Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures

In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two coalition structures is based on a “step-by-step” approach to describe negotiation steps concretely by restricting how coalition structures can change: when one coalition structure is changed to another one, either (i) only one merging of two separate coalitions into a coalition occurs, or (ii) only one breaking up of a coalition into two separate coalitions happens. As applications of our stability notion, we show that the efficient grand coalition structure can be sequentially stable in simple partition function form games and common pool resource games.

New Treatment of Resonances with Bound State Approximation by Using Pseudo Potential

We propose a new approach to extract the wave functions of resonances by the bound state approximation which gives the mixed states of the resonance components and the continuum ones. In our approach, on the basis of the method of analytic continuation in the coupling constant (ACCC), we construct Pad\'e rational function by adopting the positive energies as well as the negative ones. We report the result of the application of this new method to the second $2^+$ state of $^{12}$C which was studied with the ACCC method in our previous work. It is found that the resonance parameters obtained by the ACCC method are well reproduced by the new method. Some advantages over the ACCC method are also shown.Comment: 10pages, 2figures, submitted to Prog. Theor. Phys, changed content, added reference

Stochastic approach to correlations beyond the mean field with the Skyrme interaction

Large-scale calculation based on the multi-configuration Skyrme density functional theory is performed for the light N=Z even-even nucleus, 12C. Stochastic procedures and the imaginary-time evolution are utilized to prepare many Slater determinants. Each state is projected on eigenstates of parity and angular momentum. Then, performing the configuration mixing calculation with the Skyrme Hamiltonian, we obtain low-lying energy-eigenstates and their explicit wave functions. The generated wave functions are completely free from any assumption and symmetry restriction. Excitation spectra and transition probabilities are well reproduced, not only for the ground-state band, but for negative-parity excited states and the Hoyle state.Comment: 4 pages, 1 figure, Talk at 2nd International Nuclear Physics Conference "Nuclear Structure and Dynamics", Opatija, Croatia, July 9 - 13, 201

Leximals, the Lexicore and the Average Lexicographic Value

The lexicographic vectors of a balanced game, called here leximals, are used to define a new solution concept, the lexicore, on the cone of balanced games. Properties of the lexicore and its relation with the core on some classes of games are studied. It is shown that on cones of balanced games where the core is additive, the leximals, the lexicore and the Average Lexicographic (AL-)value are additive, too. Further, it turns out that the leximals satisfy a consistency property with respect to a reduced game `a la Davis and Maschler, which implies an average consistency property of the AL-value. Explicit formulas for the AL-value on the class of k-convex games and on the class of balanced almost convex games are provided.cooperative games;the core;the AL-value;the Shapley value

Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning

We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in the same round as they were assigned, but in the SECRET sanctions treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is finished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish. We find that sanctioning is similar in both treatments, giving support for nonstrategic explanations of sanctions (altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments with sanctioning are higher than when the public goods game is played without any sanctioning, irrespective of announcing the sanctions to their receivers during the play of the game, or only after the game is finished. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation: subjects correctly expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place against freeriders.altruistic punishment;nonstrategic sanctions;strategic sanctions;public goods;economic experiment

New Axiomatizations and an Implementation of the Shapley Value

Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given.Shapley value;axiomatization;implementation

Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions

The first part is the study of several conditions which are sufficient for the coincidence of the prenucleolus concept and the egalitarian nonseparable contribution (ENSC-) method. The main sufficient condition for the coincidence involved requires that the maximal excesses at the ENSC-solution are determined by the (n-1)-person coalitions in then-person game. The second part is the study of both a new type of games, the so-calledk-coalitionaln-person games, and the interrelationship between solutions on the class of those games. The main results state that the Shapley value of ak-coalitionaln-person game can be written as a convex or affine combination of the ENSC-solution and the centre of the imputation set