Discrete Riemannian Geometry

Within a framework of noncommutative geometry, we develop an analogue of (pseudo) Riemannian geometry on finite and discrete sets. On a finite set, there is a counterpart of the continuum metric tensor with a simple geometric interpretation. The latter is based on a correspondence between first order differential calculi and digraphs. Arrows originating from a vertex span its (co)tangent space. If the metric is to measure length and angles at some point, it has to be taken as an element of the left-linear tensor product of the space of 1-forms with itself, and not as an element of the (non-local) tensor product over the algebra of functions. It turns out that linear connections can always be extended to this left tensor product, so that metric compatibility can be defined in the same way as in continuum Riemannian geometry. In particular, in the case of the universal differential calculus on a finite set, the Euclidean geometry of polyhedra is recovered from conditions of metric compatibility and vanishing torsion. In our rather general framework (which also comprises structures which are far away from continuum differential geometry), there is in general nothing like a Ricci tensor or a curvature scalar. Because of the non-locality of tensor products (over the algebra of functions) of forms, corresponding components (with respect to some module basis) turn out to be rather non-local objects. But one can make use of the parallel transport associated with a connection to `localize' such objects and in certain cases there is a distinguished way to achieve this. This leads to covariant components of the curvature tensor which then allow a contraction to a Ricci tensor. In the case of a differential calculus associated with a hypercubic lattice we propose a new discrete analogue of the (vacuum) Einstein equations.Comment: 34 pages, 1 figure (eps), LaTeX, amssymb, epsfi

Intentionality versus Constructive Empiricism

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism – B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science – is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other

Discerning Elementary Particles

We extend the quantum-mechanical results of Muller & Saunders (2008) establishing the weak discernibility of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces in two ways: (a) from fermions to bosons for all finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces; and (b) from finite-dimensional to infinite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces for all elementary particles. In both cases this is performed using operators whose physical significance is beyond doubt.This confutes the currently dominant view that (A) the quantum-mechanical description of similar particles conflicts with Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII); and that (B) the only way to save PII is by adopting some pre-Kantian metaphysical notion such as Scotusian haecceittas or Adamsian primitive thisness. We take sides with Muller & Saunders (2008) against this currently dominant view, which has been expounded and defended by, among others, Schr\"odinger, Margenau, Cortes, Dalla Chiara, Di Francia, Redhead, French, Teller, Butterfield, Mittelstaedt, Giuntini, Castellani, Krause and Huggett.Comment: Final Version. To appear in Philosophy of Science, July 200

Tensor product representations of the quantum double of a compact group

We consider the quantum double D(G) of a compact group G, following an earlier paper. We use the explicit comultiplication on D(G) in order to build tensor products of irreducible *-representations. Then we study their behaviour under the action of the R-matrix, and their decomposition into irreducible *-representations. The example of D(SU(2)) is treated in detail, with explicit formulas for direct integral decomposition (`Clebsch-Gordan series') and Clebsch-Gordan coefficients. We point out possible physical applications.Comment: LaTeX2e, 27 pages, corrected references, accepted by Comm.Math.Phy

Shop Notes

Contains reports on one research projects

Withering Away,Weakly

One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’, and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered discernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than against it

Six Measurement Problems of Quantum Mechanics

The notorious ‘measurement problem’ has been roving around quantum mechanics for nearly a century since its inception, and has given rise to a variety of ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics, which are meant to evade it. We argue that no less than six problems need to be distinguished, and that several of them classify as different types of problems. One of them is what traditionally is called ‘the measurement problem’. Another of them has nothing to do with measurements but is a profound metaphysical problem. We also analyse critically Maudlin’s (Topoi 14:7–15, 1995) well-known statement of ‘three measurements problems’, and the clash of the views of Brown (Found Phys 16:857–870, 1986) and Stein (Maximal of an impossibility theorem concerning quantum measurement. In: R. S. Cohen et al. (Eds.), Potentiality, entanglement and passion-at-a-distance, 1997) on one of the six measurement problems. Finally, we summarise a solution to one measurement problem which has been largely ignored but tacitly if not explicitly acknowledged.</p

Withering Away,Weakly

One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’, and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered discernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than against it