Thinking intuitively: the rich (and at times illogical) world of concepts

Intuitive knowledge of the world involves knowing what kinds of things have which properties. We express it in generalities such as “ducks lay eggs”. It contrasts with extensional knowledge about actual individuals in the world, which we express in quantified statements such as “All US Presidents are male”. Reasoning based on this intuitive knowledge, while highly fluent and plausible may in fact lead us into logical fallacy. Several lines of research point to our conceptual memory as the source of this logical failure. We represent concepts with prototypical properties, judging likelihood and argument strength on the basis of similarity between ideas. Evidence that our minds represent the world in this intuitive way can be seen in a range of phenomena, including how people interpret logical connectives applied to everyday concepts, studies of creativity and emergence in conceptual combination, and demonstrations of the logically inconsistent beliefs that people express in their everyday language

Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict

An experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails

A dual process account of creative thinking

This article explicates the potential role played by type 1 thinking (automatic, fast) and type 2 thinking (effortful, logical) in creative thinking. The relevance of Evans's (2007) models of conflict of dual processes in thinking is discussed with regards to creative thinking. The role played by type 1 thinking and type 2 thinking during the different stages of creativity (problem finding and conceptualization, incubation, illumination, verification and dissemination) is discussed. It is proposed that although both types of thinking are active in creativity, the extent to which they are active and the nature of their contribution to creativity will vary between stages of the creative process. Directions for future research to test this proposal are outlined; differing methodologies and the investigation of different stages of creative thinking are discussed. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Task analysis for error identification: Theory, method and validation

This paper presents the underlying theory of Task Analysis for Error Identification. The aim is to illustrate the development of a method that has been proposed for the evaluation of prototypical designs from the perspective of predicting human error. The paper presents the method applied to representative examples. The methodology is considered in terms of the various validation studies that have been conducted, and is discussed in the light of a specific case study

LD Hub:a centralized database and web interface to perform LD score regression that maximizes the potential of summary level GWAS data for SNP heritability and genetic correlation analysis

Motivation: LD score regression is a reliable and efficient method of using genome-wide association study (GWAS) summary-level results data to estimate the SNP heritability of complex traits and diseases, partition this heritability into functional categories, and estimate the genetic correlation between different phenotypes. Because the method relies on summary level results data, LD score regression is computationally tractable even for very large sample sizes. However, publicly available GWAS summary-level data are typically stored in different databases and have different formats, making it difficult to apply LD score regression to estimate genetic correlations across many different traits simultaneously. Results: In this manuscript, we describe LD Hub - a centralized database of summary-level GWAS results for 173 diseases/traits from different publicly available resources/consortia and a web interface that automates the LD score regression analysis pipeline. To demonstrate functionality and validate our software, we replicated previously reported LD score regression analyses of 49 traits/diseases using LD Hub; and estimated SNP heritability and the genetic correlation across the different phenotypes. We also present new results obtained by uploading a recent atopic dermatitis GWAS meta-analysis to examine the genetic correlation between the condition and other potentially related traits. In response to the growing availability of publicly accessible GWAS summary-level results data, our database and the accompanying web interface will ensure maximal uptake of the LD score regression methodology, provide a useful database for the public dissemination of GWAS results, and provide a method for easily screening hundreds of traits for overlapping genetic aetiologies

Genetic variation associated with differential educational attainment in adults has anticipated associations with school performance in children

Genome-wide association study results have yielded evidence for the association of common genetic variants with crude measures of completed educational attainment in adults. Whilst informative, these results do not inform as to the mechanism of these effects or their presence at earlier ages and where educational performance is more routinely and more precisely assessed. Single nucleotide polymorphisms exhibiting genome-wide significant associations with adult educational attainment were combined to derive an unweighted allele score in 5,979 and 6,145 young participants from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children with key stage 3 national curriculum test results (SATS results) available at age 13 to 14 years in English and mathematics respectively. Standardised (z-scored) results for English and mathematics showed an expected relationship with sex, with girls exhibiting an advantage over boys in English (0.433 SD (95%CI 0.395, 0.470), p<10-10) with more similar results (though in the opposite direction) in mathematics (0.042 SD (95%CI 0.004, 0.080), p = 0.030). Each additional adult educational attainment increasing allele was associated with 0.041 SD (95%CI 0.020, 0.063), p = 1.79×10-04 and 0.028 SD (95%CI 0.007, 0.050), p = 0.01 increases in standardised SATS score for English and mathematics respectively. Educational attainment is a complex multifactorial behavioural trait which has not had heritable contributions to it fully characterised. We were able to apply the results from a large study of adult educational attainment to a study of child exam performance marking events in the process of learning rather than realised adult end product. Our results support evidence for common, small genetic contributions to educational attainment, but also emphasise the likely lifecourse nature of this genetic effect. Results here also, by an alternative route, suggest that existing methods for child examination are able to recognise early life variation likely to be related to ultimate educational attainment