10 research outputs found
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Regulators and environmental groups: better together or apart?
This paper examines green alliances between environmental groups (EGs) and polluting firms, which have become more common in the last decades, and analyzes how they affect policy design. We first show that the activities of regulators and EGs are strategic substitutes, giving rise to free-riding incentives on both agents. Nonetheless, the presence of the EG yields smaller welfare benefits when firms are subject to regulation than when they are not. In addition, the introduction of environmental policy yields large welfare gains when the EG is absent but small benefits when the EG is already present
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Fungicide Resistance and Misinformation: A Game Theoretic Approach
Fungicide resistance developed by pathogens that grapes are susceptible to is problematic for the industry today. We provide further insight into the strategic behavior of grape growers when their choices of fungicide levels generate a negative intertemporal production externality in the form of fungicide resistance. We find that when growers encounter this type of externality, the noncooperative fungicide level is higher than the socially optimal level. We examine a compensation mechanism designed to ameliorate fungicide resistance and find that it induces the socially optimal level; however, mis-information about the severity of the fungicide resistance generates distortions. The results suggest that the information available to growers about fungicide resistance is essential for its mitigation with the proposed compensation mechanism. In particular, we find that if the misinformed grower considers fungicide resistance to be relatively mild, then it is preferable that the misinformed grower has the compensating role
Facing Fungicide Resistance in Grape Production A Game Theoretic Approach
Fungicide resistance developed by pathogens that grapes are susceptible to is problematic for the industry today. We provide further insight into the strategic behavior of grape growers when their choices of fungicide levels generate a negative intertemporal production externality in the form of fungicide resistance. We find that when growers encounter this type of externality, the noncooperative fungicide level is higher than the socially optimal level. We examine a compensation mechanism designed to ameliorate fungicide resistance and find that it induces the socially optimal level; however, mis-information about the severity of the fungicide resistance generates distortions. The results suggest that the information available to growers about fungicide resistance is essential for its mitigation with the proposed compensation mechanism. In particular, we find that if the misinformed grower considers fungicide resistance to be relatively mild, then it is preferable that the misinformed grower has the compensating role