: 7) is not interested in 'social practice generally'; in the allotment of advantage and disadvantage as such. People who are within the analytic philosophy academic community, as in any other academic subjects, are usually above the threshold of resources and educational opportunity, which constitute the proper object of social justice. In fact, it is one thing to talk about discrimination within a professional, prestigious area like any academic area, and another thing to talk about discrimination concerning the capabilities of functioning as a competent social agent and citizen. The reasonable assumption here is that those who work in academia do not tend to be severely

socially marginalized. Although they may well be at a relative disadvantage compared to their native English speaking counterparts, they do not tend to be at absolute disadvantage in terms of fundamental rights, social provisions and fundamental capabilities. This means that being at a relative disadvantage compared to some others does not necessarily entail having been *wronged* in a way that is relevant to justice and in a way that, thus, requires the implementation of enforceable institutional remedial measures.<sup>2</sup>

So far we have considered the specific disadvantages of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers concerning opportunities. There may be another side of such disadvantages relative to identity, self-esteem and status within the community. Being part of a minority group which is marginalized and misrecognized has been proved to affect the individual member's self-esteem and to lower her expectations and aspirations so that certain opportunities are not even considered. This reasoning has in fact backed arguments in favor of forms of affirmative action or reverse discrimination, in order to promote a reversal not only of lesser opportunity but also of the lack of self-esteem and correspondingly of aspirations and expectations induced by misrecognition.

Yet, as remarked above, the argument for remedial justice, in the form of affirmative action, does not apply to the professional group of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers, for, on the one hand, their discrimination is not relative to all social spheres, and on the other, they do not constitute a minority with a record of past oppression and discrimination. Moreover, the difficulties experienced in having their articles accepted by top journals, or being successful in applications for fellowships and grants may not have the negative impact on their self-esteem which we have described above. In fact, the common knowledge of these difficulties in the community provides the grounds helping the reduction of cognitive

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2 Principles of justice can be both comparative and non-comparative. 'Sufficiency' principles are those non-comparative principles which hold that 'what justice requires is that each person should have "enough", on some dimension or other—for instance, have all of their needs fulfilled, or have a specified set of capabilities that they are able to exercise' (Miller 2017).

dissonance between one's expectations and negative outcome (Festinger 1957; Elster 1983). In a recent psychological experiment (Wentura and Greve 2003), the findings unambiguously show that participants adapt trait-definition for self-immunization purposes. Subjects who *ex ante* had thought of themselves as specifically expert in history, and that had failed the history test, processed the negative result by adapting the 'criterial evidence' required to define someone 'expert' so as to escape the implication of not being really expert. This experiment is discussed in the literature on self-deception (Michael and Newen 2010) and corroborates an earlier experiment showing that 94% of academic rated themselves above the average compared to their peers (Gilovich 1991). Taking this discussion into account, it seems that the circumstances of analytic philosophy for non-native English speakers provide good grounds for preserving self-esteem in the face of negative results, for the supposition of some sort of bias against non-Anglophone scholars represents a ready-to-use rationalization of one's failure. Yet, the natural tendency to defend one's self-esteem in the face of contrary evidence (Brown and Dutton 1995) kicks in only if the self-esteem has been developed in the first place.

This brings us back to the distinction between the disadvantage of being a social minority target of prejudices and stereotypes in the social world, and the relative disadvantage of being a minority in an academic group which is well above the threshold for social inclusion. Yet, if in the case of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers the disadvantage in terms of self-esteem is ambivalent, since the possibility to readapt criterial evidence for self-immunization is present, the obstacles created by unfavorable biases may discourage young people to access this discipline. The assumption here being that those who are not yet part of the academic community tend to be more vulnerable, both in terms of access to basic social provisions and in terms of the development of their self-esteem. This problem seems similar to the lack of confidence that girls feel in the field of science such as math, and which unduly influence their career choices. Moreover, considering the relative advantage of non-native English speaking continental philosophers over non-native English speaking analytic philosophers, students may have a

reason to stay away from a more difficult career track. If part of the twofold disadvantages of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers is grounded in being a minority within a community dominated by native English speakers, the effect of discouragement on prospective students may perversely contribute to reproduce the situation of disadvantage by keeping the non-native English speakers a minority within the analytical philosophy group.

In sum, though the linguistic disadvantages suffered by non-native English speaking analytical philosopher is basically similar to that experienced by non-native English speakers in all areas of social interaction, yet, some specific disadvantages can be detected with reference to this academic field. They are due, respectively, to the relative small number of non-native speakers among analytical philosophy and to the prestige bias accorded to English speaking institutions. Even though this disadvantage may not necessarily translate into an issue for self-esteem for those who are already within the community of analytic philosophers, such a situation may discourage those who are not part of such community to undertake this kind of study contributing in keeping the non-native group a minority.

Thus, the most problematic issue related to the potential exclusionary implications of linguistic standards in analytic philosophy concerns those who are not yet members of such epistemic community. Non-native English speaking students may perceive the analytic tradition as a barren academic road and thus discount it as an available option in a way similar to how young women may still negatively perceive the possibility of starting an academic journey in some male-dominated academic areas. In this case, the most effective remedy has to do with the progressive widening and differentiation of the community of analytic philosophers: the more diverse the community will get, the less gated it will seem. Such differentiation process has to be left to the spontaneous mechanisms of social adjustment because remedial institutional design measures such as quotas could hardly be justified and implementable in the academic domain which is global in nature and not subjected to any global institutional governance. Of course, some minor measures can be put in place in terms of research policies at a national or macro-regional (e.g., European) level which may help to

reduce the gap between native and non-native speakers in the analytic philosophy community. For example, the European Union may pay tribute to its commitment to multilingualism by subsidizing part of the costs in language proofreading services which are mostly borne by non-native speakers in English-dominated European research areas. Acknowledging the role of spontaneous mechanisms of social adjustment does not, however, imply turning a blind eye to the problem. We believe in fact that these spontaneous mechanisms of social adjustment which are hopefully leading to a progressive widening and differentiation (e.g. more high quality analytic journals in English led by non-native English speakers) of the community of analytic philosophers can be either favored or stopped, depending on how the gatekeepers (e.g. journals' editors and those sitting on hiring committees) of such community decide to pursue their role. Given that in this case linguistic biases are implicit especially because unacknowledged and unnoticed, more awareness of the problem can help to promote the right attitudes. Such call for individual efforts to bring about the needed changes may sound in apparent contradiction with the circumstance that some biases may be unaware: if the bias is unaware, then individual efforts seem to be likely to be ineffective. However, albeit such knowledge is often not easily accessible, it is arguable that we have a 'long-range' indirect control on the kind of beliefs we have so that, although we cannot simply decide to believe that P, we can expose ourselves to the kind of contexts, communication and information that might lead us to believe that P, for example by exposing ourselves to counter-stereotypical examples or to members of stigmatized groups. There is research suggesting that such indirect strategies may modify automatic inhibitory systems in order to prevent the influence of internally held biases on outward behaviors (Holroyd 2012: 284–286; Hieronymi 2008; Feldman 2008; Murdoch 1985: 32–35; Kang and Banaji: 2006). For example, nowadays it has slowly dawned on people, at least in part, that both genders should have representation in a conference panel, on an editorial board, as well as in articles published by a journal on a yearly basis. Thus, even if one automatically thinks of men as keynote, the now shared belief that an all-male panel does not look good usually kicks in and leads

to correct the automatic response. The same thing may and should happen with reference to language and, to that end, the problem must first be acknowledged by those who are making decisions in such areas. If, in daily academic decisions, similar attention to that nowadays paid to gender issues, is displayed with references to language, accent and provenance of students and scholars, that will help to make the community of analytic philosophy more enriched, diverse and inclusive.

To conclude, this paper has investigated whether analytic philosophers who are non-native English speakers are subject to linguistic injustice and, if yes, what kind of injustice that is and whether it is different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a world where English is rapidly becoming the *lingua franca*. We have argued that the domain of analytic philosophy does not raise issues of linguistic rights but of linguistic justice (in the sense specified in Section 1). We have then claimed that we do not have reason to think that analytic philosophy is different from other academic disciplines insofar as all scholars must become fluent in the *lingua franca* to pursue an academic career. Yet there are reasons to think that the domain of analytic philosophy may put non-native speakers of English at a specific disadvantage compared with their continental counterparts. We have argued that being at a relative disadvantage compared to others does not necessarily translate to a proper injustice if fundamental civil, political and social provisions are in place—as we can reasonably assume they are for those who work in academia. We have then continued by arguing that a more straightforward circumstance of injustice arises when such disadvantage affects those who are not yet members of an academic community such as prospective students, thus contributing to keeping the non-native group a minority. We have qualified this latter case of disadvantage as a matter of structural injustice. Such injustice is structural because it is not directly attributable to specific individuals but to structural political, social, and ideological conditions. There is no simple breach of perfect obligations but the disadvantage is rooted in more systematic (structural) reasons. This entails a forward-looking account of responsibility held by those in positions of power. Such forward-looking

accounts of responsibility should aim to change those social standards, social norms and stereotypes which create and nourish discriminatory behaviors. In this case, individuals in position of power have what Pablo Gilabert (2017) has called ‘dynamic duties’ which are aimed at changing circumstances so that certain desirable outcomes become achievable by changing political and cultural circumstances in turn.

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