Miniatures from domestic contexts in Iron age Iberia

This article reviews a set of miniatures from domestic contexts in Iron Age eastern Iberia, and interprets them in terms of their role in forging social personae. After an introduction to the historical case under consideration, the miniatures are described in terms of their typology and their contexts of provenance are outlined. Though not abundant, they tend to occur in central places in the landscape; specifically, they are often found in houses of the powerful. The vast majority are miniatures of pottery and tools, though some miniature weapons are recorded. We contend that these objects were used as a means of enculturation and for the learning of values and norms. It is no coincidence that they emerge in the archaeological record of Iron Age Iberia at the same time as the rise of a social structure based on hereditary power

Gene–Environment Interactions at Nucleotide Resolution

Interactions among genes and the environment are a common source of phenotypic variation. To characterize the interplay between genetics and the environment at single nucleotide resolution, we quantified the genetic and environmental interactions of four quantitative trait nucleotides (QTN) that govern yeast sporulation efficiency. We first constructed a panel of strains that together carry all 32 possible combinations of the 4 QTN genotypes in 2 distinct genetic backgrounds. We then measured the sporulation efficiencies of these 32 strains across 8 controlled environments. This dataset shows that variation in sporulation efficiency is shaped largely by genetic and environmental interactions. We find clear examples of QTN:environment, QTN: background, and environment:background interactions. However, we find no QTN:QTN interactions that occur consistently across the entire dataset. Instead, interactions between QTN only occur under specific combinations of environment and genetic background. Thus, what might appear to be a QTN:QTN interaction in one background and environment becomes a more complex QTN:QTN:environment:background interaction when we consider the entire dataset as a whole. As a result, the phenotypic impact of a set of QTN alleles cannot be predicted from genotype alone. Our results instead demonstrate that the effects of QTN and their interactions are inextricably linked both to genetic background and to environmental variation

QTL analysis and genomic selection using RADseq derived markers in Sitka spruce: the potential utility of within family data

Sitka spruce (Picea sitchensis (Bong.) Carr) is the most common commercial plantation species in Britain and a breeding programme based on traditional lines has been in operation since the early 1960s. Rotation lengths of 40-years have led breeders to adopt a process of indirect selection at younger ages based on traits well correlated with final selection, but still the generation interval is unlikely to reduce much below twenty years. Recent successful developments with genomic selection in animal breeding have led tree breeders to consider the application of this technology. In this study a RAD sequence assay was developed as a means of investigating the potential of molecular breeding in a non-model species. DNA was extracted from nearly 500 clonally replicated trees growing in a single full-sibling family at one site in Britain. The technique proved successful in identifying 132 QTLs for 5-year bud-burst and 2 QTLs for 6-year height. In addition, the accuracy of predicting phenotypes by genomic selection was strikingly high at 0.62 and 0.59 respectively. Sensitivity analysis with 200 offspring found only a slight fall in correlation values (0.54 and 0.38) although when the training population reduced to 50 offspring predictive values fell further (0.33 and 0.25). This proved an encouraging first investigation into the potential use of genomic selection in the breeding of Sitka spruce. The authors investigate how problems associated with effective population size and linkage disequilibrium can be avoided and suggest a practical way of incorporating genomic selection into a dynamic breeding programme

The type-B moral error theory

I introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts (both of which she deems morally irrelevant), but denies that there are categorical all things considered oughts on pain of requiring ‘queer’ facts to obtain. I detail the most central motivation of this version of the theory against its more traditional rival, according to which there are no irreducible normative properties at all. The motivation is that it, unlike its rival, can successfully be defended against the notorious charge of self-defeat

Revisiting Folk Moral Realism

Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (by Goodwin and Darley, Wainryb et al., Nichols, and Nichols and Folds-Bennett) indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards realism. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed internal critique of these four studies. I argue that, once interpreted properly, all of them turn out in line with recent research. They suggest that most ordinary people experience morality as “pluralist-” rather than realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people have the intuition that realism is true with regard to some moral issues, but variants of anti-realism are true with regard to others. This result means that moral realism may be less well justified than commonly assumed