Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions

Privatização num mercado misto com decisões sequenciais

Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i) quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos estudados.We consider a market in which a public firm and a private firm compete by deciding, sequentially, the quantities to be produced. The government imposes a tax on the quantities, according to a function that is a weighted sum of the welfare and the total revenue obtained by applying this tax. The aim of this paper is to study the effect of privatization, (i) when the leader is the public firm; and (ii) when the leader is a private firm. Furthermore, we do a comparison between the results from the two models

Privatization and productive efficiency in an international Stackelberg mixed duopoly

We consider a Stackelberg mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing (domestic) public firm competes against a profit-maximizing (foreign) private firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign private firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of privatization on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare. We show that privatization lowers productive efficiency of the domestic firm, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. Furthermore, we also show that privatization of the domestic public firm deteriorates the domestic social welfare, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Dinâmica simbólica e ferradura de Smale

Descrevemos a “ferradura de Smale”, um sistema dinâmico bem conhecido que apresenta um conjunto de propriedades muito importantes em Sistemas Dinâmicos. O estudo da dinâmica da “ferradura de Smale” permitenos entender a importância do conceito de dinâmica simbólica.We describe the Smale horseshoe, a well-known dynamical system that presents a set of properties which are very important in Dynamical Systems. The study of the dynamics of the Smale horseshoe allows us to understand the importance of the notion of symbolic dynamics

Price-quantity-setting mixed duopoly models: market opening

Usually, market models analyse competition between firms with either quantity or price as decision’s variables. This paper considers mixed duopoly competitions in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce complementary goods. We analyse, separately, the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the price and the private firm chooses the output production; and the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the output production and the private firm chooses the price. By considering domestic and international models, we analyse the effects of opening the market to a foreign firm. We also compare the results obtained with different types of decision variables. This paper contributes to the understanding of the implications of firms’ decisions on social welfare. As a result, the paper shows that, in the domestic competition, social welfare is higher when the state-owned public firm sets price and the domestic private firm sets production outputs than in other competitions. Furthermore, when the market is opened to foreign firms, social welfare is higher when both firms set prices than in other competitions.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Comportamento das interfaces solo - geossintético

Tese de mestrado integrado. Engenharia Civil. Faculdade de Engenharia. Universidade do Porto. 201