ANALISIS PSIKOLOGI SOSIAL DALAM NOVEL MERAJUT RAHMAT CINTA KARYA HASYIM ELHANAN SERTA RELEVANSINYA SEBAGAI MATERI PEMBELAJARAN DI SMA

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan unsur-unsur struktural yang membangun novel Merajut Rahmat Cinta karya Hasyim Elhanan, psikologi tokoh dalam novel Merajut Rahmat Cinta karya Hasyim Elhanan, serta relevansinya sebagai materi pembelajaran sastra di SMA. Penelitian ini menggunkaan metode penelitian deskriptif dengan pendekatan psikologi sosial. Hasil penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut. Pertama, unsur-unsur struktural yang membangun meliputi tema percintaan, latar di pondok pesantren, alur maju, amanat yang disampaikan bahwa setiap manusia harus ikhlas dan berserah diri kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dalam menjalani kehidupan, kemudian cinta yang hakiki adalah cinta yang didasari atas kecintaan kepada Sang Pencipta, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. Kedua, aspek psikologi sosial tampak dari perilaku berkondisi dan perilaku tak berkondisi. Ketiga, novel Merajut Rahmat Cinta karya Hasyim Elhanan memiliki kesesuaian dengan konsep pemelajaran sastra karena terdapat nilai-nilai edukatif, sehingga novel Merajut Rahmat Cinta karya Hasyim Elhanan dapat digunakan sebagai bahan pemelajaran apresiasi sastra di SMA

\u3cem\u3eThe Mystery of Economic Growth.\u3c/em\u3e Elhanan Helpman.

Book note for Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. $5.95 hardcover

Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms

New developments in the world economy have triggered research designed to better understand the changes in trade and investment patterns, and the reorganization of production across national borders. Although traditional trade theory has much to offer in explaining parts of this puzzle, other parts required new approaches. Particularly acute has been the need to model alternative forms of involvement of business firms in foreign activities, because organizational change has been central in the transformation of the world economy. This paper reviews the literature that has emerged from these efforts. The theoretical refinements have focused on the individual firm, studying its choices in response to its own characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the opportunities afforded by foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are organizational features, such as sourcing strategies. But the theory has gone beyond the individual firm, studying the implications of firm behavior for the structure of industries. It provides new explanations for trade structure and patterns of FDI, both within and across industries, and has identified new sources of comparative advantage.

Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms

New developments in the world economy have triggered research designed to better understand the changes in trade and investment patterns, and the reorganization of production across national borders. Although traditional trade theory has much to offer in explaining parts of this puzzle, other parts required new approaches. Particularly acute has been the need to model alternative forms of involvement of business firms in foreign activities, because organizational change has been central in the transformation of the world economy. This paper reviews the literature that has emerged from these efforts. The theoretical refinements have focused on the individual firm, studying its choices in response to its own characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the opportunities afforded by foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are organizational features, such as sourcing strategies. But the theory has gone beyond the individual firm, studying the implications of firm behavior for the structure of industries. It provides new explanations for trade structure and patterns of FDI, both within and across industries, and has identified new sources of comparative advantage.

The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps

Recent attempts to resolve the international debt crisis have lead some countries to engage in debt-equity swaps. The paper explores conditions under which such transactions are beneficial to the debtor as well as the creditors. It identifies a market failure that may prevent the emergence of actually beneficial swaps and analyzes the effects of swaps on the investment level in the debtor country. The latter helps to evaluate the contribution of this policy to future difficulties with debt service payments.

Macroeconomic Effects of Price Controls: The Role of Market Structure

Price controls were part of Israel's stabilization program of July 1985. Some results of the program seem to be inconsistent with competitive macroeconomic models. It is suggested that these results are consistent with an economy that has an oligopolistic market structure. The paper explores the effects of market structure on macroeconomic performance in the presence and absence of price control.

Endogenous Macroeconomic Growth Theory

The paper focuses on the innovation-based approach to endogenous growth. It begins by spelling out conditions for sustained long-run growth in neoclassical economies and uses these conditions as a standard of comparison for the conditions required to sustain long-run growth in economies with product innovation. It presents two models of product innovation that can sustain growth in the long run. The models share the same fundamental mechanism of economic growth. They are used to derive a variety of implications relating structural features to long-run growth rates and they are then applied to a number of policy issues. The usefulness of the approach represented by these models is examined by considering a number of issues, such as unemployment and trade relations.

Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: How do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.