When laypeople are right and experts are wrong: Lessons from love canal

Love Canal, a suburban town in New York State built on a waste disposal site of a former chemical factory, provoked one of the first major environmental controversies. It involved scientists, citizens and politicians, including the US Congress and President. The controversy raises many important problems, and the article focuses in particular on the uses of scientific knowledge and the role of scientists. Although the scientists worked for the authorities, they regarded their knowledge as objective and their advice as neutral. However, the residents of Love Canal did not trust them, and engaged their own scientist. At the time of the controversy (1978) the Precautionary Principle had not been formulated, but the controversy involved many issues that have later been related to the principle. One particular issue was the uses of statistics, and the relationship between type 1 and type 2 statistical errors. The article relates the controversy to recent debates on the proper use of significance tests and statistics, and argues that context and values have to be taken into consideration. It concludes that in cases like Love Canal it is imperative to inform about uncertainty and to involve all stakeholders.publishedVersio

Teaching Philosophy of Science to Science Students: An Alternative Approach

Although most scientists and their students probably are skeptical towards philosophy, there has been an increasing demand for philosophy, among others philosophy of science, in science education programs. However, for this endeavour to be successful, some obstacles must be overcome. One obstacle is scientists’ skepticism towards philosophy. Another obstacle is that the traditional philosophy of science curriculum is not relevant. It was not relevant in the past, and it is even less relevant in the present situation. This paper presents an approach to teaching philosophy of science to science students that is different from traditional approaches. It is based on the assumption that modern science has been dominated by a scientific ideal where measurements and mathematics play a key role. Although this has by and large been a success story, it is imperative that students learn how to apply measurements and mathematics adequately, and to know the limits of their competence. This is particularly important in the present situation, where many of the problems facing science are complex, uncertainties are high, and decision-makers have to rely on advice from scientists. Therefore, an important objective of a course in philosophy of science for science students is to convey the importance of good judgement, wisdom and humility.publishedVersio

Computers will not acquire general intelligence, but may still rule the world

Jobst Langrebe’s and Barry Smith’s book Why Machines Will Never Rule the World argues that artificial general intelligence (AGI) will never be realized. Drawing on theories of complexity they argue that it is not only technically, but mathematically impossible to realize AGI. The book is the result of cooperation between a philosopher and a mathematician. In addition to a thorough treatment of mathematical modelling of complex systems the book addresses many fundamental philosophical questions. The authors show that philosophy is still relevant for questions of information technology in general and artificial intelligence in particular. This paper endorses Landgrebe’s and Smith’s arguments that artificial general intelligence cannot be realized, but not their conclusion that machines will never rule the world. It is not only a question of what technology can do. An equally important question is what technology does to us. Machines may not take over the world in a literal sense, but they may have many negative effects. Some of the most serious can be placed under the category of the “degeneration effect”

What can history teach us about the prospects of a European Research Area?

This report is the result of work carried out by the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities at the University of Bergen, Norway. The work was commissioned by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre at Ispra (Italy), and as such this report is the final deliverable of our Service Contract 257218 with the EC-JRC. The history of science has a lot to offer to contemporary debates on research policy and on science in society. This is especially true when the history of science is not seen as independent from political, economic and cultural history. This calls for a historical sensitivity also for challenges, problems, conflicts and crises; and such a sensitivity appears to be timely in present-day Europe, where the word “crisis” is taking a predominant place on public and political scenes. Having argued that the idea that scientific knowledge should determine or prescribe the course of action is in itself part of the 17th century solutions that contemporary society has inherited as part of the problem, the report suggests possible lines of action and reflection for the European Research Area focusing on European values including diversity and tolerance, universalism, democracy and public knowledge. The report also discusses Grand Challenges and Deep Innovation, reassessing the present function of the ERA, and what policy indicators might be of use.JRC.G.3-Econometrics and applied statistic

The Problem of Scientific Uncertainty

In a certain sense uncertainty and ignorance have been recognized in science and philosophy from the time of the Greeks. However, the mathematical sciences have been dominated by the pursuit of certainty. Therefore, experiments under simplified and idealized conditions have been regarded as the most reliable source of knowledge. Normally, uncertainty could be ignored or controlled by applying probability theory and statistics. Today, however, the situation is different. Uncertainty and ignorance have moved into focus. In particular the global character of some environmental problems has shown that the problems cannot be disregarded. Therefore, scientists and technologists have in many ways come into a new situation. This situation encompasses totally different problems than scientists and technologists are traditionally trained to deal with. The new situation requires interdisciplinarity, and in general a “democratization” of science is required

The Problem of Scientific Uncertainty

In a certain sense uncertainty and ignorance have been recognized in science and philosophy from the time of the Greeks. However, the mathematical sciences have been dominated by the pursuit of certainty. Therefore, experiments under simplified and idealized conditions have been regarded as the most reliable source of knowledge. Normally, uncertainty could be ignored or controlled by applying probability theory and statistics. Today, however, the situation is different. Uncertainty and ignorance have moved into focus. In particular the global character of some environmental problems has shown that the problems cannot be disregarded. Therefore, scientists and technologists have in many ways come into a new situation. This situation encompasses totally different problems than scientists and technologists are traditionally trained to deal with. The new situation requires interdisciplinarity, and in general a “democratization” of science is required

The Problem of Scientific Uncertainty

In a certain sense uncertainty and ignorance have been recognized in science and philosophy from the time of the Greeks. However, the mathematical sciences have been dominated by the pursuit of certainty. Therefore, experiments under simplified and idealized conditions have been regarded as the most reliable source of knowledge. Normally, uncertainty could be ignored or controlled by applying probability theory and statistics. Today, however, the situation is different. Uncertainty and ignorance have moved into focus. In particular the global character of some environmental problems has shown that the problems cannot be disregarded. Therefore, scientists and technologists have in many ways come into a new situation. This situation encompasses totally different problems than scientists and technologists are traditionally trained to deal with. The new situation requires interdisciplinarity, and in general a “democratization” of science is required

When laypeople are right and experts are wrong: Lessons from love canal

Love Canal, a suburban town in New York State built on a waste disposal site of a former chemical factory, provoked one of the first major environmental controversies. It involved scientists, citizens and politicians, including the US Congress and President. The controversy raises many important problems, and the article focuses in particular on the uses of scientific knowledge and the role of scientists. Although the scientists worked for the authorities, they regarded their knowledge as objective and their advice as neutral. However, the residents of Love Canal did not trust them, and engaged their own scientist. At the time of the controversy (1978) the Precautionary Principle had not been formulated, but the controversy involved many issues that have later been related to the principle. One particular issue was the uses of statistics, and the relationship between type 1 and type 2 statistical errors. The article relates the controversy to recent debates on the proper use of significance tests and statistics, and argues that context and values have to be taken into consideration. It concludes that in cases like Love Canal it is imperative to inform about uncertainty and to involve all stakeholders

Why general artificial intelligence will not be realized

The modern project of creating human-like artificial intelligence (AI) started after World War II, when it was discovered that electronic computers are not just number-crunching machines, but can also manipulate symbols. It is possible to pursue this goal without assuming that machine intelligence is identical to human intelligence. This is known as weak AI. However, many AI researcher have pursued the aim of developing artificial intelligence that is in principle identical to human intelligence, called strong AI. Weak AI is less ambitious than strong AI, and therefore less controversial. However, there are important controversies related to weak AI as well. This paper focuses on the distinction between artificial general intelligence (AGI) and artificial narrow intelligence (ANI). Although AGI may be classified as weak AI, it is close to strong AI because one chief characteristics of human intelligence is its generality. Although AGI is less ambitious than strong AI, there were critics almost from the very beginning. One of the leading critics was the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who argued that computers, who have no body, no childhood and no cultural practice, could not acquire intelligence at all. One of Dreyfus’ main arguments was that human knowledge is partly tacit, and therefore cannot be articulated and incorporated in a computer program. However, today one might argue that new approaches to artificial intelligence research have made his arguments obsolete. Deep learning and Big Data are among the latest approaches, and advocates argue that they will be able to realize AGI. A closer look reveals that although development of artificial intelligence for specific purposes (ANI) has been impressive, we have not come much closer to developing artificial general intelligence (AGI). The article further argues that this is in principle impossible, and it revives Hubert Dreyfus’ argument that computers are not in the world

Teaching Philosophy of Science to Science Students: An Alternative Approach

Although most scientists and their students probably are skeptical towards philosophy, there has been an increasing demand for philosophy, among others philosophy of science, in science education programs. However, for this endeavour to be successful, some obstacles must be overcome. One obstacle is scientists’ skepticism towards philosophy. Another obstacle is that the traditional philosophy of science curriculum is not relevant. It was not relevant in the past, and it is even less relevant in the present situation. This paper presents an approach to teaching philosophy of science to science students that is different from traditional approaches. It is based on the assumption that modern science has been dominated by a scientific ideal where measurements and mathematics play a key role. Although this has by and large been a success story, it is imperative that students learn how to apply measurements and mathematics adequately, and to know the limits of their competence. This is particularly important in the present situation, where many of the problems facing science are complex, uncertainties are high, and decision-makers have to rely on advice from scientists. Therefore, an important objective of a course in philosophy of science for science students is to convey the importance of good judgement, wisdom and humility