Presentism and Temporal Experience

Abstract- Presentism And Temporal Experience Intuitively, we all believe that we experience change and the passage of time. Presentism prides itself as the most intuitive theory of time. However, a closer look at how we would experience temporality if presentism was true reveals that this is far from obvious. For if presentism was really so intuitive, then it would do justice to these intuitions. In the course of this article I examine how presentism fares when combined with various leading theories of perception and temporal perception. I focused on two Central Questions. Can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of change and duration? And can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of time as passing? I argue that there is no possible combination which allows for an experience of time as passing. This result alone undermines the alleged intuitive advantage of presentism and with it the motivation for the view. Presentism, it remains safe to say, is not as intuitive a theory as its adherents like to portray it

The Ethical Spirit of EU Values

This open access book, summarising the research conducted at this Jean Monnet Chair, seeks to identify the ethical spirit of European Union (EU) values. EU integration began at the economic level; human rights were only added at a later stage. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty turned the EU into a ‘Union of values’ by enshrining certain concepts in Art 2 TEU. This provision can be seen as a hub linked to various other provisions of EU primary and secondary law. The values contained therein have, amongst others, been applied to two areas (digitalisation and non-financial reporting, partly in sports), and further specified in others (health and partly in sports). This book analyses the evolution of values (ratione temporis) and the questions of who is entitled and who is obliged (ratione personae). Besides the external perspective (ratione limitis; e.g., Brexit), it focuses on the composition of the EU’s common values (ratione materiae). As Art 2 TEU can be viewed as a hub, it is essential to focus on various relations, not only between values, but also between values and other provisions of EU law, as well as other concepts. Based on this description of the status quo, the book subsequently addresses a possible future direction, arguing for an additional narrative (trust), an additional value (environmental protection), and a more communitarian Union. In closing, apart from the classical commitment of the EU and the Member States to uphold the values of the EU, the book discusses the level of individuals and values as virtues. Various figures and tables complement this overview of the status quo of the Union of values and outline of its future direction

The Ethical Spirit of EU Values

This open access book, summarising the research conducted at this Jean Monnet Chair, seeks to identify the ethical spirit of European Union (EU) values. EU integration began at the economic level; human rights were only added at a later stage. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty turned the EU into a ‘Union of values’ by enshrining certain concepts in Art 2 TEU. This provision can be seen as a hub linked to various other provisions of EU primary and secondary law. The values contained therein have, amongst others, been applied to two areas (digitalisation and non-financial reporting, partly in sports), and further specified in others (health and partly in sports). This book analyses the evolution of values (ratione temporis) and the questions of who is entitled and who is obliged (ratione personae). Besides the external perspective (ratione limitis; e.g., Brexit), it focuses on the composition of the EU’s common values (ratione materiae). As Art 2 TEU can be viewed as a hub, it is essential to focus on various relations, not only between values, but also between values and other provisions of EU law, as well as other concepts. Based on this description of the status quo, the book subsequently addresses a possible future direction, arguing for an additional narrative (trust), an additional value (environmental protection), and a more communitarian Union. In closing, apart from the classical commitment of the EU and the Member States to uphold the values of the EU, the book discusses the level of individuals and values as virtues. Various figures and tables complement this overview of the status quo of the Union of values and outline of its future direction

Awareness without Time

Recently, philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Examples include dreams, trances, and meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This paper aims to give a coherent conceptualisation of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’ without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the paper will expand on an account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession. The conclusion points towards some further avenues of research

The experience of temporal passage

In this thesis I analyse the notion of temporal passage (the passage of time), our (alleged) experience of it, and whether we can come to know anything about temporal passage through experience. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the metaphysics of temporal passage. I argue that temporal passage is a logically coherent notion, as long as it is understood as a change in what exists (exists simpliciter) within a presentist framework. A core element of part one is my reconstruction of McTaggart’s (1908; 1927) infamous argument against temporal passage as a special case of the problem of change. I argue that McTaggart’s argument requires a view of time according to which all times exist (A-eternalism), and temporal passage as a qualitative change of terms in the time-series with regards to pastness, presentness and futurity (A-properties). I provide a limited defence of the paradox within McTaggart’s framework, where I interpret it as a regress of mutually dependent, merely relational changes. The regress I say is vicious, due to the dependencies between its different stages: every change in terms of A-properties involves the instantiation of mutually exclusive A-properties and must thus be qualified to different times, which must undergo the same kind of change. To maintain the dynamic of time while avoiding contradiction, none of these relational changes can occur without the next, where on each level of the regress the solution to the initial problem recreates the very same kind of problem. I then argue that temporal passage, understood as change in what exists simpliciter, or absolute becoming, avoids the paradox. This view is best accommodated by presentism, the view that only the present exists. The conclusion of part one is that temporal passage should be understood as absolute becoming of times within a presentist framework. In the second part of the thesis I argue against a frequently found (but rarely explicitly analysed) argument, which states that we can infer that time passes from experience because the fact that time passes is the best explanation for having experiences of temporal passage. I argue that the argument fails because we either cannot experience temporal passage at all, or not in a way that allows us to infer that time passes from experience. I begin by discussing different types of experiences that are commonly mistaken for experiences of temporal passage: experiences of qualitative change and successive experiences of events as occurring now. I then argue that the only experience that could be best explained by the fact that time passes would be a perceptual experience of events undergoing absolute becoming. Whether we can perceptually represent the absolute becoming of events, or ‘A-change’, is then assessed in the light of three major accounts of temporal perception: the memory theory, the retentional theory and the extensional theory. None of those theories, I argue, can account for the required experience, at least not in the right way. The memory theory does not allow for experiences of A-change because it denies that we can have perceptual experiences of change in general. The retentional theory does not allow for experiences of A-change as A-change. The extensional theory proves to be incompatible with presentism and therefore with absolute becoming. I explore two non-standard forms of presentism that take the metaphysical present to be temporally extended (in different ways) and that are, for this reason, prima facie compatible with the extensional theory. One of these views turns out to be incoherent. Combined with the extensional theory, the other one does not allow us to perceptually represent absolute becoming either. Given all major theories of temporal perception, we cannot infer that time passes from experience. In the last section I defend my argument against two objections, one involving ‘high level properties’, and one involving ‘present-as-absent’ representation in experience. I conclude that we cannot infer from experience whether time passes or not

A Puzzle About Aftertaste

When we cook, by meticulously following a recipe, or adding a personal twist to it, we sometimes care not only to (re-)produce a taste that we can enjoy, but also to give our food a certain aftertaste. This is not surprising, given that we ordinarily take aftertaste to be an important part of the gustatory experience as a whole, one which we seek out, and through which we evaluate what we eat and drink—at least in many cases. What is surprising is that aftertastes, from a psychological point of view, seem to be analogous to afterimages, and thus have little or no epistemic import. In this paper we tackle this puzzle, and argue that we are right in treating aftertastes seriously. The moral is that both from a metaphysical and an epistemic point of view aftertastes should be categorized differently from afterimages

High failure rate of the Duraloc Constrained Inlay

Background and purpose After total hip arthroplasty, dislocations are a frequent complication and are difficult to treat in some patients. A great variety of implants and antiluxation mechanisms are used in surgical therapy

Idiopathic toe walking and sensory processing dysfunction

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>It is generally understood that toe walking involves the absence or limitation of heel strike in the contact phase of the gait cycle. Toe walking has been identified as a symptom of disease processes, trauma and/or neurogenic influences. When there is no obvious cause of the gait pattern, a diagnosis of idiopathic toe walking (ITW) is made. Although there has been limited research into the pathophysiology of ITW, there has been an increasing number of contemporary texts and practitioner debates proposing that this gait pattern is linked to a sensory processing dysfunction (SPD). The purpose of this paper is to examine the literature and provide a summary of what is known about the relationship between toe walking and SPD.</p> <p>Method</p> <p>Forty-nine articles were reviewed, predominantly sourced from peer reviewed journals. Five contemporary texts were also reviewed. The literature styles consisted of author opinion pieces, letters to the editor, clinical trials, case studies, classification studies, poster/conference abstracts and narrative literature reviews. Literature was assessed and graded according to level of evidence.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Only one small prospective, descriptive study without control has been conducted in relation to idiopathic toe walking and sensory processing. A cross-sectional study into the prevalence of idiopathic toe walking proposed sensory processing as being a reason for the difference. A proposed link between ITW and sensory processing was found within four contemporary texts and one conference abstract.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Based on the limited conclusive evidence available, the relationship between ITW and sensory processing has not been confirmed. Given the limited number and types of studies together with the growing body of anecdotal evidence it is proposed that further investigation of this relationship would be advantageous.</p