Privatization, Corporate Control and Regulatory Reform: The case of Telefonica

This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a disperse ownership and give managers a high level of discretion in running the company. By this, the government effectively created an agency problem inside the firm. There were no powerful shareholders to constrain the managers, and the threat of a takeover was not a credible one, since the government kept a golden share. There is no overall evidence of capture of politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although evidence suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. We interpret the political interference with the firm’s control (a well documented phenomenon both in this study and in the cross-country literature on privatization; e.g. political ends in privatization, influence in appointments, golden shares) as the most visible part of such collusion. Liberalization and multi-level regulation will likely make any type of collusion or capture more difficult in the future.Governance, Privatization, Regulation, Deregulation, Capture

Regulatory reform, development and distributive concerns

This survey reviews the relationship between regulation and distribution, focusing on regulatory reform in developing countries. The characteristics of these countries impose constraints on appropriate regulatory policies. These constraints condition: i) the terms of the trade-off between firms' rents and efficiency, including the commitment problem in the presence of sunk investments; and ii) the probability of success of removing cross-subsidies. The choices made at reforming infrastructure industries may have a significant impact on perceived distribution and development, and this impact will drive attitudes toward reform. Distributive problems are channeled through politics and institutions, conditioning the potential solutions to the commitment problem. These issues have been extensively explored by the academic literature, which provides guidance on how to address second-generation regulatory reforms.regulation; privatization; infrastructures; development; distribution;

The Spanish government should offer Catalonia a referendum on federalism, not independence

Catalonia held a non-binding consultation on independence on 9 November. Francesc Trillas assesses the argument that the Spanish government should now seek to address the Catalan independence debate by proposing a formal referendum on the issue. He argues that while there are benefits to holding a referendum, there are also a number of costs in the Catalan case, and that offering a binding vote on federalism would be a far better option for Catalonia, Spain and Europe as a whole

A federal Spain within a federal Europe would offer the best solution for Catalonia

The issue of European integration has played an important role in the debate over Catalan independence. Francesc Trillas writes that an independent Catalonia would have competing motivations in the sense that closer European integration would potentially undermine its independence, but stepping back from European integration would have a damaging effect on its ability to trade with other European states. He argues that pushing for a federal Spain within a federal Europe would offer Catalonia the best solution

Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications

We analyse the impact of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation on broadband deployment using a theoretical model and an empirical estimation. Although central powers may be more focused and internalize interjurisdictional externalities, decentralized powers may internalize local horizontal policy spillovers and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments. The latter may, for instance, alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical infrastructures. In the empirical exercise, using data for OECD and EU countries for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether centralization promotes new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existing literature, in the main, claims it does, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband penetration.Regulation, industrial policy, decentralization, broadband

Telecommunications policies: Determinants and impact

This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. The authors find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. They also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behavior of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when the endogeneity of regulatory independence is taken into account.telecommunications; liberalization; institutions;

Regulatory federalism in telecommunications

The liberalization of telecommunications and technological change have unbundled a vector of public interventions in this industry. Now different government levels interact. The economics of federalism shed light into this new landscape. The insights from this branch of research are used to analyze the European Union common telecommunications policy (as compared to the history of federal and state regulations in the US) and the role of local and regional powers in the promotion of broadband new generation networks. Decentralized non-specialized policies internalize policy externalities, whereas specialized centralized authority internalizes territorial spillovers. Preliminary empirical evidence shows that decentralization of policies inside member states is not detrimental for broadband investment in the European Union.La liberalización de las telecomunicaciones y los cambios tecnológicos han dado lugar a un nuevo vector desagregado de intervenciones públicas en este sector. Dado que en la regulación ahora participan distintos niveles de gobierno, el análisis económico del federalismo puede aportar ideas a este nuevo escenario. Las herramientas de este área de investigación son utilizadas en este trabajo para analizar la política común de telecomunicaciones de la Unión Europea (en comparación con la historia de las regulaciones federal y estatal en los Estados Unidos), así como también el papel de los poderes locales y regionales en la promoción de las redes de nueva generación. Las políticas no especializadas y descentralizadas intenalizan las externalidades que se producen en la interacción de políticas públicas, mientras que las autoridades especializadas y centralizadas internalizan los efectos desbordamiento entre territorios. Alguna evidencia empírica preliminar señala que la descentralización de las políticas dentro de los Estados miembros no perjudica a las inversiones en banda ancha en la UE

Telecommunications policies: Measurement and determinants

This paper presents new data on telecommunications reform for a cross section of countries. We measure telecommunications reform along two dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory independence. This data set is combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze the determinants of telecommunications policies. We find that entry barriers are positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist legal tradition, but they are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find that countries with weak protection of investors' quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger incumbent are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although this last result is statistically weaker.Telecommunications policies; Liberalization; Regulation;

L'impacte de les eleccions de 2004 sobre les empreses del país

L'atemptat terrorista a Madrid tres dies abans de les eleccions generals de març de 2004 sembla que capgirà els resultat esperats pels sondejos decantant la balança del PP cap al PSOE. Investigadors de la UAB han aprofitat l'oportunitat única que els brinda aquest fet per analitzar l'impacte d'aquelles eleccions generals en les grans empreses espanyoles utilitzant les tècniques d'estudi d'esdeveniments, que mesuren l'impacte dels esdeveniments sorpresa en el mercat de valors, i així posar a prova algunes hipòtesis políticoeconòmiques. La seva conclusió és que l'impacte d'un o altre partit governant a Espanya no provoca grans canvis en les polítiques econòmiques generals, sinó que canvia el valor dels acords entre els polítics i les empreses.El atentado terrorista en Madrid tres días antes de las elecciones generales de marzo de 2004 parece que invirtió los resultados esperados por los sondeos decantando la balanza del PP hacia el PSOE. Investigadores de la UAB han aprovechado la oportunidad única que les brinda este hecho para analizar el impacto de aquellas elecciones generales en las grandes empresas españolas utilizando las técnicas del estudio de eventos, que miden el impacto de los eventos sorpresa en el mercado de valores, y así poner a prueba algunas hipótesis político-económicas. Su conclusión es que el impacto de uno u otro partido gobernante en España no provoca grandes cambios en las políticas económicas generales, sino cambia que el valor de los acuerdos entre los políticos y las empresas.The terrorist attack in Madrid three days before the general election of March 2004 seemed to be the cause of the unexpected election results, overturning all predictions and tipping the balance from PP to PSOE. UAB researchers have taken the opportunity this event presents to analyse the impact the 2004 election had on large Spanish firms. To do this, they used event study techniques, which measure the impact of surprise events on the stock market, and tested a series of politico- economic hypotheses. Their conclusion is that the impact produced by either of the ruling parties in Spain does not cause large changes in general economic policies. Instead, what changes is the value of agreements between politicians and firms