Target Zones in History and Theory: Lessons from an Austro-Hungarian Experiment (1896-1914)

The first known experiment with an exchange rate band took place in Austria- Hungary between 1896 and 1914. The rationale for introducing this policy rested on precisely those intuitions that the modern literature has emphasized: the band was designed to secure both exchange rate stability and monetary policy autonomy. However, unlike more recent experiences, such as the ERM, this policy was not undermined by credibility problems. The episode provides an ideal testing ground for some important ideas in modern macroeconomics: specifically, can formal rules, when faithfully adhered to, provide policy makers with some advantages such as short term autonomy? First, we find that a credible band has a "microeconomic" influence on exchange rate stability. By reducing uncertainty, a credible fluctuation band improves the quality of expectations, a channel that has been neglected in the modern literature. Second, we show that the standard test of the basic target zone model is flawed and develop an alternative methodology. We believe that these findings shed a new light on the economics of exchange rate bands

Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship Banking and Conditionality Lending in the London Market for Foreign Government Debt, 1815-1913

This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity crises in a manner similar to modern descriptions of relationship lending to corporate clients by parent banks. Prestigious bankers' ability to implement conditionality loans and monitor countries' financial policies also enabled them to deal with solvency. We find that, compared with prestigious bankers, bondholders' committees had neither the tools nor the prestige required for effectively dealing with defaulters. Hence such committees were far less important than previous research has claimed

Credibility and adjustment: gold standards versus currency boards

It is often maintained that currency boards (CBs) and gold standards (GSs) are alike in that they are stringent monetary rules, the two basic features of which are high credibility of monetary authorities and the existence of automatic adjustment (non discretionary) mechanism. This article includes a comparative analysis of these two types of regimes both from the perspective of the sources and mechanisms of generating confidence and credibility, and the elements of operation of the automatic adjustment mechanism. Confidence under the GS is endogenously driven, whereas it is exogenously determined under the CB. CB is a much more asymmetric regime than GS (the adjustment is much to the detriment of peripheral countries) although asymmetry is a typical feature of any monetary regime. The lack of credibility is typical for peripheral countries and cannot be overcome completely even by “hard” monetary regimes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40078/3/wp692.pd

Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913

This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and?or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations

Introduction: new research in monetary history - A map

This handbook aims to provide a comprehensive (though obviously not exhaustive) picture of state-of-the-art international scholarship on the history of money and currency. The chapters of this handbook cover a wide selection of research topics. They span chronologically from antiquity to nowadays and are geographically stretched from Latin America to Asia, although most of them focus on Western Europe and the USA, as a large part of the existing research does. The authors of these chapters constitute, we hope, a balanced sample of various generations of scholars who contributed to what Barry Eichengreen defined as "the new monetary and financial history" – an approach that combines the analysis of monetary aggregates and policies with the structure and dynamics of the banking sector and financial markets. We have structured this handbook in ten broad thematic parts: the historical origins of money; money, coinage, and the state; trade, money markets, and international currencies; money and metals; monetary experiments; Asian monetary systems; exchange rate regimes; monetary integration; central banking and monetary policy; and aggregate price shocks. In this introduction, we offer for each part some historical context, a few key insights from the literature, and a brief analytical summary of each chapter. Our aim is to draw a map that hopefully will help readers to organize their journey through this very wide and diverse research area

Currency Unions

A currency union is when several independent sovereign nations share a common currency. This has been a recurring phenomenon in monetary history. In this article I study the theoretical foundations of such unions, and discuss some important currency unions in history, most notably the case of the US. Finally I contrast the design of the EMU with economic theories and historical experiences of currency unions

The Euro as a Proxy for the Classical Gold Standard? Government Debt Financing and Political Commitment in Historical Perspective

[Introduction] In spite of the recent troubles in the euro area, Jesus Huerta de Soto (2012), a famous proponent of the gold standard, argues that the euro should be considered a 'second best to the gold standard' and is worth being preserved. From a classical liberal point of view, he sheds some light on the euro's similarities with the gold standard and on some important advantages of the currency union over its alternative, flexible exchange rates in Europe. According to Huerta de Soto (2012), the main advantage of the introduction of the common currency is that - like when 'going on gold' - European governments have given up monetary nationalism. Like the gold standard, the euro limits state power as it prevents national central banks from manipulating exchange rates and inflating away government debt. Currently, he argues, the common currency - like previously the gold standard - forces important reforms and/or spending cuts upon the countries of the euro area that face severe debt and structural problems. In this respect, the euro should be seen as 'a proxy for the gold standard'. In this policy paper, I attempt to address some similarities and differences in the institutional framework of the classical gold standard (1880 - 1912) and the European Monetary Union (EMU) (1999 - ) that affect government debt financing and the way in which countries react to crisis. I argue that - in line with Huerta de Soto (2012) - giving up monetary nationalism and committing to the rules of either the gold standard or EMU initially restricted the scope of state action. Therefore, the euro - like previously the gold standard - provided some (fiscal) policy credibility. Fiscal policy credibility was the main determinant of capital market integration and low government borrowing costs in Europe under both systems. But in contrast to Huerta de Soto (2012), I shall emphasize that neither the gold standard, nor the euro itself force reforms and spending cuts upon countries that face crisis and debt problems. The political commitment to the monetary systems determines the willingness to reform or cut spending and therewith fiscal policy credibility in crisis periods: (...

Where it All Began: Lending of Last Resort and the Bank of England During the Overend, Gurney Panic of 1866

The National Monetary Commission was deeply concerned with importing best practice. One important focus was the connection between the money market and international trade. It was said that Britain's lead in the market for acceptances originating in international trade was the basis of its sterling predominance. In this article, we use a so-far unexplored source to document the portfolio of bills that was brought up to the Bank of England for discount and study the behavior of the Bank of England during the crisis of 1866 (the so-called Overend-Gurney panic) when the Bank began adopting lending of last resort policies (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini 2011). We compare 1865 (a normal year) to 1866. Important findings include: (a) the statistical predominance of foreign bills in the material brought to the Bank of England; (b) the correlation between the geography of bills and British trade patterns; (c) a marked contrast between normal times lending and crisis lending in that main financial intermediaries and the shadow banking system only showed up at the Bank's window during crises; (d) the importance of money market investors (bills brokers) as chief conduit of liquidity provision in crisis; (e) the importance of Bank of England's supervisory policies in ensuring lending-of-lastresort operations without enhancing moral hazard. An implication of our findings is that Bank of England's ability to control moral hazard for financial intermediaries involved in acceptances was another reason for the rise of sterling as an international currency

Determinants of the income velocity of money in Portugal: 1891–1998

This paper performs a long-run time series analysis of the behaviour of the income velocity of money in Portugal between 1891 and 1998 by assessing the importance of both macroeconomic and institutional factors and looking for particularities in the Portuguese case. We estimate two cointegration vectors for the income velocity of money, macroeconomic variables and institutional variables. It is apparent that one of these vectors reflects the relationship between income velocity and macroeconomic variables, while the other reflects the relationship between income velocity and institutional variables. Moreover, a regression analysis reveals that the usual U-shaped pattern is displayed with a relatively late inflection point located around 1970, which is consistent with the Spanish case. It is further noted that this is a feature of countries with a late economic and institutional development process.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio