19,447 research outputs found
Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932
It is widely assumed that after 1918 the British general staff ignored the experience it had gained from fighting a first-class European enemy and that it was not until the establishment of the Kirke committee in 1932 that it began to garner the lessons of the Great War and incorporate them into its doctrine. This article demonstrates that in fact British military doctrine underwent a continuous process of development in the 1920s. Far from turning its back on new military technologies, the general staff rejected the manpower-intensive doctrine that had sustained the army in 1914 in favour of one that placed modernity and machinery at the very core of its thinking. Between 1919 and 1931 the general staff did assimilate the lessons of the First World War into the army's written doctrine. But what it failed to do was to impose a common understanding of the meaning of that doctrine throughout the army
Quantum objects are vague objects
[FIRST PARAGRAPHS]
Is vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations
of the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting
that insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our
representations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter.
However, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all
knowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking
whether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or
not. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe
that vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is,
equally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to
the epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of
‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’:
If two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of
physical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely
described with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts
themselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely
describable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201-
204)
It is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in
particular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness
‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus,
it may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give
a much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow
by the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for
reductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses
the property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a
definitely does not possess this property since it is surely not
indeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the
case that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978;
Salmon 1982)
Effect of space environment on circadian rhythms of plants, for the purpose of defining and verifying an experiment suitable for use in a biosatellite final report, sep. 1, 1964 - feb. 28, 1965
Space environment effect on circadian rhythms of plants for use in biosatellit
Effect of Space Environment on Circadian Rhythms of Plants, for the Purpose of Defining and Verifying an Experiment Suitable for Use in a Biosatellite Semiannual Report, Sep. 1, 1963 - Mar. 1, 1964
Space environmental effects on circadian rhythms of plants - plant data for use in biosatellite
Buoyant Venus station mission feasibility study for 1972 and 1973 launch opportunities. Volume 2 - Trajectory analysis for 1972 and 1973 missions Final report
Trajectory analysis for 1972 and 1973 buoyant Venus station missio
Neurophysiological and Behavioral Studies of Chimpanzees Semiannual Report, 1 Jul. - 31 Dec. 1966
Computer program for control of chimpanzee discrimination test analysis and electroencephalographic response dat
- …