Value relevance of institutional investors

In this paper we investigate the influence of institutional investors on share prices using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange. For finance theorists the value of an investment, real or financial, is a function of its expected benefits and the riskiness of these benefits. Whatever influences are exerted by the structure of equity ownership are diversified away by efficient risk-averse investors. Managerial and agency theorists argue that the particular ownership structure may have an effect on share value or returns. Their arguments are based (mainly) on the consequences of the separation of ownership from control. In addition to traditional methods of estimation we have used Chamberlain’s (1982) multivariate panel data estimator, which allows for arbitrary patterns of error autocorrelation and parameter temporal behavior. Among all alternative methods of estimation used, only this one produced a statistically significant and econometrically well specified relationship between share prices and institutional shareholdings.peer-reviewe

Multidirectional conditional convergence in European banking

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Stock markets and effective exchange rates in European countries: threshold cointegration findings

© 2015, Eurasia Business and Economics Society. The nexus between stock markets and exchange rates is examined in the case of eight European countries. The sample consists of four economies with national currencies and four that have adopted the euro. Thus, if differences between the two groups in the relationship governing the two markets exist, they will be unveiled. To this effect, a threshold cointegration methodology is adopted that allows for more reliable inferences to be drawn for both the short and long run nexus between the two markets. Monthly data is used covering the period 01/2000–12/2014. The findings reported herein offer support in favor of the portfolio approach thesis over the recent economic crisis period, but this finding is not the case for the entire sample. Bidirectional causality is found for Norway and the UK, pointing to a currency effect on stock markets. In view of the findings reported herein, policies aiming at reducing uncertainty in the stock markets can exert beneficial effects on currency markets

Preface - LNCS Volume 10616

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Game Authority for Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish Computer Systems

Game theory analyzes social structures of agents that have freedomof choice within a moral code. The society allows freedom andselfishness within the moral code, which social structures enforce,i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial. Social rules encourage individualprofit from which the entire society gains. Distributed computersystems can improve their scalability and robustness by usingexplicit social structures. We propose using a game authority middlewarefor enforcing the moral code on selfish agents.The power of game theory is in predicting the game outcome forspecific assumptions. The prediction holds as long as the playerscannot tamper with the social structure, or change the rules of thegame, i.e., the prisoner cannot escape from prison in the classicalprisoner dilemma. Therefore, we cannot predict the game outcomewithout suitable assumptions on failures and honest selfishness

Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers implementable by deterministic and self-stabilising automata

Systems of selfish-computers are subject to transient faults due to temporal malfunctions; just as the society is subjected to human mistakes. Game theory uses punishment for deterring improper behaviour. Due to faults, selfish-computers may punish well-behaved ones. This is one of the key motivations for forgiveness that follows any effective and credible punishment. Therefore, unplanned punishments must provably cease in order to avoid infinite cycles of unsynchronised behaviour of \u27tit for tat\u27. We investigate another aspect of these systems. We consider the possibility of subsystem takeover. The takeover may lead to joint deviations coordinated by an arbitrary selfish-computer that controls an unknown group of subordinate computers. We present strategies that deter the coordinator from deviating in infinitely repeated games. We construct deterministic automata that implement these strategies with optimal complexity. Moreover, we prove that all unplanned punishments eventually cease by showing that the automata can recover from transient faults