Practicing what you preach: How cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute across the European Union

The political fault lines surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis have underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union. Against the backdrop of an emerging political integration-demarcation divide, this article examines how cosmopolitanism structures people’s willingness to redistribute internationally within the European Union. To this aim, we conducted laboratory experiments on redistributive behaviour towards other European citizens in the United Kingdom and Germany and analysed cross-national survey data on support for international redistribution covering the EU-28. Our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism increases generosity towards other Europeans and support for international redistribution even when controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, concern for others, and political ideology

United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens

<p>In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common ‘horseshoe’ understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.</p

Radical distinction : Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe

Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the ‘left’ and ‘right’, these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts—particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-)cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters

Radical distinction : Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe

Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the ‘left’ and ‘right’, these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts—particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-)cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters

Los zand of geemancipeerde burgers? Bewegingen op de Nederlandse kiezersmarkt 2006-2010

De Nederlandse verkiezingen zijn de grilligste van West-Europa: kiezers veranderen in groten getale van stemvoorkeur. Maar zijn deze veranderingen willekeurig, of worden ze gestructureerd door onderliggende ideologische dimensies? We toetsen verschillende theorieën over de structuur van de Nederlandse kiezersmarkt op gegevens uit het 1Vandaag Opiniepanel (1VOP), met 54.763 respondenten en 53 peilingen tussen november 2006 en juni 2010. We beschrijven de veranderingen in stemvoorkeur van deze respondenten, en analyseren de structuur in hun veranderingen. We komen tot verschillende conclusies. Het Nederlandse partijstelsel wordt gestructureerd door een sociaaleconomische en een sociaal-culturele dimensie. Nederlandse kiezers zijn weliswaar volatiel, maar die volatiliteit is begrensd: ze blijven trouw aan een blok van linkse partijen (PvdA, SP, GL) of een blok van rechtse partijen (CDA, VVD, TON en PVV). D66 neemt als enige een centrale positie in, als spil in deze politieke ruimte. Hoewel de gevestigde partijen voor grote electorale uitdagingen staan, wijst de electorale grilligheid geenszins op een crisis van de Nederlandse partijendemocratie

If I recall correctly. An event history analysis of forgetting and recollecting past voting behavior

<p>The mechanisms behind vote recall inaccuracy are not well understood. The literature has been unable to separate inaccuracy due to the nature of the voter (such as non-attitudes) from inaccuracy due to interfering events after casting the vote (such as a change in vote intention). This paper employs event history analysis to disentangle time-invariant and time-variant explanations of recall inaccuracy. Using Dutch panel data on 20,936 respondents in 42 waves between 2010 and 2012 (and additional data collected between 2006 and 2010), we explain the likelihood of misreporting the 2010 vote during the subsequent electoral cycle. The analyses show that although both explanations play a role, voters’ general level of volatility before casting the recalled vote matters less than changes in vote intention after the vote. We conclude that accurate recall is affected mainly by events rather than the nature of voters. Our findings imply that survey measures of voting behavior could be improved by offering cues on the elections of interest.</p