The underpinning of the protection of fundamental rights provided by the Hungarian Constitution: Article 8 paragraph (1)

The study analyses the protection of fundamental rights in Hungary. Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Hungarian Constitution is the basis of the protection of fundamental rights. The paper shows how Art. 8 paragraph (1) elvolved and explains how the Constitutional Court formed its content during the almost two decades after the transition. The content of the rule is explained by way of an item-by-item analysis of the terms of this paragraph. The analysis shows that the fact that the protection of fundamental rights is a primary obligation is not merely a declaration, but a regulative principle of constitutional democracy

The Hungarian constitutional court in transition — from actio popularis to constitutional complaint

In Hungary, the year 2012 brought a significant change in constitutional review. With modifying the competencies of the Constitutional Court, the Basic Law introduced three types of constitutional complaints and abolished actio popularis. Actio popularis was a well-functioning legal instrument in Hungarian law since the political transition of 1989–1990. Up until January 2012 anyone could request the abstract ex post facto constitutional review of a law or regulation. Unlike the former actio popularis, the essence of the new system of constitutional complaints is to have standing requirements for the complainants. Furthermore, new types of complaints are designed to defend constitutionality against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts as well. The article aims to describe actio popularis and constitutional complaints with regard to possible comparison of weaknesses and strong points. The author argues that regarding its effectiveness the new system do not yet provide a complete substitution for actio popularis

Constitutional rights: Horizontal effect and antidiscrimination law in Hungary

This contribution aims to examine how the Hungarian Constitution applies in private relations through judicial activity and how the anti-discrimination legislation influences this tendency. The current codification procedure of the new civil code calls for a thorough theoretical background in order to answer how its provisions relate to the Constitution. After the general overview of the practice of courts and the Constitutional Court, the criticism of scholars developed on the issue will shed light on the weaknesses, but in spite of them, the overall success of the theory of indirect horizontal effect. The paper will also deal with the horizontal effect of a specific constitutional right, namely the right to equal treatment. I examine the fairly new legal instrument, the act on the prohibition of certain forms of discrimination, and demonstrate how this new practice influences the idea of horizontal effect in constitutional law and what implications it has on the new Civil Code afoot. I argue that the act at first sight exists independently from the requirement of horizontal application of fundamental rights, but, in fact, it implicates the necessity to reconsider in its light how the Constitution applies in private relations

Stabilnost ustava i njegova uloga u promicanju međugeneracijske pravednosti

This article argues that the legal normative concept of the constitution, with its inherent stability, does not hinder, but instead serves intergenerational justice. The author has two main observations. One is that unamendability belongs to the nature of the constitution no matter if this is specified in the constitution as an eternity clause or not. Even constitutions that do not contain eternity or other entrenchment clauses are not completely flexible, as this is the nature of the constitution. The strength of the stability in the normative sense depends partly on the jurisprudence of the constitutional court. The author argues that this a key element to prove that constitutions are able to serve intergenerational justice. The second argument that follows from the first one is that if constitutional courts play this role in interpreting the constitution, future judges can always adapt the constitution to the understanding of the law according to future generations. However, this argument is valid only if we accept that constitutionality is a normative concept and the level of abstraction of the constitution helps to preserve the competences of future generations. The popularity of adopting a constitution and unamendable rules saw renewed enthusiasm globally after the Second World War. Ensuring stability on the other hand yields solid ground to build on for new interpretations, but due to the limited concept embedded in the normative world, it allows for complete change as well, by stepping aside and adopting a new constitution. Therefore, the normative approach serves the best interest of future generations by requiring the implementation of constitutional adjudication. The constitution as a normative concept does not recognise different generations, even if it is intragenerational and intergenerational, but rather presupposes and safeguards the continuity of the law. By allowing the flexible adaptation of the interpreted rules, while providing stability, it leaves equal room for change for all generations.U radu se zastupa tvrdnja da prirodna stabilnost normativnog ustava omogućava, tj. ne priječi, međugeneracijsku pravednost. U radu se navode dva glavna zapažanja. Prvo glasi da je nepromjenjivost prirodno obilježje ustava čak i kada on ne sadržava klauzulu vječnosti te tako ni ustav koji ne sadržava klauzulu vječnosti ili neku drugu klauzulu ukorijenjenosti nije u potpunosti fleksibilan. Razina stabilnosti u normativnom smislu dijelom ovisi o ustavnome sudu. Prema autorici, to je ključni dokaz da ustav može omogućiti međugeneracijsku pravednost. Iz prvoga slijedi drugo zapažanje: ako je takva uloga ustavnog suda u tumačenju ustava, ustavni će suci uvijek moći prilagoditi ustav ovisno o tome kako će buduće generacije tumačiti zakone. No taj je argument valjan jedino ako ustavnost prihvaćamo kao normativnu. Popularnost usvajanja ustava i nepromjenjivih pravila iznova je porasla na globalnoj razini nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata. Stabilnost pruža solidan temelj za nova tumačenja, no s obzirom na ograničenja koja nameće normativnost također dopušta i temeljnu promjenu u smislu usvajanja novoga ustava. Stoga je normativan pristup u najboljem interesu budućih generacija jer zahtijeva primjenu ustavnog sudovanja. Normativni ustav ne čini razliku među generacijama, bez obzira na to što je unutargeneracijski i međugeneracijski, već štiti zakonski kontinuitet. Time što omogućava fleksibilnu prilagodbu protumačenih pravila istovremeno osigurava stabilnost i svim generacijama nudi jednaku mogućnost za promjene