Don\u27t Ask, Don\u27t Tell : A Qualified Defense

Upon the 10th Anniversary of the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, I was asked to reflect upon the policy by Hofstra University. This article presents my remarks at a symposium dedicagted to this topic. The article first reviews in detail the origins of the policy. It then explores the moral debate implicated by the policy, including the traditional arguments against homosexuality with special attention to the natural law, and latitudinarian arguments in favor of homosexuality or opposed to discrimination based on the basis of homosexuality. The article next surveys contemporary attitudes about homosexuality, focusing on military service by homosexuals. Finally, the article provides a qualified defense of the policy in light of competing moral claims and contemporary attitudes

Hobby Lobby y más: considerando respuestas morales al mandato contraceptivo

Resumen: El artículo analiza la situación creada por el mandato contraceptivo en los Estados Unidos en lo que concierne a una Universidad Católica y la expectativa creada por la inminencia de una decisión de la Corte Suprema de ese país en un grupo consolidado de casos que incluye el denominado “Little Sisters of the Poor”. El mandato contraceptivo, en su diseño original, requiere que los empleadores provean productos y servicios de la llamada “medicina preventiva” para sus empleados, incluyendo contracepción, abortivos (es decir, drogas que inducen el aborto) y esterilización, aunque el empleador sea una institución o empresa religiosa que se opone a tales prácticas como una cuestión de fe, moral y doctrina religiosa. El artículo evalúa las posibilidades de “acomodar” el mandato y los litigios que han surgido, y divide estos litigios en dos grupos. Primero, los que involucran a entidades con fines de lucro y empresas, como Hobby Lobby. En segundo lugar, los litigios que involucran a entidades afiliadas a instituciones religiosas y aquellas sin fines de lucro, como las Hermanitas de los Pobres (Little Sisters of the Poor). Se analizan los diferentes escenarios y las posibles reacciones de las entidades sin fines de lucro en caso de una decisión de la Corte Suprema que no sea favorable.Abstract: The article analyzes the situation created by the HHS Mandate concerning a Catholic University and the expected Supreme Court decision in a group of granted and consolidated cases including Little Sisters of the Poor. The HHS Mandate, as originally designed, required that all employers provide so-called preventative health care products and services to their employees that includes contraception, abortifacients (that is, abortion inducing drugs), and sterilization, even if the employer is a religious institution or business that opposes such practices as a matter of faith, morals and religious doctrine. The article evaluates the accommodations and related litigation, and divides the litigation pertaining to the Mandate into two groups. First, the litigation involving for-profit entities and businesses, such as Hobby Lobby. Second, the litigation involving religiously affiliated entities and nonprofits, such as Little Sisters of the Poor. Different scenarios are analyzed and the possible reactions of non-profits entities to an unfavorable Supreme Court decision are evaluated

Exclusionary Rules and Deterrence After \u3ci\u3eVega v. Tekoh\u3c/i\u3e: The Trend Toward a More Consistent Approach Across the Fourth and Fifth Amendments

The sound and fury of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions announced in the 2022 term obscured Vega v. Tekoh, in which the Court held that a violation of the Miranda rights warning and waiver requirements does not provide a basis for claiming a denial of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Tekoh’s rejection of Miranda protections for § 1983 claims may ultimately prove to be significant, of far greater potential import is the Court’s rationale in support of its holding, which was premised on its assessment of the inadequacy of deterrent benefits that would be obtained by allowing such claims.The Court’s reasoning in Tekoh may signal a future willingness to harmonize its approach to the Fourth Amendment29 exclusionary rule and the Miranda exclusionary rule, so that going forward both rules decisively rest upon a more closely related, if not nearly identical, deterrence-based rationale. This article explores the possibility that the Court ultimately may adopt a more unified approach to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence predicated upon these two different bases and the ramifications of such an approach. Part II of this article traces the historical development of the Miranda exclusionary rule from its dramatic beginning to its current diminished status. Part III describes a similar transformation of Court’s Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, with special attention on the Roberts Court’s 2009 decision in Herring v. United States. Next, Part IV reviews Vega v. Tekoh, and its unapologetic reliance on a deterrence-based rationale for the Miranda exclusionary rule. With all the foregoing as prelude, Part V considers the future basis and reach of the Miranda exclusionary rule, and the possibility that it might be treated more in conformity with Fourth Amendment exclusion. Finally, in Part VI, this article concludes that, with Vega v. Tekoh, as well as other recent decisions, the Court has laid substantial groundwork for adopting a more harmonious approach for Fourth Amendment and Miranda exclusion, and it identifies some of the consequences of a more unified approach