

# Practicing what you preach: How cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute across the European Union

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## ABSTRACT

The political fault lines surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis have underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union. Against the backdrop of an emerging political integration-demarcation divide, this article examines how cosmopolitanism structures people's willingness to redistribute internationally within the European Union. To this aim, we conducted laboratory experiments on *redistributive behaviour* towards other European citizens in the United Kingdom and Germany and analysed cross-national survey data on *support for international redistribution* covering the EU-28. Our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism increases generosity towards other Europeans and support for international redistribution even when controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, concern for others, and political ideology.

**KEYWORDS** Cosmopolitanism; experiments; international redistribution; sovereign debt crisis

## Introduction

The European sovereign debt crisis has underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union (EU). Amid unprecedented economic downturn, several member states have received financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (European Commission 2014). European policy makers are currently pushing for further social integration and risk sharing, as highlighted in the Five Presidents' Report (European Commission 2015).

However, international redistribution is highly contentious, and sceptical public opinion makes it difficult to legitimize such actions (Hobolt 2015). Citizens do not necessarily adapt their allegiances to the transnationalization of society. Globalization also triggers counter-reactions such as ethnocentrism and parochialism. West European democracies are witnessing the emergence of a new political divide that pits the proponents of globalization against its opponents (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Kriesi *et al.* 2008). The most salient issues of this conflict are immigration and European integration, and they are predominantly discussed in cultural rather than economic terms (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Teney *et al.* 2014; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Teney and colleagues (2014) show that this conflict is related to cosmopolitan and communitarian ideological dispositions. While cosmopolitans favour opening national boundaries and welcome immigration and European integration, communitarians oppose these developments.

It is less clear whether openness towards immigration and European integration is mere lip service or translates into support for international redistribution, especially as much of the current debate focuses on cultural rather than economic aspects. Moreover, while cosmopolitanism entails more open and global orientations, this may not translate into support for redistribution either at home or abroad. Cosmopolitans might be simply too elitist, mobile, and detached from society to care for 'ordinary' people in need

(Calhoun 2002; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Delhey *et al.* 2015). It is therefore not obvious that cosmopolitanism indeed breeds international solidarity within the European Union.

We ask the following question: Are cosmopolitan individuals willing to practice what they preach and share resources with other Europeans? We analyse how cosmopolitanism structures people's willingness to redistribute within the European Union using laboratory experiments in the United Kingdom and Germany and survey data from 28 EU member states (European Election Study, EES, 2014, see Schmitt *et al.* (2015)). By studying redistributive behaviour in the laboratory and preferences in a larger sample, we aim at maximizing both internal and external validity of our findings.

Our laboratory evidence suggests that while cosmopolitans do not discriminate between national and European recipients of redistribution, citizens with less cosmopolitan values give significantly less to European recipients compared to fellow nationals. Also in absolute terms, cosmopolitans give more to European recipients. Our cross-national analyses of EES underscore the external validity of these results: Across the EU, cosmopolitanism is strongly associated with support for international redistribution, even after controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, political ideology, and other relevant covariates.

This study contributes to the debate about support for international redistribution in the EU (Bechtel *et al.* 2014; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017) and to research on public support for European integration (for an overview see Hobolt and de Vries 2016). By studying how support for redistribution depends on the recipient's nationality, it also speaks to research on welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2013; Van der Waal *et al.* 2010). Our results have important implications for current policy debates, as highlighted in the controversy surrounding bailouts for countries like Greece. Public opinion plays an increasingly important role in shaping policy responses to the sovereign debt crisis (Copelovitch *et al.* 2016: 832).

## **What drives support for international redistribution in the European Union?**

Research on national redistribution has emphasized the role of self-interest in structuring public opinion (Iversen and Soskice 2001). The central idea is that individuals support redistribution if they expect to benefit from it. Research finds little evidence in support of economic self-interest as a driver of support for international redistribution<sup>i</sup>. Bechtel and colleagues (2014), for example, develop three mechanisms through which economic self-interest could structure support for international bailouts, but don't find any little empirical support for their expectations. While welfare chauvinism, the preference of excluding foreigners from welfare benefits, is more pervasive among citizens with lower levels of education, Van der Waal and colleagues (2010) conclude that this is due to lower cultural capital rather than weaker economic positions of lower educated people.

Partisanship and political ideology also play a role. Bechtel and colleagues (2014) find that voters of German mainstream parties are more supportive of international bailouts, while an experiment by Stoeckel and Kuhn (2017) shows that voters more generally follow party cues. A recent study finds that left-leaning individuals with higher socio-economic status are more supportive of international bailouts than those on the right, whereas left-leaning citizens with low socio-economic status are opposed to international bailouts (Kleider and Stoeckel 2016).

Altruism, generally understood as a preference to increase the welfare of others even if this implies a personal loss, might be an alternative motivation for support for (international) redistribution. Fong (2007) shows that altruism drives charitable giving to welfare recipients in the US, and Bechtel and colleagues (2014) demonstrate that more altruistic Europeans are more supportive of international economic bailouts.

Bernhard and colleagues (2006) have made the insightful observation, however, that many people are ‘parochially altruistic’, that is to say they behave altruistically towards their in-group, but less so towards their out-group. Shayo (2009) shows that competing group identifications influence support for redistribution. Group identity come in many guises such as race, nation, language, gender, or organizational and political affiliations, and which identification is most salient is likely context-dependent (Roccas *et al.* 2008; Shayo 2009).

The most relevant group boundary in the European context is the nation. Most citizens view their national community as the predominant reference-point for social solidarity (Whelan and Maître 2009). This is partly due to nation states having long been the main welfare providers and influencing people’s understanding of who should be in or out. Research on welfare chauvinism shows that some Europeans hold generally egalitarian values, but nonetheless think that foreigners should be excluded from welfare-state provisions (Mewes and Mau 2013). It is therefore possible that Europeans who are generally altruistic do not extend this altruism towards citizens of other countries. They might be concerned for fellow nationals, and might favour equality within their own national community, but not beyond.

More ‘cosmopolitan’ individuals are most likely to overcome these national boundaries of solidarity and do not discriminate against people from other EU member states. Cosmopolitanism has an institutional and a moral-psychological dimension (Zürn 2016). With respect to the latter, Merton (1968) describes cosmopolitans as individuals with a more open, global orientation and higher interest in, and awareness of, distant events, as opposed to ‘locals’ who have an inward looking perspective. Following Vertovec and Cohen (2002), a cosmopolitan orientation means seeing oneself as citizen of the world and appreciating other human beings irrespective of their national origin. Institutional cosmopolitanism entails the legitimization of supranational authority and

the awareness of the increased interconnectedness of political communities (Held 2002: 58).

Cosmopolitan orientations and institutions do not necessarily have a global scope (for a recent review, see Zürn 2016). In Europe, European integration is an important reference category for cosmopolitanism. In institutional terms, Archibugi (1998: 215-19) sees the EU as the first cosmopolitan model of democracy. In psychological terms, European identity and a positive evaluation of European integration clearly entail a cosmopolitan dimension: By supporting European integration, voters legitimize a supranational polity and accept increased interaction and interdependence with other European countries (Risse 2010: 61).<sup>ii</sup>

Research suggests that cosmopolitanism is indeed linked to international solidarity. Buchan and colleagues (2009) demonstrate in multilevel sequential cooperation experiments that people holding stronger cosmopolitan attitudes are more likely to cooperate internationally. Paxton and Knack (2012) show that individuals who see themselves as members of the world are more supportive of foreign aid. Cosmopolitanism has also been shown to be the main driver of support for international bailouts among Germans (Bechtel *et al.* 2014). On the basis of these insights, we formulate the hypothesis:

H1: Individuals with cosmopolitan values are less likely to discriminate against redistribution recipients from other EU member states.

Critics maintain that cosmopolitans may be open and global, but not necessarily solidaristic towards others, be it from their own country or from abroad. From this perspective, cosmopolitan individuals tend to belong to a privileged group of ‘frequent travellers’ that are increasingly detached from their surroundings, subscribe to neoliberal ideas, and even consciously aim at distinguishing themselves from society at large

(Calhoun 2002; Sklair 2001). Calhoun (2002) argues that cosmopolitanism has mainly been an elite concept that embraces economic ideals, and that its understanding of belonging and social life is too thin and superficial to provide a basis for social solidarity. Delhey and colleagues (2015) argue that with growing economic prosperity, a transnational lifestyle becomes a form of social class distinction. Cosmopolitans might support open borders and common humanity, but still be very reluctant to share their resources with people in need. As Calhoun (2002: 106) puts it, '[i]f there is to be a major redistribution of wealth [...] it is not likely to be guided by cosmopolitanism'. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H2: While not discriminating against foreigners, cosmopolitans are less generous towards redistribution recipients than individuals with more national orientations.

### **Measuring willingness to redistribute internationally**

Capturing people's willingness to redistribute internationally in empirical research is not straightforward. Considering that individuals generally tend to see and present themselves as more generous than they really are, analyses of public opinion surveys might suffer from social desirability bias (Cram and Patrikios 2015). Hence, a large body of research in experimental economics following the footsteps of Kahneman and colleagues (1986) relies on laboratory experiments to analyse which factors influence individuals' sharing behavior. By studying actual behavior rather than stated preferences, laboratory experiments reduce the risk of social desirability bias. Moreover, random assignment to different treatments, a highly homogenous participant pool, and a controlled environment increase internal validity by isolating the causal relationships. This comes, however, at the potential loss of external validity: It is not clear whether the

relationships found in the laboratory extend beyond this context and generally apply to a more heterogeneous population.

Hence, we combine laboratory experiments in Germany and the United Kingdom with cross-national survey data of the EES (Schmitt *et al.* 2015) on preferences for international redistribution. This enables us to see whether the redistributive behavior in the laboratory – involving real costs – also holds in a more representative sample across the EU.

### **Laboratory experiment**

We conducted laboratory experiments in four locations in Germany and the United Kingdom. These experiments were conducted in April and May 2013 in the midst of one of the deepest crises of the EU when questions of intra-EU solidarity and perceptions of national stereotypes were part-and-parcel of the media debate. This background lends our laboratory experiments more credibility and highlights the importance of measuring people's willingness to redistribute in a more stylized way which is less prone to social desirability compared to survey responses. The experiments were designed to capture people's redistributive behaviour, and how this varies for national and international recipients. Hence, the experiments had to involve citizens from different countries and take place in different EU member states. Participants were linked to each other across locations. Only by doing so, can we analyse people's redistributive behaviour across countries without deceiving experimental participants. The experiments took place in experimental laboratories in four locations: Oxford (n=63), Edinburgh (n=43), Munich (n=43) and Berlin (n=68) using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We opted for Germany and the United Kingdom because they differ with respect to public opinion towards European integration.



Experimental participants were recruited by the laboratories from a university student population. Only German and UK citizens were allowed to participate in the German and UK locations, respectively. Participants received an initial show-up fee and could keep the pay-offs they had earned in the games. On average, participants earned 20€ in Germany and 19£ in the United Kingdom. Table A1 (appendix) shows the descriptive statistics. Not surprisingly for a university student sample, the mean and standard deviation of participants' age is low.<sup>iii</sup> It is well documented that university students are very pro-EU, both due to their young age and their high level of education, which are important predictors of EU support (Hakhverdian *et al.* 2013; Kuhn 2012). Citizens with higher levels of education are also less opposed to immigration (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). This arguably stacks the odds against finding significant differences among a relatively homogenous group of participants.

The experiments capture redistributive behaviour using so-called *Dictator Games*, but enriched with a design that reflects the multi-level politics in the EU. The first use of dictator games is attributed to Kahneman and colleagues (1986), and this strand of research has become standard in behavioural economics. Dictator games and similar decision games have also become increasingly popular among researchers interested in political behaviour (Landa and Duell 2015).

Each participant was confronted with three decisions. In each decision, participants received an initial endowment to be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. Participants decided whether to keep it or to allocate it to another anonymous and randomly chosen recipient. Participants received different informational cues about where the recipient was located: Either the same town, the same country or another EU member state.<sup>iv</sup> The order of the decisions was randomized. The amount a donor sent to a recipient captures their redistributive behaviour. Each participant's

payoff depended on their own decisions and on other participants' decision.<sup>v</sup> Participants were not informed about the decisions taken by their peers, nor did they know whom they were matched with. Following ethical standards in behavioural economics, all information given to participants was accurate. At the end, participants answered a short questionnaire.

### **Operationalizations**

The unit of analysis refers to individual decisions. Decisions referred to redistributing locally, nationally, or internationally. We present pooled analyses of decisions nested in participants (using a random effects model to account for the within-participant clustering of observations).

Table B1 (appendix) presents all operationalizations. Our dependent variable is measured through the number of tokens contributed per decision. As key independent variables, we use four measures to operationalize cosmopolitanism. First, participants were asked to indicate on a 0-to-10 scale to what extent they care about the living conditions of people in their city, people in their country, people in Europe and humankind. We constructed a cosmopolitanism scale by subtracting the (average) indicated concern for the well-being of people in one's city and country from the (average) concern for people outside the country, namely people in Europe and human kind in general.<sup>vi</sup> Higher scores signify more cosmopolitan attitudes.

Next, as attitudes towards immigration and the EU have been identified as the main issues of the cosmopolitan dimension in Europe (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), we use disagreement with the general statement that 'Right now [country] is taking too many immigrants' on a 0-to-10 scale (with higher scores indicating support for immigration) as an indicator of cosmopolitanism. As a third indicator of cosmopolitan attitudes, we include general EU-support, which is measured as evaluations of one's

country's EU membership as good, bad, or neither good nor bad. Finally, cosmopolitan attitudes measured through respondents' feelings of European identity, namely 'Do you see yourself as [country national] only/[country national] and European/European and [country national]/European only?' While membership support relates to the EU, European identity can entail orientations towards Europe as a continent and ethno-cultural community. Moreover, as collective identities are not easily malleable, this measure is likely to be more robust to short-term changes in performance and output of European institutions than EU membership support (Kuhn 2015).

We control for *political ideology*, with an 11-point scale of self-placement on a left-right dimension to account for ideology. Given that in many member states citizens at the extremes of the left-right dimension are most Eurosceptic (Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015), we also include a squared term. According to economic self-interest explanations, individuals with lower socio-economic status should be less willing to redistribute. Consequently, we refer to participants' self-reported *class status*<sup>vii</sup>, ranging from working class to upper class. *Support for national redistribution* is measured as follows: 'Please indicate to what degree you personally agree with the following statements: Right now, differences in incomes are too large in [country]'. Answer categories range from absolutely disagree (0) to absolutely agree (10). *Concern for others* (a measure of altruism) is captured through a scale combining two questions relating to how concerned respondents are about different groups of people. All models control for *gender*.

## Results

We analyse the impact of cosmopolitanism on redistributive behaviour within the EU in two ways. First, we look at generosity towards European recipients in comparison to national recipients, in other words, discrimination of European recipients, and whether

cosmopolitans discriminate less (H1). Next, it could be that cosmopolitans do not discriminate, but give equally little to both national and European recipients (H2). We therefore also analyse the absolute generosity towards European recipients.

In the first set of analyses, we use the total amount contributed per decision as a dependent variable. The independent variable is whether the contributions go to a local, national, or European participant. Contributing less to Europeans compared to nationals is interpreted as evidence for discrimination against European recipients (H1).

Model 0 in Table 1 presents the direct effect of a European recipient cue versus a national recipient cue on the amount contributed, and is insignificant. This means that *on average* participants do not differentiate between giving to someone from their own country versus from another European member state. However, this does not mean that the origin of the recipient is irrelevant. As shown below, some people give *more* if they know that the recipient is in another member state. Contributions to local recipients are significantly higher than national contributions. This indicates that participants take the origin of the recipient into account and underscores the power of local ties.

Models 1-4 (Table 1) introduce interaction terms to test our hypothesis that more cosmopolitan participants are more generous towards other Europeans. The dummy 'European recipient' is interacted with our four measures of cosmopolitanism. For our hypothesis to be supported, we should see significant interaction terms for all measures of cosmopolitanism. This is indeed what we find.

[Table 1 about here]

The effects of cosmopolitanism and European recipient cue are visualized in figure 1. In the left panel, we see that participants scoring low on the cosmopolitanism scale give significantly less to European recipients compared to co-nationals, while cosmopolitans tend to give somewhat more to European recipients. It is noteworthy that the majority of

participants have a medium score of cosmopolitanism and do not discriminate either way. Participants who oppose immigration to their country give significantly less to a European recipient compared to a national recipient, while participants in favour of immigration do not discriminate in their contributions (right panel).

If we look at the interaction terms of cosmopolitanism with the *local* recipient cue (Table 1), only the interaction term with EU membership support is significant. This indicates that cosmopolitanism matters for the distinction between national versus European recipients, but not for national versus local recipients. This supports our general argument that the greatest obstacle to solidarity is the national border. This being said, the finding that people in favour of EU membership give significantly more to locals than to nationals suggests that they are ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who have both ‘roots’ and ‘wings’, as Beck (2002: 19) put it, rather than opposing the global to the local.

We did not find any significant direct effects of the control variables, except for class, which runs in the opposite direction than expected: Participants placing themselves in a higher class give significantly less per decision. We interacted the origin cues with support for national redistribution, concern for others, social class, and political ideology (Table C1, appendix). This failed to yield any significant results.

[Figure 1 about here]

While our findings suggest that cosmopolitans do not discriminate against Europeans, we cannot rule out that cosmopolitans are overall less generous than people with less cosmopolitan outlooks (H2). Cosmopolitans are often portrayed as too detached to care for others (Calhoun 2002). We further analyse our data by looking at contributions to European recipients only (Table 2). This reduces the number of observations to roughly a third, which makes it more difficult to detect significant relationships. All four measures of cosmopolitanism significantly increase contributions

to European recipients. Hence, those who display higher levels of support for the EU and immigration not only fail to discriminate between European and national recipients, they are also more generous to European recipients in absolute terms compared to other donors.

[Table 2 about here]

Our results suggest that reported cosmopolitanism is indeed more than lip service: It translates into real behaviour and renders people more willing to decrease their material welfare for the sake of other Europeans.

As a robustness check, we included dummy variables for each experimental location to capture potential contextual effects (Table C2 in the appendix). While participants in Oxford contributed significantly less in some decisions, and contributions in Edinburgh and Berlin were significantly higher, these differences do not substantively change the individual effects.

## **Survey**

To enhance generalizability, we harness the EES 2014 (Schmitt *et al.* 2015) conducted in all 28 EU member states. It includes a question on financial aid to other EU member states in economic difficulties. It is therefore highly suitable to further analyse whether the patterns found in the laboratory also hold for the entire European population.

## **Variables**

The following question serves as dependent variable: ‘In times of crisis, it is desirable for [our country] to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties’. A 4-point scale is used to distinguish between strong and moderate (dis)agreement. Four per cent of the respondents opted for the ‘don’t know’

option, and were removed from the analysis. This item measures redistribution from one member state to the other in the context of a crisis, while the experiment referred to individual redistributive behaviour towards other individuals. We are not aware of any cross-national survey that includes an item that is closer to our experimental dependent variable. Any difference in the wording of the dependent variables should decrease the probability of obtaining the same findings across data sources.

Three items operationalize cosmopolitanism: *Attitudes towards immigration* are measured by support for restrictive immigration policy. On an 11-point scale, answer categories range from ‘fully in favour of restrictive policy on immigration’ (0) to ‘fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration’ (10). While this operationalization is not exactly the same as in the experiment, both measures capture attitudes towards how the state should deal with immigration. *General EU-support* is measured by the EU membership support question (same wording as in experiment). *European identity* is measured by agreement with the statement that ‘You feel attached to Europe’ (from ‘not at all’ to ‘yes, definitely’, 1-4).

Turning to the control variables, support for *national redistribution* of wealth is measured on an 11-point scale ranging from fully opposed (0) to fully in favour of redistribution from the rich to the poor in [country] (10). The EES provides information on *educational attainment* by the age at which a respondent finished full-time education. The three categories, 15 or younger, 16-19, and 20 and older, roughly capture the step from mandatory education to secondary education and to higher education. The measure is not ideal, but widely used in cross-national survey research. To measure *social class*, respondents are asked to locate themselves on an 11-point scale, where 0 corresponds to the lowest and 10 to the highest level in society. The EES does not provide any measures of income. *Political ideology* is measured using the same 11-point left-right scale as in the laboratory experiment, and a squared term is included to account for higher

euroscepticism at the extremes. Additionally, the models control for *age* and *gender*. At the country level, we include a control variable for *GDP per capita* in 2013 and for *Eurozone membership*. Table A2 (appendix) displays a descriptive overview.<sup>viii</sup>

The dependent variable is ordinal and we therefore use ordered logistic regression analysis. To account for the clustered structure (individuals nested in countries), we estimate multilevel models with a random intercept at the country level.<sup>ix</sup> We standardized the political attitude scales to better compare effect sizes.

## Results

Table 3 presents the full multivariate model. We included a stepwise build-up of the models in the appendix (Table E1). Each of the variables used to test our hypothesis has a significant correlation in the expected (positive) direction. The more citizens favour immigration ( $b=.30$ ), feel attached to Europe ( $b=.35$ ) and support EU membership ( $b=.44$ ), the more they favour international redistribution in the EU. As shown in appendix E, the coefficient of these variables remains strong and significant in all model specifications (Table E1). This suggests that similar relationships exist across the European population as found in the experiments.

Interestingly, support for national redistribution is not significantly related to support for international redistribution. The coefficients of the socio-structural control variables are in line with previous studies. Confirming existing research (Hakhverdian *et al.* 2013), citizens with higher education are significantly more in favour of international redistribution ( $b= -.12$  for lower educated and  $b=.22$  for higher educated), and the same applies to those with a higher (perceived) social class ( $b=.06$ ). Men are more supportive of international redistribution ( $b=.12$ ). Right-wing citizens are significantly less solidary across borders than left-wing citizens ( $b= -.10$ ). The squared term is insignificant. Support for international redistribution is higher in countries with a higher GDP per



capita. A possible interpretation is that citizens of less affluent EU member states feel that their country is less capable of aiding other countries. Eurozone member countries demonstrate clearly lower support for international redistribution. This relationship appears only when we control for GDP, indicating that when comparing two equally affluent EU member states, the one that is Eurozone member is less supportive of international redistribution.

Tables E2a and E2b present the model estimations for each country separately and show that cosmopolitanism is the principal and most consistent predictor of international solidarity in each country.

[Table 3 about here]

Figure 2 graphically displays the effects of immigration attitudes for all four categories of the dependent variable. This gives a sense of the effect sizes. Going from least to most in favour of immigration restriction, the predicted probability to *fully agree* with international redistribution to other EU member states increases from .08 to .21. A similar increase occurs for the likelihood of tending to agree. As we would expect, the inverse relationship exists for the lower two categories of the dependent variable: as support for immigration decreases, people become more likely to oppose international redistribution. On average, predicted probabilities change with .13 when immigration support increases from its minimum to its maximum.

[Figure 2 about here]

## **Discussion and outlook**

Against the backdrop of the European sovereign debt crisis and the turmoil surrounding financial bailouts of some member states, this study examines to what extent cosmopolitanism shapes international solidarity in the EU. Are European citizens that

subscribe to cosmopolitan attitudes practicing what they preach, and willing redistribute within the EU?

By complementing laboratory experiments on redistribution in the United Kingdom and in Germany with existing survey data from the EES 2014, we show that various aspects of cosmopolitanism, most notably, orientations towards immigrants and European integration, are powerful predictors of the willingness to redistribute internationally. Importantly, our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism matters more for people's willingness to redistribute internationally compared to conventional economic and political variables, such as political ideology or attitudes towards income inequality. This dovetails with evidence by Bechtel and colleagues (2014) regarding bailout support, and suggests that their findings for Germany might be applicable more generally.

Our study does come with some limitations. It is impossible to assess causality in cross-sectional surveys like the EES, and while the great strength of experimental research lies in random assignment to treatments, the fact that cosmopolitanism cannot be randomly assigned limits our ability to make causal claims. That said, the fact that our findings regarding cosmopolitanism and international redistribution preferences are similar across data sources and methods used increases our overall confidence in their validity.

Bearing these limitations in mind, our findings suggest that preferences for national and European redistribution are two different beasts that are not necessarily related to each other. Important predictors of national redistribution, like self-interest or left-right ideology, do not play a big role in explaining support for international redistribution within the EU. These findings corroborate the statement by Noël and Thérien (2002: 649) that '[p]ublic opinion on international redistribution is not a simple extension of public attitudes about domestic redistribution'.

Our findings inform current scholarly debates on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe (Copelovitch *et al.* 2016). The jury is still out on whether Europeans are ready to redistribute internationally. While Zürn (2016: 25) notes that ‘there is little sign of comprehensive transnational solidarity developing that would make it possible to shift redistributive policy in the sense of creating social rights to the global, or even European level’, Risse (2014) is more optimistic. He contends that the share of citizens who identify (also) as European is large enough, and their identification is strong enough, to provide public support for international redistribution (Risse 2014: 1208). Our results suggest that a considerable share of Europeans is indeed open towards international redistribution, even if this incurs some personal cost. Our evidence showing that cosmopolitans do not discriminate against recipients from other EU member states and are overall more generous, challenges the critique that cosmopolitanism is too superficial and detached from society to provide a basis for social solidarity. To the contrary, it suggests that cosmopolitans are at the forefront of international solidarity in the EU.

Finally, our results speak to current policy debates in the EU. We show that support for redistribution within the EU is substantial, perhaps more so than the popular media leads us to believe. This is important information for policy makers. It renders some legitimacy to continuing efforts to financially assist member states in crisis. Moreover, the finding that cosmopolitanism rather than support for national redistribution motivates Europeans’ commitment to international solidarity has important implications for policy makers attempting to mobilize support for financial bailouts. Elites might not be able to frame policy programmes such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the same way than those at the national level. If general preferences for redistribution played a larger role, elites could emphasize the neediness of particular member states, and point out the vast economic inequalities throughout the Union. However, our results suggest that these strategies are likely to be less fruitful than

those aimed at downplaying national differences or appealing to collective European identity.

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<sup>i</sup> A growing body of research challenges the role of self-interest for national redistribution as well.

<sup>ii</sup> However, as any collective identity, European identity requires a common other, which is often defined in ethnic or cultural terms (Diez 2004; Kuhn 2015).

<sup>iii</sup> Three participants were older than 35; removing them did not alter the results.

<sup>iv</sup> No information about the exact member state was given.

<sup>v</sup> For the exact wording of the instructions, see appendix (D).

<sup>vi</sup> A principal axis factor analysis (promax oblique rotation) shows that these four items load on two distinct factors. The first factor relates city- and country-level concerns (Eigenvalue 2.56, respective factor loadings .79 and .85, remaining loadings <.4), while the second factor underlies concerns with people in Europe and humankind (Eigenvalue 2.27, respective factor loadings .61 and .74, remaining loadings <.4).

<sup>vii</sup> Many university students are financially supported by their parents and the state; it is therefore not sensible to measure their income. Alternatively, we assessed the effect of parental socio-economic background by adding the father's educational level to the models. This had no significant effect in any of the models, and did not alter the results substantively. As it reduced the sample with 30 participants, we did not include it in the main models.

<sup>viii</sup> Estimations with a dummy for member states that joined in 2004-2013 and a dummy for net contributor status did not change the effect of our independent variables. Due to

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high collinearity they are not included in the final models. Missing values were treated by list-wise deletion.

<sup>ix</sup> Ordered logistic random intercept models are estimated using Stata's *gllamm* package.

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## Acknowledgements

Laboratory experiments were conducted at BLESS (Berlin), BLUE (Edinburgh), CESS (Oxford), and MELESSA (Munich). We thank Michele Belot, Ray Duch, Martin Kocher, and Dorothea Kübler for granting us access to the laboratories. We thank Laura Cram, Juan Diez Medrano, Catherine de Vries, Dominik Düll, Monika Eigmüller, Juan Fernandez, Luara Ferracioli, Ann-Kristin Kölln, David Rueda, Waltraud Schelkle, Marco Steenbergen, Florian Stöckel, the editors, and the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. Friederike Molitor and Marieke Lomans provided excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## Funding

This research was supported by a British Academy Grant and a VENI grant of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research awarded to Theresa Kuhn.

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## Tables and Figures

Figure 1





Figure 1: Effect of European recipient as cosmopolitanism (left) and immigration support (right) increase

Figure 2



**Figure 2: Predicted probability of support for transnational redistribution (1-4) by support for immigration**

Source: EES 2014, based upon model 3 (table E1). Note: Average predicted change (from minimum to maximum) over the four categories of dependent variable is .13.

**Table 1. Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with participant characteristics**

	Model 0 No interactions	Model 1 Cosmopolitanism	Model 2 Immigration	Model 3 European identity	Model 4 EU support
Local recipient	17.62 (8.19)*	16.06 (8.24)*	10.90 (19.19)	-3.07 (14.18)	-58.08 (23.01)**
European recipient	-7.94 (8.19)	-6.03 (8.24)	-60.42 (19.19)****	-32.02 (14.18)*	-93.01 (23.01)***
<i>Cosmopolitanism</i>					
Cosmopolitanism scale		17.44 (22.67)			
Support for immigration			5.66 (6.31)		
European identity				48.41 (28.80)*	
EU membership support					15.16 (28.04)
<i>Interactions with recipient</i>					
L*Cosmopolitanism scale		7.72 (10.39)			
E*Cosmopolitanism scale		22.00* (10.39)			
L*Support for immigration			0.85 (2.75)		
E*Support for immigration			8.29 (2.75)**		
L*European identity				22.62 (13.14)	
E*European identity				27.53 (13.14)*	
L*EU membership support					44.92 (13.10)***
E*EU membership support					51.47 (13.10)***
<i>Control variables</i>					
Age	3.46 (3.51)	3.10 (3.56)	3.97 (3.52)	1.25 (3.60)	3.55 (4.10)
Gender (1=male)	1.96 (33.50)	-1.03 (33.99)	3.48 (33.42)	15.80 (35.44)	12.38 (33.77)
Class	-36.92 (18.31)*	-41.48 (18.95)*	-40.24 (18.41)*	-50.36 (19.22)**	-38.60 (18.61) *
Left-right placement	-4.15 (12.00)	-1.48 (12.32)	1.70 (12.65)	2.54 (12.42)	0.50 (12.21)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	-4.51 (3.83)	-4.99 (3.86)	-4.98 (3.83)	-3.85 (3.93)	-3.81 (3.86)
Inequality aversion	-2.19 (6.82)	-2.04 (7.01)	-2.43 (6.80)	-3.44 (7.29)	-3.84 (6.86)
Concern for others	30.06 (20.13)	34.75 (20.71)	29.14 (20.08)	32.86 (20.89)	25.53 (20.45)
Constant	217.70 (105.09)**	216.06 (116.02)**	201.50 (117.21)**	275.02 (115.09) ***	204.72 (122.04) **

**Table 2. Total contributions to European recipient**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Cosmopolitanism	Immigration	European identity
Cosmopol. scale	38.80 (21.82)*		
Immigration		13.62* (6.08)	
European identity			74.69** (27.85)
EU support			
Age	2.10 (3.55)	3.04 (3.50)	-0.06 (3.60)
Gender (1=male)	-6.84 (33.91)	1.70 (33.23)	13.74 (35.08)
Class	-32.58 (18.91)	-34.79 (18.30)	-42.56 (19.26)*
Left-right	-6.67 (12.29)	-2.28 (12.58)	-3.17 (12.45)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	-6.30 (3.85)	-6.59 (3.81)	-5.04 (3.93)
Inequality aversion	-2.01 (6.99)	-1.74 (6.76)	-3.43 (7.30)
Concern for others	34.48 (20.67)	25.93 (19.98)	30.34 (20.94)
Constant	339.06** (116.57)	237.27* (116.00)	352.04** (115.85)
N	178	182	171
R-squared	0.06	0.07	0.08

Source: own laboratory experiment. OLS regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\*

**Table 3. Multilevel ordered logistic model explaining support for financial help to other EU member states**

	Model 1
<i>Socio-structural factors</i>	
Age	0.00 (.00)*
Gender (1=male)	0.12 (.03)***
Class ( <i>subjective, 1-10</i> )	0.06 (.01)***
Low educated ( <i>ref: middle</i> )	-0.12 (.04)**
High educated ( <i>ref: middle</i> )	0.22 (.03)***
<i>Attitudes</i>	
Left-right (z)	-0.10 (.01)***
Left-right squared (z)	0.01 (.01)
Support redistribution (z)	0.00 (.01)
Support immigration (z)	0.30 (.01)***
Attachment to EU (z)	0.35 (.02)***
EU membership support (z)	0.44 (.02)***
<i>Country level</i>	
GDP per capita (2013)	0.01 (.00)***
Eurozone member (0/1)	-0.50 (.04)**
Constant cut1	-0.88 (.08)***
Constant cut2	0.64 (.08)***
Constant cut3	3.13 (.08)***
Level 2 variance (country)	0.08 (.01)***

Source: EES 2014. Multilevel ordered logistic model with random intercept at country level. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. n(respondents)=20,633; n(countries)=28.



## APPENDIX:

### **Practicing what you preach: How cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute across the European Union**

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<b>Appendix A: Descriptive statistics .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Appendix B: Operationalizations .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Appendix C: Robustness checks experiments.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Appendix D: Wording of experimental instructions.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Appendix E: Additional results of cross-national survey analysis.....</b>	<b>11</b>

## Appendix A: Descriptive statistics

**Table A1. Descriptives of experimental data**

Variable	N (subjects)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	201	23.77	4.62	19	52
Gender (1=male)	203	.57	.50	0	1
Class	191	2.96	.93	1	5
Left-right (centered)	197	-1.16	1.76	-4.5	4.5
Inequality aversion	199	7.34	2.70	0	10
Concern for others (z)	195	.09	.86	-2.49	1.34
Cosmopolitanism scale (z)	195	.03	.78	-2.16	2.14
Immigration support	200	6.43	3.01	0	10
National/European identity	188	.88	.67	0	3
EU membership support	197	1.64	.63	0	2

Source: Own laboratory experiment, data collected in 4 locations in the UK and Germany in Spring 2013

**Table A2. Descriptives of European Election Study 2014 data**

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	51.91	17.09	18	99
Gender (1=male)	0.48	0.50	0	1
Class	5.53	1.55	1	10
Education	2.27	0.72	1	3
Support for redistribution	6.12	2.89	0	10
Support for immigration	4.54	3.08	0	10
Left-right self-placement	5.08	2.61	0	10
Attachment to Europe	2.91	0.92	1	4
EU membership support	2.46	0.72	1	3
Transnational solidarity in the EU	2.51	0.94	1	4
Eurozone member	0.67	0.47	0	1
GDP per capita	98.64	33.46	45	257

Note: N (respondents) is 20,633, n(countries) is 28 for all variables (listwise deletion applied).

## Appendix B: Operationalizations

**Table B1. Operationalization of variables in lab experiments and EES 2014**

	<i>Lab experiments</i>	<i>European Election Survey</i>
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Amount of tokens given to anonymous, randomly matched recipient in another EU member state	In times of crisis, it is desirable for [our country] to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties (1-4)
<i>Independent variables</i>		
Cosmopolitanism scale	(Care for people in Europe+ Care for human kind) – (Care for people in city + Care for people in country)	
Support for immigration	Country is taking too many immigrants (0-10, <i>reverse coded</i> )	Support for more restrictive immigration policy (0-10, <i>reverse coded</i> )
European identity	Identify as national/European or both (1-4)	Attachment to Europe (1-4)
EU membership support	Country's EU-membership good/bad/neither (1-3)	Country's EU-membership good/bad/neither (1-3)
<i>Control variables</i>		
Age	Age in years	Age in years
Gender	Gender dummy (male=1)	Gender dummy (male=1)
Level of education		Age when finished education: low (<16), middle (16-19), high (>19)
Social class	Subjective social class (1-5)	Subjective social class (0-10)
Ideology	Left-right self-placement (0-10)	Left-right self-placement (0-10)
Inequality aversion	Income differences too large (0-10)	Support for redistribution of wealth (0-10)
Concern for others	Care for people in city + Care for people in country	



## Appendix C: Robustness checks experiments

**Table C1. Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with class, ideology, inequality aversion and concern for others**

	Model 0 No interactions	Model 1 Class	Model 2 Ideology	Model 3 Inequality aversion	Model 4 Concern for others
<i>Recipient in game</i>					
Local	16.26 (8.21)*	22.26 (28.54)	24.06 (11.11)*	23.09 (24.16)	16.16 (8.26)
European	-8.07 (8.21)	-27.39 (28.54)	-7.36 (11.11)	-20.88 (24.16)	-7.93 (8.26)
<i>Interactions with recipient</i>					
L*Class		-2.01 (9.18)			
E*Class		6.49 (9.18)			
L*Left-right			0.77 (5.67)		
L*Left-right2			-1.49 (1.93)		
E*Left-right			-9.63 (5.67)		
E*Left-right2			-2.71 (1.93)		
L*Inequality aversion				-0.93 (3.09)	
E*Inequality aversion				1.74 (3.09)	
L*Concern for others					1.40 (9.84)
E*Concern for others					-1.73 (9.84)
<i>Control variables</i>					
Age	3.46 (3.51)	3.46 (3.51)	3.46 (3.51)	3.46 (3.51)	3.46 (3.51)
Gender (1=male)	1.96 (33.50)	1.96 (33.50)	1.96 (33.50)	1.96 (33.50)	1.96 (33.50)
Class	-36.92 (18.31)*	-38.42 (19.07)*	-36.92 (18.32)*	-36.92 (18.32)*	-36.92 (18.32)*
Left-right placement	-4.15 (12.00)	-4.15 (12.00)	-1.20 (12.44)	-4.15 (12.00)	-4.15 (12.00)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	-4.51 (3.83)	-4.51 (3.83)	-3.11 (3.99)	-4.51 (3.83)	-4.51 (3.83)
Inequality aversion	-2.19 (6.82)	-2.19 (6.82)	-2.19 (6.82)	-2.47 (7.05)	-2.19 (6.82)
Concern for others	30.06 (20.13)	30.06 (20.13)	30.06 (20.13)	30.06 (20.13)	30.17 (20.92)
Constant	317.70 (105.08)**	323.38 (113.53)**	316.11 (112.51)**	320.94 (113.19)**	318.94 (112.43)**
<i>N (decisions/subjects)</i>	546/182	546/182	546/182	546/182	546/182

**Table C2. Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with participant character controlled for location of experiment**

	Inequality	Concern for others	Cosmopolitanism	Immigration	European identity	EU support
Oxford	-6.59 (45.49)	-9.98 (45.03)	-3.69 (45.52)	-3.24 (44.90)	11.20 (48.15)	-1.4 (46.1)
Edinburgh	96.19* (50.46)	92.87 (49.96)	90.32 (51.03)	95.89 (50.03)	110.25* (52.42)	89.1 (51.1)
Berlin	84.57* (47.40)	97.96* (46.80)	103.73* (47.73)	89.53 (46.71)	86.60 (49.31)	87.5 (46.1)
Age	2.80 (3.61)	3.03 (3.59)	1.84 (3.64)	3.17 (3.59)	1.71 (3.69)	2.14
Gender (1=male)	-14.14 (32.92)	-7.16 (32.41)	-13.69 (32.66)	-18.71 (32.33)	-20.23 (34.71)	-26.1 (32.1)
Class	-33.68* (18.39)	-36.59* (17.89)	-41.99* (18.55)	-37.56* (18.00)	-41.62* (19.33)	-36.1 (18.1)
<i>Attitudes</i>						
Left-right placement	-0.47 (11.60)	-0.91 (11.12)	2.59 (11.08)	8.30 (11.56)	6.74 (11.27)	6.7 (11.1)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	-2.64 (3.67)	-4.49 (3.78)	-3.17 (3.65)	-3.10 (3.64)	-2.81 (3.78)	-2.2 (3.7)
Inequality aversion	-4.24 (6.82)					-3.1 (6.6)
Concern for others		32.51 (20.15)				
Cosmopolitanism			7.30 (22.08)			
Support for immigration				4.90 (6.10)		
European identity					27.01 (28.93)	
EU membership support						6.07 (27.1)
<i>Recipient in game</i>						
Local	22.17 (23.56)	17.47* (8.30)	17.53*(8.27)	8.30 (18.92)	-1.97 (14.01)	-58 (23.1)
European	-29.01 (23.56)	-6.96 (8.30)	-6.00 (8.27)	-65.92*** (18.92)	-31.94* (14.01)	-96 (23.1)
<i>Interactions with recipient</i>						
L*Inequality aversion	-0.83 (3.02)					
E*Inequality aversion	2.72 (3.02)					
L*Concern for others		4.15 (9.84)				
E*Concern for others		0.32 (9.84)				
L*Cosmopolitanism			8.15 (10.49)			
E*Cosmopolitanism			22.00* (10.49)			
L*Support for immigration				1.47 (2.71)		
E*Support for immigration				9.17*** (2.71)		
L*European					20.80	

identity					(12.75)	
E*European					25.81*	
identity					(12.75)	
L*EU						46.01***
membership						(13.10)
support						
E*EU						
membership						53.85***
support						(13.10)
Constant	294.32*	274.08*	313.76**	243.05*	283.05*(1	278.60*
	(127.34)	(117.19)	(121.63)	(123.00)	23.89)	(1
						40.76)
N	552/184	549/183	540/180	555/185	519/173	546/182
(decisions/subjects)						

Source: own lab experiment. Panel data analysis, random effects estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (1-tailed).

## Appendix D: Wording of experimental instructions

### **General instructions:**

Welcome to this experiment. This experiment is about how people make decisions. If you pay close attention to the instructions then you could make a significant amount of money.

Feel free to ask the monitor questions as they arise. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. Please note that the consumption of food and beverages is not allowed during the experiment.

This experiment consists of 4 modules and one questionnaire at the end. Instructions will be handed out at the beginning of each module. We ask that you plan on staying until the end of the session, which will last about 90 minutes.

In this experiment you are going to be asked to take decisions that affect you and other people. Some will be in this city, but they may not be in this room now; some will be from other cities in the United Kingdom, and some will be from other member states of the European Union.

At this point, some people may have already participated in this experiment, and other groups are participating in the same experiment these weeks. Your choices, and the choices by others, will be matched with the help of some colleagues at another university once the research is finished. You will be paid £6 in cash as a show up fee at the end of this session, and in three weeks time, at the end of this research, you will receive an email asking you to come to be paid in cash for the decisions that you and the people you have been matched with made.

The same instructions are being given to other people in other countries. Everyone will get the same materials that you get, and is hearing the same thing you are, but in their own language.

All of the decisions are similar, so please pay attention to these instructions. At the outset of each decision you will be given tokens. It will be important to keep in mind that 1000 tokens are worth £3.25 to you. We have taken care that the tokens are worth the same value in terms of what could be purchased with them in each participating country.

Again, keep in mind that you are being matched with other people (some of whom are from around here, and others from other places in the UK or other European member states). Your decisions, and the decisions of the other participants, will affect how much you make. When the research is finished, our server will match the information about others' choices in order to calculate each participant's payments. This may take a few weeks, and that's why you will receive your payoffs in three weeks time, but you will receive a £6 cash show up fee before you leave today.



## Dictator game

- a) In this module you are going to make three independent decisions.
- b) Half of the participants will receive an *Endowment* of **1000 tokens** (group A), and the other half will not (group B).
- c) Each participant who receives an *Endowment* (group A) will be randomly paired with another participant who has not (group B). You will not know the other person's identity, nor will they know yours. Nor will these identities be revealed after the session is completed.
- d) However, before the endowments are distributed and the pairing takes place, you may allocate the endowment between yourself and the other person as you wish if you were to receive this *Endowment*.
- e) Profits in this module will be calculated in the following way:
  - i) *Group A: Profits = Endowment – Amount Sent*
  - ii) *Group B: Profits = Amount Received*

### Decision 1

Remember that you don't know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B.

How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she is participating in another location in the UK?

How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)?

### Decision 2

Remember that you don't know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B.

How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she might not be in this room, but is participating in this local area?

How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)?

### Decision 3

Remember that you don't know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B.

How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she is participating in another member state in the European Union?

How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)?

[NB: all participants were asked to make all three decisions; decisions were in a random order]

## Appendix E: Additional results of cross-national survey analysis

**Table E1. Multilevel ordered logistic models explaining support for financial help to other EU countries**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Socio-structural factors</i>						
Age	0.00 (.00)***	0.00 (.00)*	0.00 (.00)***	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)*	0.00 (.00)*
Gender (1=male)	0.12 (.03)***	0.12 (.03)***	0.15 (.03)***	0.10 (.03)***	0.10 (.03)***	0.12 (.03)***
Class (subjective, 1-10)	0.12 (.01)***	0.12 (.01)***	0.11 (.01)***	0.08 (.01)***	0.08 (.01)***	0.06 (.01)***
Low educated (ref: middle)	-0.28 (.04)***	-0.27 (.04)***	-0.23 (.04)***	-0.19 (.04)**	-0.18 (.04)***	-0.12 (.04)**
High educated (ref: middle)	0.44 (.03)***	0.41 (.03)***	0.40 (.03)***	0.33 (.03)***	0.29 (.03)***	0.22 (.03)***
<i>Attitudes</i>						
Left-right (z)	-0.09 (.01)***	-0.10 (.01)***	-0.06 (.01)***	-0.11 (.01)***	-0.13 (.01)***	-0.10 (.01)***
Left-right squared (z)	0.02 (.01)	0.02 (.02)*	0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	0.02 (.01)*	0.01 (.01)
Support redistribution (z)		-0.03 (.01)*				0.00 (.01)
Support immigration (z)			0.36 (.01)***			0.30 (.01)***
Attachment to EU (z)				0.54 (.01)***		0.35 (.02)***
EU membership support (z)					0.59 (.01)***	0.44 (.02)***
<i>Country level</i>						
GDP per capita (2013)	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)**	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***
Eurozone member (0/1)	-0.27 (.03)*	-0.26 (.03)*	-0.47 (.03)***	-0.31 (.03)***	-0.58 (.03)**	-0.50 (.04)**
Constant cut1	0.29 (.07)	0.07 (.08)	-0.04 (.07)	-0.42 (.07)***	-0.46 (.08)***	-0.88 (.08)***
Constant cut2	1.67 (.07)***	1.45 (.08)***	1.36 (.08)***	1.03 (.07)***	1.02 (.08)***	0.64 (.08)***
Constant cut3	3.97 (.08)***	3.74 (.08)***	3.71 (.08)***	3.42 (.08)***	3.43 (.08)***	3.13 (.08)***
Level 2 variance (country)	0.10 (.01)***	0.14 (.01)***	0.14 (.01)***	0.13 (.01)***	0.10 (.01)***	0.08 (.01)***
Observations	20,633	20,633	20,633	20,633	20,633	20,633

Source: European Election Study 2014. Multilevel ordered logistic models with random intercept at country level. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.

**Table E2a. Ordered logistic regression models by country (Western Europe)**

	BEL	DNK	GRC	ESP	FIN	FRA	IRL	ITA	LUX	NLD	AUT	PRT	SWE	DEU	UK
Age	0.01** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Male	0.44*** (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)	0.28* (0.13)	0.34* (0.14)	0.32* (0.14)	0.39** (0.14)	0.28 (0.15)	0.13 (0.21)	0.23 (0.13)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.15)	0.24 (0.13)	0.15 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.13)
Class ( <i>I-10</i> )	0.04 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.11 (0.05)
<i>Education</i> ( <i>ref: mid</i> )															
Low	-0.45* (0.21)	0.08 (0.36)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.33 (0.23)	-0.55* (0.22)	0.18 (0.21)	0.11 (0.32)	-0.43 (0.26)	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.14 (0.28)	0.06 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.18)
High	0.39** (0.14)	0.22 (0.19)	0.30 (0.16)	0.74*** (0.16)	0.15 (0.17)	0.55*** (0.16)	0.47** (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)	0.17 (0.25)	0.12 (0.15)	0.32 (0.16)	0.06 (0.24)	-0.17 (0.17)	0.47*** (0.13)	0.21 (0.16)
Left-right	-0.31*** (0.08)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.28*** (0.08)	-0.24* (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.18* (0.09)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.33*** (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.28*** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.14* (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.06)
Support redistrib.	-0.11 (0.07)	0.17* (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.17 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.04 (0.09)	0.15 (0.12)	0.08 (0.09)	0.22** (0.08)	-0.34*** (0.09)	0.20* (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)
Support immig.	0.35*** (0.08)	0.48*** (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.89*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.70*** (0.09)	0.18 (0.14)	0.73*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.50*** (0.08)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.07)
EU attach.	0.45*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.09)	0.18* (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)	0.48*** (0.09)	0.46*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.08)	0.22* (0.11)	0.74*** (0.15)	0.55*** (0.08)	0.44*** (0.09)	0.20 (0.10)	0.47*** (0.09)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.08)
EU member	0.33*** (0.08)	0.51*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.47*** (0.08)	0.47*** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.24** (0.08)	0.62*** (0.15)	1.00*** (0.09)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.58*** (0.08)	0.56*** (0.07)
Constant cut1	-1.07** (0.36)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-0.95** (0.35)	0.18 (0.34)	-2.30*** (0.39)	-0.79* (0.34)	-1.21** (0.38)	-0.73 (0.46)	-2.91*** (0.63)	-2.02*** (0.43)	-2.84*** (0.39)	-0.78* (0.38)	-3.55*** (0.41)	-1.03*** (0.29)	-2.03*** (0.34)
Constant cut2	0.73* (0.36)	-0.68 (0.39)	0.40 (0.34)	1.71*** (0.34)	-0.24 (0.38)	0.72* (0.34)	0.18 (0.38)	0.95* (0.46)	-0.92 (0.60)	0.38 (0.42)	-1.19** (0.38)	0.56 (0.38)	-1.98*** (0.39)	0.72* (0.29)	-0.53 (0.33)
Constant cut3	3.43*** (0.38)	2.08*** (0.40)	2.42*** (0.36)	3.88*** (0.36)	3.10*** (0.40)	3.13*** (0.36)	2.80*** (0.39)	3.48*** (0.49)	2.47*** (0.61)	3.46*** (0.44)	1.39*** (0.38)	3.81*** (0.44)	1.09** (0.38)	3.42*** (0.30)	2.19*** (0.34)

	BGR	CYP	CZE	EST	HUN	LVA	LTU	MLT	POL	ROU	SVK	SVN	HRV
Age	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Male	-0.44** (0.17)	0.30 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.36* (0.16)	0.12 (0.13)	0.05 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.47 (0.24)	-0.17 (0.16)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.13 (0.15)
Class (1-10)	0.04 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.17** (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.09)	0.22*** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
<i>Education (ref: mid)</i>													
Low	0.53 (0.35)	0.10 (0.30)	-0.94** (0.32)	-0.71 (0.37)	-0.29 (0.17)	-0.67 (0.40)	-0.52 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.30)	0.12 (0.32)	-0.39 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.27)	0.10 (0.22)	0.13 (0.29)
High	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.25)	-0.19 (0.17)	0.29 (0.16)	0.26 (0.17)	0.08 (0.16)	0.28 (0.16)	0.07 (0.33)	0.25 (0.17)	0.03 (0.19)	0.18 (0.16)	0.31 (0.16)	-0.51** (0.17)
Left-right	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.12 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
Left-right <sup>2</sup>	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.35*** (0.10)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)	0.18** (0.06)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Support redistrib.	0.12* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)
Support immig.	-0.14 (0.10)	0.14 (0.10)	0.18** (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.38** (0.14)	0.34*** (0.10)	0.04 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	0.13 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)
EU attach.	0.10 (0.10)	0.15 (0.11)	0.09 (0.07)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)	0.41*** (0.09)	0.52*** (0.09)	0.41** (0.16)	0.28* (0.11)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.23** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.10)	0.13 (0.08)
EU member	0.57*** (0.12)	0.19 (0.11)	0.47*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.12)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.28 (0.17)	0.43*** (0.11)	0.25** (0.10)	0.50*** (0.09)	0.22* (0.09)	0.26** (0.08)
Constant cut1	-0.45 (0.40)	-0.37 (0.54)	-0.91* (0.40)	-0.84* (0.43)	-0.47 (0.32)	-0.80 (0.42)	-1.39*** (0.42)	-0.16 (0.72)	-0.32 (0.43)	-1.53*** (0.42)	-0.39 (0.35)	-1.77*** (0.42)	-0.53 (0.37)
Constant cut2	0.83* (0.40)	0.38 (0.54)	0.88* (0.40)	0.78 (0.43)	1.01** (0.33)	0.84* (0.42)	0.03 (0.41)	1.09 (0.72)	1.50*** (0.43)	-0.26 (0.41)	1.24*** (0.36)	0.04 (0.41)	0.83* (0.36)
Constant cut3	2.75*** (0.43)	1.75** (0.55)	3.59*** (0.43)	3.37*** (0.45)	3.42*** (0.35)	3.26*** (0.44)	2.64*** (0.43)	3.39*** (0.75)	4.72*** (0.48)	1.84*** (0.42)	3.99*** (0.40)	2.10*** (0.43)	2.96*** (0.38)
N	514	356	860	674	823	638	667	261	600	545	783	685	653

Source: European Election Study 2014. Ordered logistic regression models. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.