Collusion, competition and piracy

In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on pricesin an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical productdifferentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discountfactor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We alsoshow that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higherquality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of thesenew characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.Collusion, competition, piracy, consumers, cost of copying,

WHY DOES THE PIRATE DECIDE TO BE THE LEADER IN PRICES?

We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and incentives why a pirate would want to be a leader in prices. The framework of analysis used is a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition, where both incumbent and pirate are committed to keep their prices. We find that both government and incumbent have a key role in avoiding the entry of the pirate. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a monopolist, even if he installs an antipiracy system, because a monopoly provides the lowest social welfare. However, he will let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader, or encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of the pirate, which depends on the technology of the government for monitoring piracy. The pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being brought down by the incumbent and the government, although the leader's profit is lower than the follower's profit. Finally, we find that high-income countries with cheaper monitoring technology have lower piracy rates.Pirate, Incumbent, Government, Price Leadership, Copy, Monitoring Piracy, Income

Lobbyin to prevent commercial piracy

In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more difficult getting the pirate to enter the market.Common Agency, Lobbying, Commercial Piracy, Incumbent, Consumers and Government

Investigación y nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación en la enseñanza: el futuro inmediato

Nuevos canales de comunicación están transformando el campo de las comunicaciones. Las redes de comunicación, que hoy cubren la totalidad del mundo desarrollado, están propiciando una transformación de muchos de los criterios y principios que parecían inmutables. La llegada de estos canales a la enseñanza ya ha comenzado y no se ha realizado la reflexión previa de lo que ello significa y de los cambios estructurales a los que obliga. Este trabajo pretende abrir interrogantes e iniciar líneas de investigación que hagan posible una incorporación consciente de estos canales a los procesos de enseñanza, de forma que ello no signifique una imposición comercial o social sino una utilización pedagógicamente adecuada de los mismos

Privatization policies by national and regional governments

In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, we consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. We show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum, because a private duopoly does not achieve the social optimum. However, not all public interventions in firms are better than the private duopoly. On the other hand, the preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite. Finally, the privatization policies of regional governments are completely opposite from one region to the other, and do not coincide with that of the national government. Overall, this paper shows that the relative size of regions is an important feature in the design of the privatization policies implemented by national and regional governments

Preventing commercial piracy when consumers are loss averse

© 2020. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in Information Economics and PolicyI analyze how the loss aversion of consumers affects the strategies of the government and the incumbent for preventing commercial piracy. To that end, I develop a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition in which con- sumers have a reference-dependent utility. Regardless of the quality of the illegal copy, conventional models that do not take into account the loss aversion of consumers overes- timate the government’s effort to deter piracy but underestimate the incumbent’s effort. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that blocking the entry of a pirate by the govern- ment can provide more welfare than accommodating it. However, the government will not block it because socially it is better to encourage the incumbent to establish a price low enough to deter the pirate from entering

Price versus quantity in a duopoly of vertical differentiation with loss-averse consumers

© 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in Research in EconomicsIn a model àla Mussa and Rosen (1978) in which consumers are loss-averse, I check the robustness of the result obtained by Tanaka (2001) . As he did, I find that the quantity con- tract is a dominant strategy for both firms. Thus, Cournot is the outcome in equilibrium. Finally, I find that loss aversion in general intensifies competition

Collusion and Customization

© 2020. This document is made available under the CC-BY 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by /4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in International Game Theory Review.We analyze the effect of customizing a product on the ability of firms to tacitly collude on prices. Following [Bar-Isaac et al. [2014] Targeted product design: Locating inside the Salop circle, Mimeo], we allow firms to be located inside the circle in the Salop model [Salop, S. [1979] Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell J. Econ., 10(1), 141–156]. Our analysis shows that the effect of product customization on the stability of collusion depends on the sensitivity of consumers’ utility to the degree of customization. In particular, if that sensitivity is low enough, then greater customization facilitates collusion. Otherwise, greater customization hinders collusion if consumers value the product little

Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

© 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in International Game Theory ReviewIn order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market

TRACKING THE PRICE OF ALMONDS IN SPAIN

© 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in Journal of Competition Law & EconomicsI look for signs of manipulation of the price of almonds in the markets of Albacete, Murcia, and Reus in Spain. To that end, I use Benford’s Law to analyze the distribution of the second and third digits of the price of almonds. I find that prices in the Albacete and Reus markets deviate from Benford’s Law, especially for the third digit, and those in the Murcia market deviate from Benford’s Law for the second digit but not for the third digit. I therefore find signs that the price of almonds in the Spain’s main markets is being manipulated