Företags försvar vid anklagelser om brott – betydelsen av den nordiska kontexten

AbstractIn recent years, several Swedish companies have been accused in the media, by NGOs, and via legal proceedings of engaging in criminal activities. Two of these companies, TeliaSonera and Lundin Petroleum have been the focus of substantial public attention. During the years following the revelations that TeliaSonera, a partly state owned telecommunications company, had committed bribery offences in Central Asia, the affair went from a public scandal in Sweden to a legal process in Sweden and abroad. Lundin Petroleum, a family owned oil company accused of participating in crimes against humanity in Sudan, has continuously denied the accusation by using a variety of denials and neutralizations. The current paper analyzes the strategies employed by these two businesses when defending themselves against allegations of criminal acts. Drawing on Stanley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work on processes of denial and neutralization techniques, we have identified four main techniques used by the two companies to deflect allegations of criminal wrongdoing: literal denial; denial of knowledge; condemning the condemners; and appealing to a higher loyalty. In addition, we identify how the corporations emphasise their “Nordic values” by linking into a post-colonial discourse and justify their behaviour by relativising it. The article contributes to the discussion of neutralization strategies by pointing out the importance of the context in which a defence takes place

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Conscription Refusal as Pollitical Resistance

Since the law on universal conscription was passed 1901, there has been a debate in Sweden concerning how to deal with those who refuse military service. The state faces a dilemma: on the one hand maintaining the law on conscription, while on the other allowing the right to conscientious objection. The objective of this article is to scrutinize how the Swedish state has tried to solve this dilemma. At the beginning of the 20th century, those who refused to fulfill the fundamental duty of military service were not regarded as deserving any kind of legal protection. Their actions questioned the consensus on the need for a military defense, and therefore had to be punished. But it did not take long until this view was modified, and a law was established that opened up the option of community service for conscientious objectors. In that way, the legislators created a buffer in the conflict between pro-militarists and anti-militarists. As long as the objectors stayed in the buffer construction, they did not represent any threat towards military defense. On the contrary, they even served as proof that the state respected human rights. The opposition was in that manner divided into two parts; those who accepted community service and those who did not. The latter, who did not accept the state’s offer of community service, were sentenced to prison. Since 1901, the legislator’s main strategy to tackle opposition towards military defense has been a combination of co-optation via community service and repression via prison for those who do not accept that service. It has been of great concern for the lawmakers to keep the number of the latter, the total resisters, sentenced to prison as low as possible. If the number becomes too high, it will cause debate and criticism, both in public and in the parliament. The lawmakers have responded by modifying the prison sentence and changing the construction of the buffer

Conscription Refusal as Pollitical Resistance

Since the law on universal conscription was passed 1901, there has been a debate in Sweden concerning how to deal with those who refuse military service. The state faces a dilemma: on the one hand maintaining the law on conscription, while on the other allowing the right to conscientious objection. The objective of this article is to scrutinize how the Swedish state has tried to solve this dilemma. At the beginning of the 20th century, those who refused to fulfill the fundamental duty of military service were not regarded as deserving any kind of legal protection. Their actions questioned the consensus on the need for a military defense, and therefore had to be punished. But it did not take long until this view was modified, and a law was established that opened up the option of community service for conscientious objectors. In that way, the legislators created a buffer in the conflict between pro-militarists and anti-militarists. As long as the objectors stayed in the buffer construction, they did not represent any threat towards military defense. On the contrary, they even served as proof that the state respected human rights. The opposition was in that manner divided into two parts; those who accepted community service and those who did not. The latter, who did not accept the state’s offer of community service, were sentenced to prison. Since 1901, the legislator’s main strategy to tackle opposition towards military defense has been a combination of co-optation via community service and repression via prison for those who do not accept that service. It has been of great concern for the lawmakers to keep the number of the latter, the total resisters, sentenced to prison as low as possible. If the number becomes too high, it will cause debate and criticism, both in public and in the parliament. The lawmakers have responded by modifying the prison sentence and changing the construction of the buffer

Policing of Political Protest : The Security Police's Control of the Extra-parliamentary Opposition in Sweden During and after the Cold War

Throughout history, those in power have monitored and exercised control over individuals and groups who have been perceived as representing some form of threat to their power. Irrespective of the system of government in place, political crime is a matter of central interest to a society's security police. Political crimes are often committed by extra-parliamentary groups or organizations. The focus of this paper is how the Swedish secret police (SÄPO) have acted against what they have perceived as the extreme left, mainly anarchists and autonomists, during and after the cold war. Did SÄPO's perception of this part of the extra-parliamentary opposition change when the cold war was over in the early 1990s? Were these groups and individuals perceived as the new enemy in the threat vacuum that temporarily arose in the aftermath of the cold war? Furthermore, had the new security concept that was introduced at that time any impact on SÄPO's activities

Internationaliseringen av kriminalpolitiken

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