1,223 research outputs found

    The 51st (Highland) Division during the First World War

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    The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the 51st (Highland) division over the course of the First World War. Underpinning the study is an analysis of both change and continuity, at home and overseas, and the performance of the division as a fighting unit. The key themes identified for study have been training, esprit de corps, recruitment and reinforcement, and battle performance. Through the investigation of the key themes, other important characteristics have been analysed, such as command and control, organisation, and the level of centralisation in both the formation and in the wider Army. Key questions in the research apply to both divisional study and to wider academic understanding of the First World War. The thesis considers a number of themes that have been neglected by historians old and new, and brings into sharp focus some areas of research that may have produced inaccurate assumptions. In addition, a substantial range and quantity of primary sources have been utilised, many unexplored until now. The selection of the 51st (Highland) Division for study was based on a number of criteria. (Highland) Division experiences were both unique and not unique. In some areas it was a very individual formation, but in other areas or at particular times of the war it was not

    Evaluation of spectrophotometric pH methods for freshwater measurements

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    Austerity and Illusion

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    Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically on the contention that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Finding no good reason to accept this claim, we develop and defend a simple, naïve account of both veridical perception and illusion, here dubbed Simple, Austere Naïve Realism

    Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta

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    We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply

    Knowledge and Ways of Knowing

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