A dimensão comunicativa de uma exposição de objetos técnicos The communicative dimension of a technical objects exhibit

O presente trabalho discute algumas tendências dos museus de ciências e tecnologia. Inicialmente, é apresentada uma pequena introdução histórica dos museus de ciência no mundo contemporâneo, a fim de situar a presença dos espaços museográficos interativos com uma nova função de comunicação. Finalmente, por meio da análise de pequenos diálogos durante uma visita a uma exposição de objetos técnicos, refletimos sobre a negociação de significado do diálogo possível entre um objeto de exposição e o visitante.<br>This article discusses new approaches for science and technology museums. Firstly, we do a brief historic introduction about science museums and how they provide interactive museographic space. The goal is to make a new communication approach. Finally, through the analysis of the dialogues during the visit to the technical objects exhibit we seek insight into the negotiation through dialogue between the exhibit and the public

Nature of the Selenium Submonolayer Effect on the Oxygen Electroreduction Reaction Activity of Ru(0001)

California\u27s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the major hub of California\u27s water supply system and is central to the ecosystem of many native threatened and endangered species. Conflicts over the Delta have evolved over more than a century. This paper traces changes in this conflict in game-theoretic terms, with its implications for the region\u27s physical and ecological decline and governance. The Delta is not a zero-sum problem and win-win resolutions may exist if stakeholders cooperate. Game theory provides some insights on the potential for win-win solutions. The Delta problem has had a Prisoner\u27s Dilemma structure, in which stakeholder self-interest makes cooperation unlikely within a reasonable time frame. However, the core of the Delta conflict is changing as the unsustainable future becomes more widely understood. Today\u27s Delta problem has characteristics of a Chicken game, where cooperation is in everyone\u27s interest, but it is unlikely because parties deviating from the status quo are likely to bear more of the costs of a long-term solution. The State of California may become the victim (or chicken) of the Delta game, bearing the greatest costs, if it continues to rely on leaving parties to develop voluntary cooperative solutions without a sufficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation. © 2012 American Society of Civil Engineers