The EU and US : friends or rivals

As boas relações entre a União Europeia e os EUA são essenciais para a estabilidade global. Mas as actuais relações transatlânticas permanecem constrangidas sobretudo como resultado da guerra no Iraque e da abordagem unilateral da primeira administração George W. Bush. As divergências entre UE-EUA têm aumentado nas áreas políticas e estratégicas bem como nas áreas económicas e sociais. Uma das maiores divergências incide sobre a governação global e sobre o papel atribuído à ONU e a outras instituições multilaterais. Também existe um elevado grau de anti-americanismo (ou de oposição às políticas da administração Bush) na Europa, e de ressentimento para com a Europa (ou melhor, para com a França e Alemanha) nos EUA. A UE não tem ideia de como lidar com a única superpotência mundial. Normalmente prefere- se o bilateral aos canais europeus. Mas as actuais estruturas UE-EUA não permitem uma discussão séria sobre muitas destas diferenças. Nem a OTAN é uma estrutura adequada para um diálogo estratégico transatlântico, como o chanceler Schroeder referiu na Conferencia Wehrkunde, em Munique, em Janeiro de 2005

After Brexit: Prospects for UK-EU cooperation on foreign and security policy. EPC Policy Brief 30 October 2017

Both the UK and the EU want to continue cooperating closely with one another on defence and security issues after Brexit. But how this ‘close relationship’ will come about, or what it will look like is less clear. In this Policy Brief, Fraser Cameron presents us with the different options for the future, and argues that the development of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU on foreign and security policy will mainly depend on three things: First, the broader positioning of the UK in global affairs. To what extent will it seek to act autonomously, and to what extent as a close partner of the EU, or even as the junior transatlantic partner to the US? Second, developments within the EU itself. It is an open question whether post-Brexit the EU will form a more cohesive and effective foreign and security policy or whether it will remain divided as it was on Iraq, Libya and Syria. Various European leaders are now pushing for a stronger EU in security and defence, but previous attempts have shown how difficult it is to move forward in this sensitive area. The differences in outlook between France and Germany, for example, remain very significant. Third, the final Brexit divorce settlement. An amicable separation will create goodwill to collaborate, while a nasty parting of ways will also impact on foreign and security policy

The European Union's New Rival - China

The European Union-China relationship, based on an optimistic joint strategic agenda agreed in 2013, has shifted direction, with the EU in March 2019 describing China as a "systemic rival" in some areas. The EU has struggled to find a common approach to China, but this change was agreed at record speed and occurred against the background of growing United States pressure on its European allies to support the Donald Trump administration's hard-line approach to China. As the new EU leadership team takes over, it will have to navigate a difficult path in relations with China and the US. The main reason for the shift in the EU's approach was business frustration at China's failure over many years to implement promises to open up its economy and accept a level playing field. Chinese foot-dragging in the negotiations for a bilateral investment agreement, now running for over six years, was another factor in the changed EU approach. A number of key players, including commissioners dealing with China, members of the European Parliament, and EU ambassadors who had served in Beijing, played a key role in securing this changed approach, which was agreed very quickly despite some long-standing divisions between member states on how to deal with China. Pressure from the Trump administration - which, unlike the EU, views China as a "strategic rival" - also played a part. It is likely that the new EU leadership under Ursula von der Leyen will maintain the tougher line, and place greater emphasis on reciprocity and strategic autonomy as guidelines for dealing with China. Meanwhile there is continuing useful cooperation between the EU and China on the foreign policy front, notably on Iran, and on global issues such as climate change and support for the multilateral trading system. The EU has to invest more in understanding China, which is a growing and formidable rival. EU leaders need to spend more time discussing China and agreeing a comprehensive approach covering all sectors. It should work with like-minded partners where there are shared interests concerning China

"It's Asia, Stupid": Time for the EU to Deepen Relations with Asia

Global economic power is shifting rapidly to Asia, now the EU's most important trade partner. The EU has a vital stake in the peace and security of Asia as few of its policy goals, including climate change and preservation of the multilateral system, can be achieved without the positive engagement of Asia. This is even more important because of the attitude of President Trump to Asia and global affairs. The EU thus needs to give greater priority to Asia and develop a more coherent policy approach. Growth rates in Asia have outstripped those in the EU and US for many years. Projected economic growth of 5.5 per cent this year in the Asia-Pacific region is far ahead of the 2.1 per cent and 1.9 per cent projected in the US and the EU, respectively. With economic clout comes political influence, which means that the EU has to pay more attention to Asia to achieve its own policy goals, whether in trade, climate change, migration, or terrorism. The EU has to prioritise and should concentrate on its strategic partners (China, Japan, India, and South Korea) and support for ASEAN. The withdrawal of the US from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) offers the EU an opportunity. The policy of bilateral free trade agreements with selected partners should be continued as there is little prospect of any region-to-region agreement. The EU has a major stake in Asian security as any conflict would immediately impact global supply chains. It should do more to tackle "hot spots," such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Myanmar, and emphasise its integrated approach to security, as demonstrated in Operation Atalanta. The EU should not give up its normative agenda but should promote it in a more sensitive and realistic manner. The EU could also do more to help resolve the historical disputes in Asia, including paying more attention to its own historical role in the region. With the multilateral system under threat from the Trump presidency, the EU needs to engage more with Asia to secure its policy goals. It should revitalise its strategic partnerships as the centrepiece of a new Asia strategy. At the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Brussels in 2018, the EU should highlight its commitment to a stronger partnership with Asia. While trade will still be at the centre of EU-Asia relations, the agenda needs to be expanded to include a range of global issues

spotlight europe 2008/08, July 2008: Prospects for a new EU-Russia-Agreement

The latest EU-Russia-Summit on 27th June 2008 marks a breakthrough in their relations. The planned negotiations on a new strategic partnership between the two actors were stalled for nearly two years. Now all member states have agreed on a broad negotiating mandate for the Commission. After the Irish 'No' to the Lisbon Treaty the talks with Russia become a test case for the EU´s capacity to act as a global player

History matters for the EU’s geopolitical ambitions. EPC Commentary July 2021.

While Europe has a decent record in dealing with the consequences of its bloody modern history, it is only now beginning to confront the collective amnesia regarding its behaviour during the colonial era. If the Union wants to realise its geopolitical ambition to be a global player, EU leaders should deal with the impact of past colonial misdeeds head-on and ensure that EU diplomats and younger Europeans are aware of how our history affects the present. Europeans have warmly embraced US President Joe Biden as a friend and partner. As they seek more geopolitical impact, EU leaders would do well to also listen to the president’s views on history and the power of remembrance. Speaking on the centenary of the 1921 Tulsa race massacre, Biden urged Americans to be honest about their history, insisting that great nations “come to terms with their dark sides”

The oral-aboral axis of a sea urchin embryo is specified by first cleavage

Several lines of evidence suggest that the oral-aboral axis in Strongylocentrotus purpuratus embryos is specified at or before the 8-cell stage. Were the oral-aboral axis specified independently of the first cleavage plane, then a random association of this plane with the blastomeres of the four embryo quadrants in the oral-aboral plane (viz. oral, aboral, right and left) would be expected. Lineage tracer dye injection into one blastomere at the 2-cell stage and observation of the resultant labeling patterns demonstrates instead a strongly nonrandom association. In at least ninety percent of cases, the progeny of the aboral blastomeres are associated with those of the left lateral blastomeres and the progeny of the oral blastomeres with the right lateral ones, respectively. Thus, ninety percent of the time the oral pole of the future oral-aboral axis lies 45 degrees clockwise from the first cleavage plane as viewed from the animal pole. The nonrandom association of blastomeres after labeling of the 2-cell stage implies that there is a mechanistic relation between axis specification and the positioning of the first cleavage plane

Macromere cell fates during sea urchin development

This paper examines the cell lineage relationships and cell fates in embryos of the sea urchin Strongylocentrotus purpuratus leading to the various cell types derived from the definitive vegetal plate territory or the veg_2 tier of cells. These cell types are gut, pigment cells, basal cells and coelomic pouches. They are cell types that constitute embryonic structures through cellular migration or rearrangement unlike the relatively non-motile ectoderm cell types. For this analysis, we use previous knowledge of lineage to assign macromeres to one of four types: VOM, the oral macromere; VAM, the aboral macromere, right and left VLM, the lateral macromeres. Each of the four macromeres contributes progeny to all of the cell types that descend from the definitive vegetal plate. Thus in the gut each macromere contributes to the esophagus, stomach and intestine, and the stripe of labeled cells descendant from a macromere reflects the re-arrangement of cells that occurs during archenteron elongation. Pigment cell contributions exhibit no consistent pattern among the four macromeres, and are haphazardly distributed throughout the ectoderm. Gut and pigment cell contributions are thus radially symmetrical. In contrast, the VOM blastomere contributes to both of the coelomic pouches while the other three macromeres contribute to only one or the other pouch. The total of the macromere contribution amounts to 60% of the cells constituting the coelomic pouches