Work, Justice, and Collective Capital Institutions : Revisiting Rudolf Meidner and the Case for Wage-Earner Funds

This article makes the case for a specific variety of what we call Collective Capital Institutions (CCIs), by returning to the idea of Wage-Earner Funds (WEFs) – a 1970s Swedish policy proposal designed gradually to shift ownership and control over parts of the economy to democratically controlled institutions. We identify two attractive rationales in favour of such a scheme and argue that both can fruitfully be transposed to the current worldwide economic situation. The egalitarian rationale is that WEFs could help in the pursuit of equality by giving a wider set of people a stake in collectively owned companies and a right to their profits. The democratic rationale is that WEFs redistribute not only these profits, but also the power over economic decisions made within companies. We then contrast such schemes for collective capital ownership with the similar but much more privatised proposals set out in, for instance, John Rawls's idea of a ‘property-owning democracy’. We argue that CCIs ultimately are more likely to contribute to the development of the ‘sense of justice’ within society that is needed for a stable just society. We conclude that CCIs deserve a great deal more exploration in academic and political discussions of egalitarian economic systems

The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research

Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a technological upheaval with the potential to change human society. Because of its transformative potential, AI is increasingly becoming subject to regulatory initiatives at the global level. Yet, so far, scholarship in political science and international relations has focused more on AI applications than on the emerging architecture of global AI regulation. The purpose of this article is to outline an agenda for research into the global governance of AI. The article distinguishes between two broad perspectives: an empirical approach, aimed at mapping and explaining global AI governance; and a normative approach, aimed at developing and applying standards for appropriate global AI governance. The two approaches offer questions, concepts, and theories that are helpful in gaining an understanding of the emerging global governance of AI. Conversely, exploring AI as a regulatory issue offers a critical opportunity to refine existing general approaches to the study of global governance

Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share : Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute

Contemporary political philosophy primarily conceives of justice as a virtue of major social institutions. Yet, much advocacy of justice is increasingly focused on how well particular individuals live up to its demands, and proceeds by calling out and criticising their unjust behaviour. The institutional focus renders political philosophy unable to inform and evaluate such attempts to change, not legal frameworks, but rather the principles that people find acceptable and act on in their daily lives. To address this shortcoming, this dissertation provides a political philosophical analysis of what justice requires of individuals, and why. It does so by developing and defending an account of contributive justice, which answers the inquiry’s guiding questions of who should contribute to justice and why, as well as what a contribution is, and how individual duties of justice should be enforced. The arguments provided support the conclusion that achieving a just society is not simply a question of designing and complying with the right kind of institutions, but that we all have a pro tanto duty to contribute in our day-to-day lives towards the furthering of a just society, and that relying on informal and decentralised social sanctions is the best way to promote adherence to this duty. The duty to contribute defended in this dissertation differs from existing policies that make access to welfare state services conditional on individuals’ willingness to work or study. It also differs from prominent existing philosophical defences of similar positions, centred around the ideas of equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens. Critically analysing these accounts, the dissertation shows that, although each account can justify a duty to contribute, their specific answers to the guiding questions are ultimately unsatisfactory. For instance, they are unable to explain both why it is unjust to opt out from doing your bit of the labour necessary to meet the demands of justice, and why individuals who cannot contribute should nevertheless be able to claim the share that they are due. These shortcomings can be avoided, however, by combining concerns about equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens into a hybrid account. This generates a two-part pro tanto duty to contribute whereby, firstly, everyone has a duty to contribute towards making sure that everyone receives what they are due as a matter of justice. If and when this level is reached, everyone then has an obligation to benefit others, conditional upon them benefitting from the work of others. While it is unjust to refuse to contribute in the first way, the hybrid account leaves room for people to reject additional benefits and thereby absolve themselves from having to contribute further. Furthermore, the pro tanto nature of this duty means that it could be outweighed by other morally important considerations. Although demanding, it will hence not crowd out all personal pursuits. The dissertation also suggests that adherence to this duty should be enforced not through state action, but rather by individuals responding to and upholding a system of social sanctions. Contrasting this so-called ethos of justice with similar systems of social control, such as peer-to-peer online monitoring and sanctioning, and the Social Credit System currently being implemented in China, arguably shows that the informal and decentralised nature of the ethos allows it to avoid the potentially freedom-curtailing effects of the similar systems

The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence : Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research

Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a technological upheaval with the potential to change human society. Because of its transformative potential, AI is increasingly becoming subject to regulatory initiatives at the global level. Yet, so far, scholarship in political science and international relations has focused more on AI applications than on the emerging architecture of global AI regulation. The purpose of this article is to outline an agenda for research into the global governance of AI. The article distinguishes between two broad perspectives: an empirical approach, aimed at mapping and explaining global AI governance; and a normative approach, aimed at developing and applying standards for appropriate global AI governance. The two approaches offer questions, concepts, and theories that are helpful in gaining an understanding of the emerging global governance of AI. Conversely, exploring AI as a regulatory issue offers a critical opportunity to refine existing general approaches to the study of global governance.La inteligencia artificial (IA) representa una revolución tecnológica que tiene el potencial de poder cambiar la sociedad humana. Debido a este potencial transformador, la IA está cada vez más sujeta a iniciativas reguladoras a nivel global. Sin embargo, hasta ahora, el mundo académico en el área de las ciencias políticas y las relaciones internacionales se ha centrado más en las aplicaciones de la IA que en la arquitectura emergente de la regulación global en materia de IA. El propósito de este artículo es esbozar una agenda para la investigación sobre la gobernanza global en materia de IA. El artículo distingue entre dos amplias perspectivas: por un lado, un enfoque empírico, destinado a mapear y explicar la gobernanza global en materia de IA y, por otro lado, un enfoque normativo, destinado a desarrollar y a aplicar normas para una gobernanza global adecuada de la IA. Los dos enfoques ofrecen preguntas, conceptos y teorías que resultan útiles para comprender la gobernanza global emergente en materia de IA. Por el contrario, el hecho de estudiar la IA como si fuese una cuestión reguladora nos ofrece una oportunidad de gran relevancia para poder perfeccionar los enfoques generales existentes en el estudio de la gobernanza global.L'intelligence artificielle (IA) constitue un bouleversement technologique qui pourrait bien changer la société humaine. À cause de son potentiel transformateur, l'IA fait de plus en plus l'objet d'initiatives réglementaires au niveau mondial. Pourtant, jusqu'ici, les chercheurs en sciences politiques et relations internationales se sont davantage concentrés sur les applications de l'IA que sur l’émergence de l'architecture de la réglementation mondiale de l'IA. Cet article vise à exposer les grandes lignes d'un programme de recherche sur la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA. Il fait la distinction entre deux perspectives larges : une approche empirique, qui vise à représenter et expliquer la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA; et une approche normative, qui vise à mettre au point et appliquer les normes d'une gouvernance mondiale de l'IA adéquate. Les deux approches proposent des questions, des concepts et des théories qui permettent de mieux comprendre l’émergence de la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA. À l'inverse, envisager l'IA telle une problématique réglementaire présente une opportunité critique d'affiner les approches générales existantes de l’étude de la gouvernance mondiale.