Patterns of third-party and disputant-initiated mediation inmilitarized interstate disputes, 1946-1992

In this dissertation, I seek to explain mediation initiation in militarized interstate disputes. In large part this purpose serves to bridge an important gap in the mediation literature between the onset of mediation and its outcome. Specifically, I examine how various dispute, disputant and third party traits interact to foster a mediation attempt. In doing so, I focus on answering three related questions. First, what are the differences between third party and disputant initiated mediation? Second, why are the two types different? Third, what are the implications of these differences? A new dataset on third party intermediary interventions is utilized for this study, covering the post World War II period from 1946 to 1992. During this period, there are 1137 militarized interstate disputes, with 379 mediation attempts by third party actors. After a thorough description of the data and the manner in which the dataset was compiled, I empirically test various hypotheses concerning both third party and disputant initiated mediation as they relate to the conflict and mediation literatures. In doing so, I distinguish between three dimensions of a militarized dispute: power, severity and regime type. Additionally, I incorporate a triadic model of conflict management behavior that takes into account third party characteristics and linkages to disputants to explain mediation initiation. Finally, I disaggregate disputant initiated mediation to determine if different conditions lead to one or both disputants initiating mediation efforts. My results suggest that the conditions leading to third party initiation are rather different than those leading to disputant initiation. Most notable are how dispute factors such as territory, multilateral disputes and power asymmetry affect the likelihood of either type of initiation. Additionally, the role of third party characteristics like major power status and linkages such as trade and alliance ties are also found to be important in determining when third parties will initiate mediation. Such results on the whole suggest a further need to re-evaluate our observations about mediation outcome and mediation theory in general

Replication Data for: Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in Interstate Disputes

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how the design of alliances affects conflict management behavior. In particular, we argue that third-party states’ willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence of an alliance relationship and the depth of that relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner’s disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments – both across and within alliance types – increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly

Replication data for: The Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in Interstate Disputes

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third-party states'™ willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner'™s disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments -- both across and within alliance types --“ increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly

Podobnosti preferenc in skupinska hegemonija

The Group of Seven (G-7) nations hold economic and military/political capabilities in hegemonic proportion in international politics. Organisationally, the G-7 has worked during both the Cold War and thereafter to address a broad series of global governance issues and to develop global architecture. Yet, there has been little by way of systematic analysis to determine the extent of the groupćs cohesiveness, and the likelihood that suchcohesiveness will endure in the post-Cold War environment. Here, we develop a method for assessing G-7 cohesion and apply it to systematically describe trends in G-7 cohesion since 1975 in the United Nations General Assembly. We conclude with some suggestions for future research.V mednarodni politiki države iz skupine sedmih najbolj razvitih (G 7) obvladujejo ekonomske in vojaško-politične zmogljivosti hegemonskih razmerij. Države skupine G 7 so med hladno vojno in po njej delovale organizirano, da bi razvile globalno arhitekturo. Kot skupina so se soočale s številnimi vprašanji globalnega vodenja/upravljanja (governance). O tej temi pa je bilo malo sistematično analiz, še zlasti takšnih, ki bi ugotavljale, koliko je skupina kohezivna in kakšna je verjetnost, da bo ta kohezivnost preživela v mednarodnem okolju tudi po koncu hladne vojne. Avtorji razvijajo metodo za ugotavljanje kohezivnosti skupine G 7 in jo uporabijo, da bi sistematično opisali težnje po njej znotraj generalne skupščine Združenih narodov od leta 1975 naprej. Članek sklenejo s priporočili za prihodnje raziskovanje

Anticipating backfire: the effect of institutions on repression of nonviolent dissent

The state repression literature has paid disproportionate attention to explaining and predicting repression in response to violent dissent while overlooking the role of nonviolent dissent in the repression-dissent process. I present a theory of repression that considers how the tactics and participants involved in nonviolent dissent uniquely threaten political power and affect leaders' decision-making differently than violent dissent. Violent dissidents rely on physical coercion and must possess the willingness and ability to engage in violence; this requirement tends to result in homogeneous dissident groups that are not representative of the larger population. Nonviolent dissidents, on the other hand, use non-physically coercive tactics and are often more representative of the general public than violent dissidents. These peaceful tactics and diverse participants increase the chance that the public will disagree with the use of repression and sanction leaders. Strategic leaders recognize that repression of nonviolent dissent may backfire in this way, but they cannot easily gauge the likelihood that audiences will learn about or be angered by the use of repression against nonviolent dissidents. I suggest that certain domestic institutions provide leaders with information on the likelihood of backfire that serves as a constraint on repressive behavior. Specifically, I predict that leaders in those states with high levels of press freedom and a constitutionally protected right of petition expect that repression of nonviolent dissent is more likely to backfire and will be less likely to repress as a result. A free press threatens to disseminate information on the state's use of force against peaceful citizens, and the potential media attention increases the likelihood that citizens learn about the abuse and sanction leaders. Where the right of petition is constitutionally protected, leaders have an additional expectation that repressing nonviolent dissent will upset domestic audiences and that these angry citizens will mobilize to sanction repressive leaders. I test these predictions using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) v2.0 dataset and use an illustrative case of repression in Mexico to test the plausibility of the theory. (Published By University of Alabama Libraries