1,154 research outputs found

    Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports

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    In many countries, the collective sale of TV rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities.In several cases, however, leagues won in court, on the ground that sport cannot be considered a standard good.In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of TV rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare viewpoint.We find that collective sale is socially preferable when leagues are small, relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and where teams get little performance-related revenues.broadcasting industry;sport;broadcasting rights

    Influence of extraction methods on the composition of essential oils of Achillea millefolium L. from Lithuania

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    In this study, flowering aerial parts of Achillea millefolium were used as a matrix for supercritical CO2 extraction (SFE) of volatile oil. The collected extracts were analyzed by GC-FID and GC-MS methods and their composition were compared with that of the essential oil isolated by hydrodistillation (HD). The composition of the essential oil obtained by hydrodistillation and SFE methods is widely different. Indeed, the SFE volatile oil had a pale yellow color whereas the HD oil had a blue color due to the presence of chamazulene (48.0% vs. 4.3%). Other important constituents of HD oil were (E)- caryophyllene (19.5 %) and γ-muurolene (13.1%). The CO2 supercritical extract was dominated by (E)-caryophyllene (26.0%), γ-muurolene (22.0%), and caryophyllene oxide (8.1%)

    White Knights and the Corporate Governance of Hostile Takeovers

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    We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions under which a white knight wins the takeover contest despite the smaller value of its synergies as compared to those of the hostile bidder. The paper provides a new explanation for the reason why we observe so few hostile takeovers in reality; moreover, it sheds some light on the effectiveness of white knights as an anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the market for corporate control. ∗We would like to thank Vasso Ioannidou, Maria Fabiana Penas and Paul Sengmueller for their useful comments, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Groningen and the University of Tilburg

    Bibliografia degli scritti (1994-2011)

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