288 research outputs found

    Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?

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    Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist

    The Relationship Between Belief and Credence

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    Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one’s subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far

    Stakes sensitivity and credit rating: a new challenge for regulators

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    The ethical practices of credit rating agencies (CRAs), particularly following the 2008 financial crisis, have been subject to extensive analysis by economists, ethicists, and policymakers. We raise a novel issue facing CRAs that has to do with a problem concerning the transmission of epistemic status of ratings from CRAs to the beneficiaries of the ratings (investors, etc.), and use it to provide a new challenge for regulators. Building on recent work in philosophy, we argue that since CRAs have different stakes than the beneficiaries of the ratings in the ratings being accurate, what counts as knowledge (and as having ‘epistemic status’) concerning credit risk for a CRA may not count as knowledge (as having epistemic status) for the beneficiary. Further, as it stands, many institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) are bound by law to make some of their investment decisions dependent on the ratings of officially recognized CRAs. We argue that the observation that the epistemic status of ratings does not transmit from CRAs to beneficiaries makes salient a new challenge for those who think current regulation regarding the CRAs is prudentially justified, namely, to show that the harm caused by acting on a rating that does not have epistemic status for beneficiaries is compensated by the benefit from them acting on a CRA rating that does have epistemic status for the CRA. Unlike most other commentators, therefore, we offer a defeasible reason to drop references to CRAs in prudential regulation of the financial industry

    Coordinate control of cell cycle regulatory genes in zebrafish development tested by cyclin D1 knockdown with morpholino phosphorodiamidates and hydroxyprolyl-phosphono peptide nucleic acids

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    During early zebrafish (Danio rerio) development zygotic transcription does not begin until the mid-blastula transition (MBT) ∼3 h after fertilization. MBT demarcates transition from synchronous short cell cycles of S and M phases exclusively to full cycles encompassing G(1) and G(2) phases. Transcriptional profiling and RT–PCR analyses during these phases enabled us to determine that this shift corresponds to decreased transcript levels of S/M phase cell cycle control genes (e.g. ccna2, ccnb1, ccnb2 and ccne) and increased transcript levels of ccnd1, encoding cyclin D1, and orthologs of p21 (p21-like) and retinoblastoma (Rb-like 1). To investigate the regulation of this process further, the translation of ccnd1 mRNA, a G(1)/S checkpoint control element, was impaired by microinjection of ccnd1-specific morpholino phosphorodiamidate (MO) 20mer or hydroxyprolyl-phosphono peptide nucleic acid (HypNA-pPNA) 16mer antisense oligonucleotides. The resulting downregulation of cyclin D1 protein resulted in microophthalmia and microcephaly, but not lethality. The phenotypes were not seen with 3-mismatch MO 20mers or 1-mismatch HypNA-pPNA 16mers, and were rescued by an exogenous ccnd1 mRNA construct with five mismatches. Collectively, these results indicate that transcription of key molecular determinants of asynchronous cell cycle control in zebrafish embryos commences at MBT and that the reduction of cyclin D1 expression compromises zebrafish eye and head development

    Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment

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    Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistants—motivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded

    Sprouty Proteins Inhibit Receptor-mediated Activation of Phosphatidylinositol-specific Phospholipase C

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    PLCγ03B3 binds Spry1 and Spry2. Overexpression of Spry decreased PLCγ03B3 activity and IP3 and DAG production, whereas Spry-deficient cells yielded more IP3. Spry overexpression inhibited T-cell receptor signaling and Spry1 null T-cells hyperproliferated with TCR ligation. Through action of PLCγ03B3, Spry may influence signaling through multiple receptors

    Tyrosine kinase signalling in breast cancer: Modulation of tyrosine kinase signalling in human breast cancer through altered expression of signalling intermediates

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    The past decade has seen the definition of key signalling pathways downstream of receptor tyrosine kinases (RTKs) in terms of their components and the protein-protein interactions that facilitate signal transduction. Given the strong evidence that links signalling by certain families of RTKs to the progression of breast cancer, it is not surprising that the expression profile of key downstream signalling intermediates in this disease has also come under scrutiny, particularly because some exhibit transforming potential or amplify mitogenic signalling pathways when they are overexpressed. Reflecting the diverse cellular processes regulated by RTKs, it is now clear that altered expression of such signalling proteins in breast cancer may influence not only cellular proliferation (eg Grb2) but also the invasive properties of the cancer cells (eg EMS1/cortactin)
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