145 research outputs found
Vitalism in Early Modern Medical and Philosophical Thought
Vitalism is a notoriously deceptive term. It is very often defined as the view, in biology, in early modern medicine and differently, in early modern philosophy, that living beings differ from the rest of the physical universe due to their possessing an additional âlife-forceâ, âvital principleâ, âentelechyâ, enormon or Ă©lan vital. Such definitions most often have an explicit pejorative dimension: vitalism is a primitive or archaic view, that has somehow survived the emergence of modern science (the latter being defined in many different ways, from demystified Cartesian reductionism to experimental medicine, biochemistry or genetics: Cimino and Duchesneau eds. 1997, Normandin and Wolfe eds. 2013). Such dismissive definitions of vitalism are meant to dispense with argument or analysis.
Curiously, the term has gained some popularity in English-language scholarship on early modern philosophy in the past few decades, where it is used without any pejorative dimension, to refer to a kind of âactive matterâ view, in which matter is not reducible to the (mechanistic) properties of size, shape and motion, possessing instead some internal dynamism or activity (see e.g. James 1999, Boyle 2018, Borcherding forthcoming). The latter meaning is close to what the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth termed âhylozoismâ, namely the attribution of life, agency or mind to matter, and he implicitly targeted several figures I shall mention here, notably Margaret Cavendish and Francis Glisson, for holding this view. However, one point I shall make in this entry is that when vitalism first appears by name, and as a self-designation, in the Montpellier School (associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier, in the second half of the eighteenth century; thus vitalisme appears first, followed shortly thereafter by Vitalismus in German, with âvitalismâ appearing in English publications only in the early nineteenth century: Toepfer 2011), it is quite different from both the more âsupernaturalâ view described above â chiefly espoused by its rather obsessive opponents â and from the more neutral, but also de-biologized philosophical view (that of e.g. Cavendish or Conway who are, broadly speaking naturalists). Rather than appealing to a metaphysics of vital force, or of self-organizing matter, this version of vitalism, which I shall refer to as âmedical vitalismâ, seems to be more of a âsystemicâ theory: an attempt to grasp and describe top-level (âorganizationalâ, âorganismicâ, âholisticâ) features of living systems (Wolfe 2017, 2019).
In this entry I seek to introduce some periodization in our thinking about early modern (and Enlightenment) vitalism, emphasizing the difference between the seventeenth-century context and that of the following generations â culminating in the ideas of the Montpellier School. This periodization should also function as a kind of taxonomy or at least distinction between some basic types of vitalism. As I discuss in closing, these distinctions can cut across the texts and figures we are dealing with, differently: metaphysical vs. non-metaphysical vitalism, philosophical vs. medical vitalism, medical vs. âembryologicalâ vitalism, and so on. A difference I can only mention but not explore in detail is that the more medically grounded, âorganismicâ vitalism is significantly post-Cartesian while the more biological/embryological vitalism is, inasmuch as it is a dynamic, self-organizing matter theory, an extension of Renaissance ideas (chymiatry, Galenism and in general theories of medical spirits).
I examine successively vitalismâs Renaissance prehistory, its proliferation as âvital matter theoryâ in seventeenth-century England (in authors such as Cavendish, Conway and Glisson, with brief considerations on Harvey and van Helmont), and its mature expression in eighteenth-century Montpellier (notably with Bordeu and MĂ©nuret de Chambaud)
Investigating trophic ecology and dietary niche overlap among morphs of Lake Trout in Lake Superior
Four morphs of Lake Trout (Salvelinus namaycush, Walbaum 1792) have been identified in Lake Superior: leans, siscowets, humpers, and redfins. In this comprehensive study, the trophic ecology of Lake Trout morphs were characterized using stomach content, fatty acid, and stable isotope data. Stomach content results indicated a predominately piscivorous diet for leans, siscowets, and redfins, whereas humper diets were comprised of 50% fish and 50% Mysis by mass. Humper and siscowets were most similar in their dietary fatty acid profiles, whereas redfins had the most distinct dietary fatty acid profile. Results from stable isotope analysis revealed some among-morph differences along a pelagic-profundal consumption gradient (34S), but there were no significant differences in trophic position (15N) or basal carbon sources among morphs (13C). Using the recently developed nicheROVER software package, 4-dimensional trophic niches for each morph were quantified using stable isotope ratios (ÎŽ13C, ÎŽ15N, and ÎŽ34S) and fatty acid profiles (30 dietary fatty acids, condensed to one axis). Humpers had the largest 4-dimensional niche regions of all four morphs, and redfins had the smallest. Pairwise probability of overlap among morphs in these four-dimensional niche regions was determined to be < 50% in most cases. Overall, stomach content results indicate that humpers diets were more planktivorous than the other morphs, consistent with previous research. Results of the niche overlap analysis suggests some degree of generalist feeding for all morphs. Better characterization of seasonal variation in diet using tracers that reflect more recent feeding (e.g., fatty acids, stomach contents, and/or stable isotope analyses performed on tissues that turnover more quickly than muscle) are needed to further elucidate among-morph differences and similarities in diet and trophic ecology
The material soul: Strategies for naturalising the soul in an early modern epicurean context
We usually portray the early modern period as one characterised by the âbirth of subjectivityâ with Luther and Descartes as two alternate representatives of this radical break with the past, each ushering in the new era in which âIâ am the locus of judgements about the world. A sub-narrative called âthe mind-body problemâ recounts how Cartesian dualism, responding to the new promise of a mechanistic science of nature, âsplit offâ the world of the soul/mind/self from the world of extended, physical substanceâa split which has preoccupied the philosophy of mind up until the present day. We would like to call attention to a different constellation of textsâneither a robust âtraditionâ nor an isolated âepisodeâ, somewhere in betweenâwhich have in common their indebtedness to, and promotion of an embodied, Epicurean approach to the soul. These texts follow the evocative hint given in Lucretiusâ De rerum natura that âthe soul is to the body as scent is to incenseâ (in an anonymous early modern French version). They neither assert the autonomy of the soul, nor the dualism of body and soul, nor again a sheer physicalism in which âintentionalâ properties are reduced to the basic properties of matter. Rather, to borrow the title of one of these treatises (LâĂme MatĂ©rielle), they seek to articulate the concept of a material soul. We reconstruct the intellectual development of a corporeal, mortal and ultimately material soul, in between medicine, natural philosophy and metaphysics, including discussions of Malebranche and Willis, but focusing primarily on texts including the 1675 Discours anatomiques by the Epicurean physician Guillaume Lamy; the anonymous manuscript from circa 1725 entitled LâĂme MatĂ©rielle, which is essentially a compendium of texts from the later seventeenth century (Malebranche, Bayle) along with excerpts from Lucretius; and materialist writings such Julien Offray de La Mettrieâs LâHomme-Machine (1748), in order to articulate this concept of a âmaterial soulâ with its implications for notions of embodiment, materialism and selfhood
Francis Bacon and the Theologico-political Reconfiguration of Desire in the Early Modern Period
Bacon\u2019s ideas on motion rested on an appetitive and acquisitive consideration of life in which nature was identified with a tendency to preserve order, virtue with the unceasing effort to expand the boundaries of life, and government with the art of maintaining and balancing power (reason of state). A remarkable outcome of this view was the opinion that, in a universe ruled by the principle of self-preservation, life appeared to be constitutively vulnerable, being always exposed to episodes of aggression and violence that originated in its own environs. In the teleological framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, by contrast, life was an indication of perfection, for it signalled the fulfilment of potentialities brimming with energy and knowledge. To be alive, for both Plato and Aristotle, meant to attain a higher degree of ontological perfection. For Bacon, to be alive meant to counter a deeper and stronger tendency to rest. Compared to Aristotelian and Platonic ideals of life as self-fuelling activity, Bacon shifted the emphasis away from the notion of spontaneous self-organization towards that of reactivity. From this point of view, he rightfully belongs to the early modern history of conatus, understanding by conatus the struggle to remain in existence and expand the scope and power of one\u2019s being. By elaborating an original theory of conative motions, Bacon adopted and reinterpreted some of the most controversial issues of Renaissance philosophy concerning both nature and politics (above all from Bernardino Telesio and Niccol\uf2 Machiavelli), and bequeathed them to a number of seventeenth-century philosophers eager to explore new ways of addressing life\u2019s puzzling tangle of desires, power and knowledge
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