EU-flashlight 2017/07. Brexit and freedom of movement in the EU: a legal primer. Interview September 2017

Brexit negotiations are in full swing. A main point of contention involves the freedom of movement of EU citizens. To explore the legal basis and limitations of a key EU right, we interviewed Federico Fabbrini, Professor of European Law

flashlight europe 03/2017: Brexit and a Multi-speed Europe: a Lawyer's Perspective. Interview / 16 March 2017

On 25 March 2017 the European Union celebrates the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. With Brexit around the corner and the EU searching for its future strategy, we talk to EU law Professor Federico Fabbrini on the legal challenges ahead

spotlight europe 01/2017: Reforming Economic and Monetary Union: Legislation and Treaty Change

This paper examines the legal mechanisms for reforming EMU — EU legislation, amendments to intergovernmental treaties concluded outside EU law, and EU treaty changes. It provides guidance on how to introduce several needed changes to EMU, suggesting that many reforms can be accomplished à traité constant, but that improving the EU institutional system ultimately requires changing the EU treaties

spotlight europe #2016/01: How Brexit opens a window of opportunity for treaty reform in the EU

Whether policymakers in Brussels and across European capitals like it or not: after the UK formally withdraws, the remaining EU member states will need to change the EU treaties and other quasi-constitutional EU laws. They will have to adopt key legal acts – such as a new decision on the allocation of the seats in the European Parliament and new rules on the funding of the EU – to account for a new Union at 27 member states. In sum, Brexit opens a window of opportunity for a broader constitutional reform that could be exploited to improve the architecture of the EU

Funding the War in Ukraine: The European Peace Facility, the Macro‐Financial Assistance Instrument, and the Slow Rise of an EU Fiscal Capacity

The war in Ukraine represented a major geopolitical shock for the EU. In the face of an illegal Russian aggression, EU institutions and member states rallied to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine also exposed the limited fiscal capacity of the EU. As a result, EU institutions and member states had to come up with creative ways to financially back Ukraine’s military and civilian efforts. This article examines the two key tools deployed by the EU so far to fund Ukraine in its war against Russia, namely the European Peace Facility and the Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument. The article details the legal features of these tools, evaluates their intergovernmental vs. supranational nature, and reflects on their significance for the consolidation of an EU fiscal capacity. As the article argues, the war in Ukraine quickly prompted the EU to replicate some of the novelties it used to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, namely the use of common borrowing and spending. Nevertheless, structural fiscal and governance weaknesses still limit the ability of the EU to mobilize resources and leverage power on the international stage

Austerity, the European Council, and the Institutional Future of the European Union: A Proposal to Strengthen the Presidency of the European Council

This article contextualizes the resilience of austerity in Europe, explaining it in light of the transformations in the EU system of governance. As the article maintains, since the eruption of the Eurocrisis, the European Council-the body congressing the heads of state and government of the EU member states together with its President and the President of the European Commission-has risen to the center of EU governance. In an intergovernmental institution such as the European Council, however, larger and wealthier states have been able to impose their preferences on other states-a development that is at odds with the anti-hegemonic nature of the EU integration project. To address this problematic state of affairs, this article proposes a targeted institutional reform: strengthening the President of the European Council. As this article claims, a President of the European Council endowed with its own executive powers and legitimated by a popular election could restore a balance between the member states and, at the same time, create a forum for democratic contestation of the policies of the European Union. The proposal to strengthen the presidency of the European Council builds on recent calls to redefine this institution as the presidency of the European Union as a whole. However, it faces several challenges. This article considers the following questions: 1) What are the advantages associated with the proposal to strengthen the European Council presidency and what powers should be attributed to the office?; 2) What electoral mechanism could be conceived to select the President in an asymmetrical Union of states and citizens?; and 3) What are the incentives-and is there a window of opportunity-to implement this reform? This article proposes ways to address these issues, opening a debate on a potentially fruitful constitutional reform of the EU system of governance

The Fiscal Compact, the Golden Rule, and the Paradox of European Federalism

This Article analyzes the central provision of the recently en-acted Fiscal Compact, which directs member states of the European Union (EU) to incorporate into their constitutions a “golden rule”—that is, a requirement that yearly budgets be balanced. The purpose of the Article is to examine—by surveying the introduction of these pervasive budgetary constraints in four selected EU member states (Germany, France, Italy and Spain)—the institutional implications that the “golden rule” has on the role of the political and judicial branches, both in the states and in the EU as a whole. The Article argues that, while the domestic effects of the “golden rule” are likely to vary from one state to another, the Fiscal Compact systematically enhances the powers of the EU institutions to direct and police the budgetary policies of EU member states, thus increasing centralization in the EU architecture of economic governance. The Article then contrasts this development with the federal experience of the United States. A comparative perspective sheds light on the fact that, while most U.S. states are also endowed with constitutional “golden rules,” the federal government never played a role in their adoption and is barred from interfering with the budgetary processes of the states. In conclusion, the Article suggests that an unexpected paradox emerges in the new constitutional architecture of the EU: Although in crafting the institutional response to the Euro-zone crisis state governments have repeatedly discarded a U.S.-like federal model as being too centralized and centripetal for the EU, they have ended up establishing a regime that is much less respectful of state sovereignty than the U.S. federal system