Is conflict adaptation triggered by feature repetitions? An unexpected finding

For decades, cognitive adaptation to response conflict has been considered to be the hallmark of cognitive control. Notwithstanding a vast amount of evidence ruling out low-level interpretations of these findings, disbelief still exists with regard to the underlying cause of the observed effects. Especially when considering cognitive adaptation to unconscious conflict, it is still a matter of debate whether repetitions of features between trials might explain this intriguing finding rather than the involvement of unconscious control. To this purpose, we conducted two masked priming experiments in which four different responses to four different stimuli were required. This allowed us to completely eliminate repetitions of prime and target over consecutive trials. Independent of whether conflicting information was presented clearly visible or almost imperceptible, the results showed an unexpected pattern. Contrary to the regular congruency sequence effect (CSE; i.e., classic Gratton effect), in both experiments the congruency effect increased following incongruent trials. Interestingly, this reversed effect completely disappeared when we eliminated all trials with feature repetitions from the analysis. A third experiment, in which feature repetitions were excluded a priori, showed a small but regular CSE in the error rates only. Given that feature repetitions are theoretically thought to create a regular CSE, our results are not in line with an interpretation in terms of feature repetitions nor with an interpretation in terms of cognitive control. We conclude that examining cognitive adaptation with or without feature repetitions might be more difficult to conceive than is often suggested in the literature

Beyond trial-by-trial adaptation : a quantification of the time scale of cognitive control

The idea that adaptation to stimulus or response conflict can operate over different time scales takes a prominent position in various theories and models of cognitive control. The mechanisms underlying temporal variations in control are nevertheless poorly understood, which is partly due to a lack of appropriate empirical measures. Inspired by reinforcement learning models, we developed a method to quantify the time scale of control behaviorally, by computing trial-by-trial effects that go beyond the preceding trial. Briefly, we extended the congruency sequence effect from 1 trial to multiple trials into the past and quantified the influence of previous trials on current-trial performance as a function of trial distance. The rate at which this influence changes across trials was taken as a measure of the time scale of control. We applied the method to a flanker task with different conflict frequencies and volatility. Results showed that the time scale of control was smaller in rare-conflict and volatile contexts, compared to frequent-conflict and neutral contexts. This is in agreement with theories differentiating transient from sustained control. The method offers new opportunities to reveal temporal differences in control modes and can easily be applied to various empirical paradigms. (PsycINFO Database Recordstatus: publishe

Is conflict adaptation an illusion?

Conflict adaptation theory is one of the most popular theories in cognitive psychology. The theory argues that participants strategically modulate attention away from distracting stimulus features in response to conflict. Although results with proportion congruent, sequential congruency, and similar paradigms seem consistent with the conflict adaptation view, some researchers have expressed scepticism. The paradigms used in the study of conflict adaptation require the manipulation of stimulus frequencies, sequential dependencies, time-on-task regularities, and various other task regularities that introduce the potential for learning of conflict-unrelated information. This results in the unintentional confounding of measures of conflict adaptation with simpler learning and memory biases. There are also alternative accounts which propose that attentional adaptation does occur, but via different mechanisms, such as valence, expectancy, or effort. A significant (and often heated) debate remains surrounding the question of whether conflict adaptation exists independent of these alternative mechanisms of action. The aim of this Research Topic is to provide a forum for current directions in this area, considering perspectives from all sides of the debate

Is Consciousness Necessary for Conflict Adaptation? A State of the Art

Facing response conflict, subjects try to improve their responses by reducing the influence of the detrimental information which caused the conflict. It was speculated that this adaptation to conflict can only occur when the conflicting information is consciously perceived. In this review we give an overview of the research looking at the possibility of unconscious stimuli to provoke this conflict adaptation. In a first part we discuss adaptation to conflict on a trial-by-trial basis. When the previous trial contained conflicting information, subjects will adapt to this by reducing the influence of the conflicting information on the current trial. However, the interesting question is whether this is also possible when the conflicting information remains unconscious. In a second part we will discuss blockwise adaptation to conflict. If conflict is very frequent, subjects will adapt to this by reducing the conflicting information sustainably. Again the question is whether this is possible when the conflict was never experienced consciously. In a third part we will discuss the neural basis of conscious and unconscious conflict adaptation. We will critically discuss the research on these topics and highlight strengths and weaknesses of the used paradigms. Finally, we will give some suggestions how future research can be more conclusive in this respect

Mechanisms of masked semantic priming: A meta-analysis

The author and the promoter give permission to consult this master dissertation and to copy it or parts of it for personal use. Each other use falls under the restrictions of the copyright, in particular concerning the obligation to mention explicitly the source when using results of this master dissertation. Eva Van den Bussche 3 Foreword This master dissertation is part of a doctoral project in collaboration with Bert Reynvoet and Wim Van den Noortgate. The collection of the data, the statistical analyses and writing of the dissertation were completed by the student. The student wishes to thank all researchers who contributed to this meta-analysis by providing us with the statistical information needed to compute effect sizes. We especially want to thank Kenneth Forster, Andrea Kiesel, Sachiko Kinoshita and Carsten Pohl for sending us unpublished data and Tom Verguts for reading a previous version of this paper and for his useful comments

Cognitive effort modulates connectivity between dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and task-relevant cortical areas

Investment of cognitive effort is required in everyday life and has received ample attention in recent neurocognitive frameworks. The neural mechanism of effort investment is thought to be structured hierarchically, with dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) at the highest level, recruiting task-specific upstream areas. In the current fMRI study, we tested whether dACC is generally active when effort demand is high across tasks with different stimuli, and whether connectivity between dACC and task-specific areas is increased depending on the task requirements and effort level at hand. For that purpose, a perceptual detection task was administered that required male and female human participants to detect either a face or a house in a noisy image. Effort demand was manipulated by adding little (low effort) or much (high effort) noise to the images. Results showed a network of dACC, anterior insula (AI), and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) to be more active when effort demand was high, independent of the performed task (face or house detection). Importantly, effort demand modulated functional connectivity between dACC and face-responsive or house-responsive perceptual areas, depending on the task at hand. This shows that dACC, AI, and IPS constitute a general effort-responsive network and suggests that the neural implementation of cognitive effort involves dACC-initiated sensitization of task-relevant areas

The temporal dynamics of metacognition: Dissociating task-related activity from later metacognitive processes

In recent years, neuroscience research spent much effort in revealing brain activity related to metacognition. Despite this endeavor, it remains unclear exactly when metacognitive experiences develop during task performance. To investigate this, the current study used EEG to temporally and spatially dissociate task-related activity from metacognitive activity. In a masked priming paradigm, metacognitive experiences of difficulty were induced by manipulating congruency between prime and target. As expected, participants more frequently rated incongruent trials as difficult and congruent trials as easy, while being completely unable to perceive the masked primes. Results showed that both the N2 and the P3 ERP components were modulated by congruency, but that only the P3 modulation interacted with metacognitive experiences. Single-trial analysis additionally showed that the magnitude of the P3 modulation by congruency accurately predicted the metacognitive response. Source localization indicated that the N2 task-related activity originated in the ACC, whereas the P3-interplay between task-related activation and metacognitive experiences originated from the precuneus. We conclude that task-related activity can be dissociated from later metacognitive processing

The effect of cognitive effort on the sense of agency

While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cognitive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our thoughts and actions (i.e., sense of agency). Previous studies have shown that cognitive effort can be both detrimental and facilitative for the experienced sense of agency. We hypothesized that the reason for these contradictory findings might lie in the use of differential time windows in which cognitive effort operates. The current study therefore examined the effect of cognitive effort exerted on the current trial, on the previous trial or across a block of trials on sense of agency, using implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2) measures of sense of agency. We showed that the exertion of more cognitive control on current trials led to a higher explicit sense of agency. This surprising result was contrasted to previous studies to establish potential reasons for this surprising finding and to formulate recommendations for future studies