The changing nature of communication and regulation of risk in Europe

The regulation and communication of risk has changed significantly over the past 20 years or so, partially as a result of a number of regulatory scandals in Europe and elsewhere (Lofstedt 2004: Majone and Everson 2001; Sunstein 2005), which have led to public distrust of regulators and policy makers. This increase in public distrust has resulted in a phasing-out of consensual-style regulation, and the emergence of a newer model of regulation based on variables including public participation, transparency, and increasingly powerful non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This paper discusses some of the consequences of adopting this new model of regulation through a series of case studies

The Relationship Between Barriers and Drivers of COVID-19 Protective Behaviors in Germany and the UK

Objectives: To explore and evaluate the impact of factors including public risk perceptions on COVID-19 protective behaviors across the UK and Germany. Methods: We used survey data collected from a representative sample for Germany and the UK (total N = 1,663) between April and May 2021. Using a Structural Equation Model, we evaluate the role of personal health risk perceptions, official message quality, source of news, age and political orientation on COVID-19 protective behaviors in the context of German and UK risk communication strategies. Results: Personal health risk perceptions had a significant positive influence on protective behaviors. Economic risk perceptions had a negative direct influence on protective behaviors, particularly in Germany, as well as a positive indirect influence. Official message quality, use of official news sources and age had positive impacts on risk perceptions and protective behaviors. Left-wing political orientation was linked to greater likelihood of undertaking protective behaviors. Conclusion: For future pandemics, more attention should be paid to evaluating and conceptualizing different varieties of risk perceptions, risk communication strategies, and demographic variables alongside their impacts on undertaking protective behaviors.publishedVersio

The COVID-19 pandemic: how can risk science help?

This paper reflects on how risk science, with its concepts, principles, approaches, methods and models, can support the actual assessments, communication and handling of the vulnerabilities and risks related to the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. We highlight the importance of acknowledging uncertainty as a main component of risk, in order to properly characterize and communicate risk, as well as to understand the difference between professional risk judgements and risk perception. We challenge the use of the commonly referred to phrase that the policies adopted are science-based, in a situation like this characterized by fundamental uncertainties about the underlying phenomena and the effects of possible interventions. Arguments are provided for a ‘balanced’ use of precaution, combined with adaptive management and learning.publishedVersio

The Risks of the Mask

In this article we go beyond epidemiological models to make a case for a more holistic approach to the use of face masks as a risk mitigation factor in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. We argue that while masking offers a measure of protection from infection, its moral, political, and affective implications produce two main collateral risks. These are: (1) the heightening of social boundaries, which thus increase the potential of conflict between different social groups; and (2) the impairment of normative interaction rituals followed by a dynamic of distancing, insulation, and social alienation. While we stop short from constructing a hierarchy of risks, we do argue that policy makers should consider these collateral risks as part of any large-scale Covid-19 risk mitigation and communication strategy. We thus provide some principled guidance on how that might be done.publishedVersio

The Ditchley Transparency Manifesto

This manifesto is based on the discussions that have taken place since the Workshop on Transparency, organized in Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, on June 17 and 18, 2010. The authors present a strategic view on the concrete measures that must be taken for a European pharmaceutical transparency initiative to be successful

’All we have to do is be uncertain’: assessing the ‘amplification of institutional incertitude’ in European food safety and risk governance

This paper addresses efforts made by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in recent years to foreground the identification, representation, and public disclosure of scientific uncertainty in its risk assessment procedures and communications, a process aptly characterised in this paper as the ‘amplification of institutional incertitude’. We argue that while the introduction of EFSA’s novel uncertainty reforms has opened a welcome space for academic and policy dialogue, this strategic initiative will nevertheless struggle to reconcile ongoing stakeholder concerns about the legitimacy, direction, and authority of the agency’s scientific opinions and expert advice. We observe that the instigation of EFSA’s uncertainty reforms is prefigured by a longstanding policy tension running at the heart of the agency’s directives requiring officials to be both open and transparent on the one hand, whilst being free from political influence and remaining distanced from risk management decisions on the other. The uncertainty reforms adopted may accordingly be understood as a way for EFSA to reconcile a current ‘uncertainty paradox’ facing the agency by accommodating wider concerns about uncertainty and opening itself up to further scrutiny of its risk assessment processes without relinquishing independence. We argue that prior policy tensions are unlikely to be resolved by simply ‘being uncertain’ however, because this prescriptive ‘solution’ offers only limited congruency with the wider problem diagnoses facing the agency. Moreover, we caution that as institutional incertitude is increasingly amplified, EFSA will in turn be further prompted to rethink and refresh its stakeholder engagement initiatives in order to improve its standing in the food safety field amidst ongoing criticisms and calls for greater inclusion, oversight, and input that follow. Finally, we offer some policy recommendations and highlight the need for future lines of research inquiry to take greater account of the socio-political context in which the assessment and communication of uncertainty takes place

The use of AI algorithms in architecture, engineering and construction: A tool for crisis prevention? The uncertainty perspective

Within the Architecture, engineering and construction (AEC) sector we see movements toward greater use of industrial robots, machine learning, algorithms, and other artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Yet, the AEC industry, despite being one of the largest fields on a global scale, is known for being the slowest to digitalize and innovate. Factors such as unrecognizing the value of digitalization by the decision-makers and making safety-related decisions under high levels of uncertainty, appear to be critical in preventing successful large-scale digitalization. This situation raises multiple questions from a risk science perspective. How, among other things, might the expansion of AI and more specifically AI algorithms usage in the AEC field affect uncertainties, and could AI be considered a tool for preventing crises? To obtain responses to these questions, we conducted 21 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with AEC employees who are currently using AI and AI algorithms or will soon be doing so in their everyday work. Our findings show potential for wider use within the AEC field, subject to overcoming knowledge gaps. Moreover, although having the potential to reduce some uncertainties, the increased use of AI and AI algorithms appears to be introducing an entirely new set of uncertainties. As a result, although AI may effectively prevent certain crises and be regarded as crisis prevention tool, its inadequate implementation could potentially create new risks