Trends And Driving Forces In Norwegian Urban Public Transport

Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

The Effects Of Major Toll-Road Financed Investments In Private And Public Transport Infrastructure On Public Transport

Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Efficient Pricing Of Urban Public Transport With Budget Constraints

Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

A Tale of Seven Cities: Subsidy Reductions in Norwegian Public Transport

Organisational, financial and regulatory conditions for Norwegian public transport have changed substantially over the past two decades. Operating subsidies in Norwegian conurbations have been reduced dramatically. Changes in the Transport Act, whic

Performance-based Subsides: An Alternative Subsidy Regime for Passenger Rail Transport

The Norwegian Ministry of Transport’s (MoT) 2002 White Paper on Public Transport paved the way for the introduction of performance-based contracts for rail passenger service obligations (PSO). The rationale was that such contracts provide a better allocation of risk and responsibilities between authorities and the operators, and will give further incentives for cost and market efficient solutions in passenger rail operations. We have used a simulation model for public transport in order to estimate socially optimal subsidies, which encourage Norwegian State Railways (NSB) to increase patronage and to take external costs and benefits into account. By optimal subsidy regime we mean that the arrangement combines the social surplus maximising objectives of the MoT with the NSB's commercial goals, such that net social surplus (NSS) is maximised compared to the present situation. Within the model NSS comprises: (1) change in NSB’s profit (producer surplus); (2) change in passengers benefit (consumer surplus); (3) changes in environmental and congestion costs; and (4) resource cost of public funds. Through a series of model iterations we have designed a combination of subsidies per passenger, per train kilometre and for seat capacity. With these incentives, NSB will, on a commercial basis, strive towards service levels that resemble the social surplus maximising levels of service. The subsidies internalise the benefits to existing and new passengers and the effect on road congestion of rail service improvements into NSB’s decision criteria. They also reflect the fact that rail fares are regulated. The performance-based subsidies will bring about a welfare gain in the region of NOK 8 million (€1 equals about NOK 8). The subsidies received under this regime together with the passenger revenue, may exceed the costs of the operator. To cope with this, we recommend that a fee is charged for the right to operate under this contractual regime. There is a risk that the incentives will motivate the operators to focus their efforts entirely on train kilometre, seat capacity and passenger numbers to the degree that they overlook other important aspects of service quality, like punctuality, cleanliness, information etc. As a safety net, we recommend a set of additional conditions and bonus/malus arrangements. Most important are (1) bonus/malus for train cancellations and delays, based on the principles of internalising passengers’ benefits or costs into NSB’s decision criteria; and (2) the threat of tendering if quality measurements and performance levels fall below certain levels

Public funding to long distance buses: an entry barrier or a necessity?

Despite the deregulation of the market, the Norwegian express bus market is heavily concentrated to one major actor; Nor-Way Bussekspress which is owned by 40 different bus operators. We investigate this lack of competiton. Although several entry barriers can be identified from a theoretical point of view, we find most of them to have negligible effects in the real world. One important entry barrier that we find is the fact that the main company, Nor-Way Bussekspress, receives public subsidies for certain local parts of their express routes, paid by local county councils. This not only guarantees a certain minimum of revenue, but is also an efficient barrier for potential operators to enter the market. However, this kind of arrangement has several positive effects. It makes a more extensive service possible, and diminishes the need for additional local public transport. Whether these benefits offset the welfare loss of reduced competition is an open question.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Public funding to long distance buses: an entry barrier or a necessity?

Despite the deregulation of the market, the Norwegian express bus market is heavily concentrated to one major actor; Nor-Way Bussekspress which is owned by 40 different bus operators. We investigate this lack of competiton. Although several entry barriers can be identified from a theoretical point of view, we find most of them to have negligible effects in the real world. One important entry barrier that we find is the fact that the main company, Nor-Way Bussekspress, receives public subsidies for certain local parts of their express routes, paid by local county councils. This not only guarantees a certain minimum of revenue, but is also an efficient barrier for potential operators to enter the market. However, this kind of arrangement has several positive effects. It makes a more extensive service possible, and diminishes the need for additional local public transport. Whether these benefits offset the welfare loss of reduced competition is an open question.Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydne

Nytte av tiltak for universell utforming i kollektivtransporten

Universell utforming betyr at hovedløsningen skal kunne benyttes av alle – uansett forutsetninger. For kollektivtransport gjelder det at hvert ledd i en reisekjede skal være utformet slik at kollektivtransportsystemet er tilgjengelig for alle. Denne artikkelen dokumenterer at tiltak for universell utforming i stor grad oppfattes som generell kvalitetsheving av kollektivtilbudet og i mindre grad som spesialløsninger for funksjonshemmede. Dermed kan slike tiltak vurderes på linje med andre tiltak for bedre kollektivtransport i samfunnsøkonomisk nyttekostnadsanalyser, noe som hittil ikke har vært vanlig

The geography of public transport competitiveness in thirteen medium sized cities

Thank you for publishing your article with SAGE Publishing and Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science. Your article “The geography of public transport competitiveness in thirteen medium sized cities” is now published.Securing sufficient accessibility with public transport is essential for reducing private car commuting. While most studies of transport accessibility are based on travel times, other quality factors such as the perceived disadvantage of congestion and service frequency are also of importance for transport mode choice. In this study, we use generalized journey times to calculate accessibility and public transport competitiveness, allowing us to account for other characteristics of commute trips than just travel time. We use detailed trip data to calculate generalized journey times to typical employment areas in thirteen urban regions in Norway. The results show that public transport services compete better with the car in the largest cities. Specifically, public transport is competitive for access to central employment areas but less so for less central employment areas. In the smaller cities, the private car is the most competitive mode on most commute trips. With detailed travel data, the method developed in this study can be replicated in other contexts to provide a more holistic measure of accessibility than traditional methods.The geography of public transport competitiveness in thirteen medium sized citiesacceptedVersio

Norwegian experiences with tendered buss services

Competitive tendering of local public transport services has been allowed in Norway since 1994. By 2005, 28 percent of all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, covering around 40 percent of all passengers. The majority of the tendered contracts were gross cost contracts, whereas historically, most Norwegian contracts have been net cost contracts. This article analyses the effect of competitive tendering on operating cost and subsidies paid. It is found that competitive tendering reduces costs by 10 percent and that most of the cost reduction has been used to reduce subsidies for public transport by local authorities. The effects of competitive tendering in Norway are smaller compared to other countries. This can be attributed to the fact that the industry had improved efficiency over a long period before competitive tendering was introduced