Ignorance based inference of optimality in thermodynamic processes

We derive ignorance based prior distribution to quantify incomplete information and show its use to estimate the optimal work characteristics of a heat engine.Comment: Latex, 10 pages, 3 figure

Sustainable synthesis of enantiopure fluorolactam derivatives by a selective direct fluorination – amidase strategy

Pharmaceutically important chiral fluorolactam derivatives bearing a fluorine atom at a stereogenic centre were synthesized by a route involving copper catalyzed selective direct fluorination using fluorine gas for the construction of the key C–F bond and a biochemical amidase process for the crucial asymmetric cyclisation stage. A comparison of process green metrics with reported palladium catalyzed enantioselective fluorination methodology shows the fluorination-amidase route to be very efficient and more suitable for scale-up

Identifying Surrogates for Heart and Ipsilateral Lung Dose to Guide Field Placement and Treatment Modality Selection during Virtual Simulation of Breast Radiotherapy

AIMS: Virtual simulation (VSim) of tangential photon fields is a common method of field localisation for breast radiotherapy. Heart and ipsilateral lung dose is unknown until the dosimetric plan is produced. If heart and ipsilateral lung tolerance doses are exceeded, this can prolong the pre-treatment pathway, particularly if a change of technique is required. The aim of this study was to identify predictive surrogates for heart and ipsilateral lung dose during VSim to aid optimum field placement and treatment modality selection. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Computed tomography data from 50 patients referred for left breast/chest wall radiotherapy were retrospectively analysed (model-building cohort). The prescribed dose was 40.05 Gy in 15 fractions using a tangential photon technique. The heart and ipsilateral lung contours were duplicated, cropped to within the field borders and labelled heart-in-field (HIF) and ipsilateral lung-in-field (ILF). The percentage of HIF (%HIF) and ILF (%ILF) was calculated and correlated with mean heart dose (MHD) and volume of the ipsilateral lung receiving 18 Gy (V18Gy). Linear regression models were calculated. A validation cohort of 10 left- and 10 right-sided cases with an anterior supraclavicular fossa (SCF) field, and 10 left- and 10 right-sided cases including the internal mammary nodes using a wide tangential technique and anterior SCF field, tested the predictive model. Threshold values for %HIF and %ILF were calculated for clinically relevant MHD and ipsilateral lung V18Gy tolerance doses. RESULTS: For the model-building cohort, the median %HIF and MHD were 2.6 (0.4-16.7) and 2.3 (1.2-8) Gy. The median %ILF and ipsilateral lung V18Gy were 12.1 (2.8-33.6) and 12.6 (3.3-35) %. There was a statistically significant strong positive correlation of %HIF with MHD (r2 = 0.97, P < 0.0001) and of %ILF with ipsilateral lung V18Gy (r2 = 0.99, P < 0.0001). For the validation cohort, the median %HIF and MHD were 3.9 (0.6-8) and 2.5 (1.4-4.7) Gy. The median %ILF and ipsilateral lung V18Gy were 20.1 (12.4-32.0) and 20.9 (12.4-34.4) %. The validation cohort confirmed that %HIF and %ILF continue to be predictive surrogates for heart and ipsilateral lung dose during VSim of left- and right-sided cases when including the SCF ± internal mammary nodes with a three-field photon technique. DISCUSSION: The ability to VSim breast radiotherapy (±nodal targets) and accurately predict the heart and ipsilateral lung doses on the dosimetric plan will ensure that tolerance doses are not exceeded, and identify early in the pre-treatment pathway those cases where alternative techniques or modalities should be considered

Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments

The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections

Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

Endogenous Public and Private Leadership with Diverging Social and Private Marginal Costs

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with price competition and with social marginal cost differing from private marginal costs. We find that any equilibrium timing patterns--Bertrand, Stackelberg with private leadership, Stackelberg with public leadership, and multiple Stackelberg equilibria-- emerge. When the foreign ownership share in a private firm is less than 50%, public leadership more likely emerges than private leadership. Conversely, private leadership can emerge in a unique equilibrium when the foreign ownership share in a private firm is large. These results may explain recent policy changes in public financial institutions in Japan. We also find a nonmonotone relationship between the welfare advantage of public and private leadership and the difference between social and private marginal costs for a private firm. A nonmonotone relationship does not emerge in profit ranking

Aggressiveness and Redistribution

räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen der unte

Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to minimize her own delay, or - with a certain probability - the player is malicious in which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as much as possible. We show that such games do in general not possess a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (i.e. a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Moreover, given a game, we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether it admits a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result even holds when resource latency functions are linear, each player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist of singleton sets. For a slightly more restricted class of malicious Bayesian congestion games, we provide easy checkable properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we study the impact of the malicious types on the overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this impact, we use the Price of Malice. We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of Malice for an interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games. Moreover, we show that for certain congestion games the advent of malicious types can also be beneficial to the system in the sense that the social cost of the worst case equilibrium decreases. We provide a tight bound on the maximum factor by which this happens.Comment: 18 pages, submitted to WAOA'0