The effect of the integration interval on the measurement accuracy of RMS values and powers in systems with nonsinusoidal waveforms

In this paper the possibility of errors in the measurement of average values (in particular rms values or active powers) in power systems under nonsinusoidal conditions are discussed. The errors considered are either due to the fact that the measurement time interval is not an exact multiple of the fundamental period of the voltage and current signals, or due to the presence of interharmonics or subharmonics. The errors are calculated and the results are illustrated by means of simple examples

Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control

In this paper, we study efficient dissolution of partnerships in a context of incomplete information. We generalize the results of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) to situations where the partnership takes on a common value that may depend upon all partners' types, so that each partner's individual rationality constraint depends on types other than his own. We show that in this case not only the distribution of ownership, emphasized in the earlier literature, but also the distribution of control within an organization matter in determining the possibility of efficient dissolution. We underscore this point by showing that two-person partnerships where one partner exercises complete control cannot be dissolved efficiently with any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism, regardless of the ownership structureMechanism design, efficient trading, asymmetric control, partnerships

An integrated aerodynamic/propulsion study for generic aero-space planes based on waverider concepts

The design of a unified aero-space plane based on waverider technology is analyzed. The overall aerodynamic design and performance of an aero-space plane are discussed in terms of the forebody, scramjet, and afterbody. Other subjects considered in the study are combustion/nozzle optimization, the idealized tip-to-tail waverider model, and the two-dimensional minimum length nozzle. Charts and graphs are provided to show the results of the preliminary investigations

Protection and International Sourcing

We study the impact of import protection on relationship-specific investments, organizational choice and welfare. We show that a tariff on intermediate inputs can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. It does so if it discriminates in favor of the investing party, thereby improving its bargaining position. On the other hand, a tariff can prompt inefficient organizational choices if it discriminates in favor of less productive firms or if integration costs are low. Protection distorts organizational choices because tariff revenue, which is external to the firms, drives a wedge between the private and social gains to offshoring and integration.International trade, tariffs, hold-up problem, sourcing, organizational form

Ownership Structure and the Market for Corporate Control

We study the impact of the ownership structure of a corporation on the characteristics and efficiency of the market for corporate control. We adopt a general mechanism design approach, in which endogenous sources of inefficiency in the market, including adverse selection, moral hazard, budget balance and voluntary trading, may preclude the possibility of efficiently restructuring control and ownership. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient market, and describe the characteristics of efficient restructuring mechanisms, when they exist. In efficient restructuring, corporations typically increase the number of shares of the incumbent manager when he remains in control, or give him a generous golden parachute when he is deposed. Corporations are also reluctant to assign full control and full ownership to a single stockholder, unless agency costs are severe. We characterize the set of ownership structures for which efficient restructuring is possible. While the distribution of ownership among the non-controlling shareholders is irrelevant, the level of initial managerial ownership is a central determinant of this set. Typically, efficient restructuring is easier to obtain for low levels of managerial ownership.ownership, corporate control, restructuring, mechanism design