7 research outputs found
Welfare Improving Contracts in Cournot Markets
The question this paper addresses is whether a government can regulate a Cournot oligopolist market to give higher level of welfare without changing either the strategic variable (output quantity) or the way prices are determined (by an auctioneer). The problem is set as a two- stage game played by profit-maximizing firms and a welfare-maximizing government. Firms are symmetric in capacity and technology but asymmetric in ownership. The government owns one firm and uses it strategically. The main policy implication of the model is that by owning and controlling one single firm, a government can regulate an entire industry and achieve welfare improvements. This is possible as the decision-making asymmetry among privately and publicly owned firms allows the government to change the context in which the quantity competition takes place. In addition, this paper shows that the social objectives of the government are not incompatible with profit maximization targets. The government improves the \QTR{it}{total }welfare of the economy if and only if it maximizes profits in its own firm. We shall see that, in equilibrium, the publicly-owned firm maximizes profit either by producing the Stackelberg leader output or the competitive output.Cournot competition, Welfare, Contracts
Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets: An (enhanced) two- Stage Approach
This paper presents an alternative or enhanced approach to information acquisition in Cournot markets with stochastic demand in which the cost of information acquisition is endogenously determined by firms\222 information purchasing strategy. I propose a two-stage model in which in the first stage each firm decides whether it will join a coalition to purchase information and therefore share the cost of information acquisition, to individually purchase information, or to remain uninformed. In the second-stage firms engage in Cournot competition to choose output. The model I propose encompasses the main assumptions of the current view on information acquisition, mainly those related to the role of information and how it affects firms\222 profits. However, I will argue that by adding natural assumptions on oligopolists\222 behavior, I can offer a model that provides a better description of firms\222 actions and trade\226offs than the standard view. Keywords: Information Acquisition, Cournot Markets, Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium, Strong Nash Equilibrium.Information Acquistion, Cournot Market, Strong Nash Equilibrium
The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel
Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two--players sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, ``cost of fighting,'' ``cost of shame'', and ``value of courage.''teaching, game theory, general economics
Information Acquisition with Endogenously Determined Cost in Cournot Markets with Stochastic Demand
This paper presents a model of information acquisition in Cournot Market with stochastic demand where the acquisition cost is endogenously determined. The novelty is to consider the possibility of cost reducing alliances to be formed in the first-stage of a two-stage acquisition game. This paper encompasses the main assumptions found in the current literature on information acquisition regarding the role of information and how it affects firms’ profits in a two stage the game. However, we argue that by adding natural assumptions regarding the choices and trade-offs between cost reduction and loss of strategic value we provide a better prediction for the outcome of information acquisition games and welfare implications
Information Acquisition with Endogenously Determined Cost in Cournot Markets with Stochastic Demand
This paper presents a model of information acquisition in Cournot Market with stochastic demand where the acquisition cost is endogenously determined. The novelty is to consider the possibility of cost reducing alliances to be formed in the first-stage of a two-stage acquisition game. This paper encompasses the main assumptions found in the current literature on information acquisition regarding the role of information and how it affects firms’ profits in a two stage the game. However, we argue that by adding natural assumptions regarding the choices and trade-offs between cost reduction and loss of strategic value we provide a better prediction for the outcome of information acquisition games and welfare implications
Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia
It is well known that instability is a limit to the formation of cartels, and that some synergies are required to give cartel members an advantage over outsiders. In this paper, we explore theoretically the linkage between cost-reduction alliances (like research joint ventures) and the formation of cartels. The former have negative external impacts on outsiders, while the latter have positive external effects on outside (independent) competitors. We find that when the decisions to join both are made simultaneously the cartel can be profitable and stable for a smaller number of members than previously found for cartel formation alone by Salant et al. (1983, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 185–199). This result follows both for open membership and exclusive membership rules, and suggests a possible anticompetitive impact of research joint ventures. Copyright Springer 2006cartel, group formation, RJV, D21, D43,