Rituals and Sacraments

Christians, like their Islamic brothers and sisters, pray to God regularly. Much like Islam, the most important Christian prayer is praise and thanksgiving given to God. Christians pray morning and evening, either alone or with others, and at meals. But among the most important Christian prayers are the community ritual celebrations known as The Sacraments [from Latin, meaning signs ]. Christians also celebrate seasons and festival days [see Feasts and Seasons]. Download full text to read more.https://ir.stthomas.edu/encounteringislam/1027/thumbnail.jp

Visual Masking: A Reliable Measure for the Assessment of Cognitive Dysfunction in the Elderly?

Reliable assessment of cognitive dysfunction in the elderly is a prerequisite for the evaluation of treatment of age-related cognitive decline. Psychophysical thresholds are known to be more reliable than psychometric tests, as assessed by stability of performance in visual masking. A backward (Till & Franklin, 1981) and a forward masking study (Coyne, 1981) were replicated. Thereafter, the same volunteers carried out a backward and forward masking task adapted to minimize noncognitive age-related influences: target and mask duration were individually adjusted to control for reduced eye transmissiveness. Attention was assessed with the electrooculogram; a dependent variable insensitive to sporadic decreases of attention was selected. Test-retest stability in the elderly after 2-4 weeks was r = .97 in backward and r = .86 in forward masking. As Alzheimer's disease mainly affects the cortex, backward masking, which is primarily cortical, may be useful to assess aspects of cognitive dysfunctio

Validação do Modelo Les Palm por meio de dados de Radiosondagens e de Aeronave Coletados durante o experimento Ggoamazon

In the present study, the evolution of the convective boundary layer over heterogeneous surface simulated by PALM LES is validated with radiosounding and airborne data from GoAmazon field campaigns, held in Amazon Rainforest during the 2014 wet and dry seasons. It is shown that, in general case, the growth of the convective boundary layer simulated by PALM compares well with observational data. However, during the morning time, the convective boundary layer depth is underestimated, whereas it showed acceptable response to the decreasing of the surface forcings along the late afternoon.A evolução da camada limite convectiva sobre superfície heterogênea simulada pelo modelo LES PALM é comparada com dados de radiosondagem e de aeronave obtidos do Experimento GoAmazon, realizado durante as estações chuvosa e seca de 2014 na Floresta Amazônica. É mostrado que, de uma forma geral, o crescimento da camada limite convectiva foi bem representado pelo modelo PALM durante os dois casos se comparados as observações. O modelo tende a subestimar a espessura da camada limite convectiva durante o período da manhã. Por outro lado, responde satisfatoriamente ao decréscimo dos forçantes de superfície no final da tarde

Estrutura da Camada Limite Atmosférica Acoplada a Heterogeneidade Superficial no Sul da Amazônia – Experimento

This study used dropsonde data from the SAMBBA field campaign (held during September/October 2012) in Amazonia. Preliminary results showed a remarkable evolution of the convective boundary layer (CBL) along surface heterogeneity, and in the presence of clouds

The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs\u27 counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys\u27 fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs\u27 bar. Merger cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs\u27 attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware\u27s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area

Mootness Fees

In response to a sharp increase in litigation challenging mergers, the Delaware Chancery Court issued the 2016 Trulia decision, which substantively reduced the attractiveness of Delaware as a forum for these suits. In this Article, we empirically assess the response of plaintiffs’ attorneys to these developments. Specifically, we document a troubling trend—the flight of merger litigation to federal court where these cases are overwhelmingly resolved through voluntary dismissals that provide no benefit to the plaintiff class but generate a payment to plaintiffs’ counsel in the form of a mootness fee. In 2018, for example, 77% of deals with litigation were challenged in federal court, and in 63% of litigated cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee. This compares with 2014, when only 4% of deals with litigation had a filing in federal court and no mootness fees were awarded. The rise of the mootness fee and the shift to federal court raise several issues, including a lack of transparency in the quality and resolution of merger cases and an increased potential for blackmail litigation. These problems are compounded by the willingness of some courts to permit the payment of a mootness fee in connection with corrective disclosures that are immaterial but possibly helpful, a standard that we argue is unworkable and increases the potential for vexatious litigation. We argue that the widespread payment of mootness fees reflects an inappropriate tax on the judicial system and corporations. Although we argue that a shift to federal courts is appropriate for litigation challenging the adequacy of merger disclosure, we maintain that a successful shift requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution of merger litigation carefully. We conclude that federal courts should require that the payment of mootness fees be subject to judicial review. We further argue that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation resulting in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard required by Trulia. We propose that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to implement these requirements or alternatively that federal judges use their inherent authority to adopt these requirements. We ultimately view these changes as necessary to limit frivolous litigation and provide for transparency and judicial oversight of the litigation process

The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs\u27 counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys\u27 fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs\u27 bar. Merger cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs\u27 attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware\u27s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area

The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys’ fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs’ bar in which cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court in an effort to escape the application of the new rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs’ attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware’s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area