The pharmaceuticalisation of security: molecular biomedicine, antiviral stockpiles, and global health security

Pharmaceuticals are now critical to the security of populations. Antivirals, antibiotics, next-generation vaccines, and antitoxins are just some of the new ‘medical countermeasures’ that governments are stockpiling in order to defend their populations against the threat of pandemics and bioterrorism. How has security policy come to be so deeply imbricated with pharmaceutical logics and solutions? This article captures, maps, and analyses the ‘pharmaceuticalisation’ of security. Through an in-depth analysis of the prominent antiviral medication Tamiflu, it shows that this pharmaceutical turn in security policy is intimately bound up with the rise of a molecular vision of life promulgated by the biomedical sciences. Caught in the crosshairs of powerful commercial, political, and regulatory pressures, governments are embracing a molecular biomedicine promising to secure populations pharmaceutically in the twenty-first century. If that is true, then the established disciplinary view of health as a predominantly secondary matter of ‘low’ international politics is mistaken. On the contrary, the social forces of health and biomedicine are powerful enough to influence the core practices of international politics – even those of security. For a discipline long accustomed to studying macro-level processes and systemic structures, it is in the end also our knowledge of the minute morass of molecules that shapes international relations

Securing circulation pharmaceutically: antiviral stockpiling and pandemic preparedness in the European Union

Governments in Europe and around the world amassed vast pharmaceutical stockpiles in anticipation of a potentially catastrophic influenza pandemic. Yet the comparatively ‘mild’ course of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic provoked considerable public controversy around those stockpiles, leading to questions about their cost–benefit profile and the commercial interests allegedly shaping their creation, as well as around their scientific evidence base. So, how did governments come to view pharmaceutical stockpiling as such an indispensable element of pandemic preparedness planning? What are the underlying security rationalities that rapidly rendered antivirals such a desirable option for government planners? Drawing upon an in-depth reading of Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis of circulation’, this article argues that the rise of pharmaceutical stockpiling across Europe is integral to a governmental rationality of political rule that continuously seeks to anticipate myriad circulatory threats to the welfare of populations – including to their overall levels of health. Novel antiviral medications such as Tamiflu are such an attractive policy option because they could enable governments to rapidly modulate dangerous levels of (viral) circulation during a pandemic, albeit without disrupting all the other circulatory systems crucial for maintaining population welfare. Antiviral stockpiles, in other words, promise nothing less than a pharmaceutical securing of circulation itself

Wie sicher ist Europa?

In seinem Vortrag spricht sich Frank Elbe, Botschafter a. D., für ein besonnenes und überlegtes Vorgehen Deutschlands und der Europäischen Union gegenüber Russland aus. Die Bereitschaft zur Kooperation sollte nicht verlorengehen. Deutschland könne dabei auf seine erfolgreichen Rezepte der Vergangenheit zurückgreifen

Pandemics, Pills, and Politics

The fascinating story of Tamiflu's development and stockpiling against global health threats.orld's most prominent medical countermeasure, Tamiflu.A pill can strengthen national security? The suggestion may seem odd, but many states around the world believe precisely that. Confronted with pandemics, bioterrorism, and emerging infectious diseases, governments are transforming their security policies to include the proactive development, acquisition, stockpiling, and mass distribution of new pharmaceutical defenses. What happens—politically, economically, and socially—when governments try to protect their populations with pharmaceuticals? How do competing interests among states, pharmaceutical companies, regulators, and scientists play out in the quest to develop new medical countermeasures? And do citizens around the world ultimately stand to gain or lose from this pharmaceuticalization of security policy?Stefan Elbe explores these complex questions in Pandemics, Pills, and Politics, the first in-depth study of the world’s most prominent medical countermeasure, Tamiflu. Taken by millions of people around the planet in the fight against pandemic flu, Tamiflu has provoked suspicions about undue commercial influence in government decision-making about stockpiles. It even found itself at the center of a prolonged political battle over who should have access to the data about the safety and effectiveness of medicines.Pandemics, Pills, and Politics shows that the story of Tamiflu harbors deeper lessons about the vexing political, economic, legal, social, and regulatory tensions that emerge as twenty-first-century security policy takes a pharmaceutical turn. At the heart of this issue, Elbe argues, lies something deeper: the rise of a new molecular vision of life that is reshaping the world we live in

Die Krise mit Russland: Gibt es Licht am Ende des Tunnels?

Frank Elbe, Botschafter a.D., kommentiert die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der EU, den USA und Russland und spricht sich für ein besonnenes Vorgehen der Europäer gegenüber Russland aus. Die Bereitschaft zur Kooperation sollte nicht verlorengehen

Flame zone of a composite propellant expanded by a laser source

Technique scales flame structure linearly with gas kinetic mean free path, which increases two to three orders of magnitude as pressure decreases like amount. Kinetic and transport time scales expand in proportion so that regression rates for laser-induced flames are two to three orders of magnitude slower

Entangled security: science, co-production, and intra-active insecurity

This article advances a new account of security as an intensely relational and ontologically entangled phenomenon that does not exist prior to, nor independently of, its intra-action with other phenomena and agencies. Security's ‘entanglement’ is demonstrated through an analysis of the protracted security concerns engendered by ‘dangerous’ scientific experiments performed with lethal H5N1 flu viruses. Utilising methodological approaches recently developed in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), the article explicates the intensely ‘co-productive’ dynamics at play between security and science in those experiments, and which ultimately reveal security to be a deeply relational phenomenon continuously emerging out of its engagement with other agencies. Recovering this deeper ontological entanglement, the article argues, necessitates a different approach to the study of security that does not commence by fixing the meaning and boundaries of security in advance. Rather, such an approach needs to analyse the diverse sites, dynamics, and processes through which security and insecurity come to intra-actively materialise in international relations. It also demands a fundamental reconsideration of many of the discipline's most prominent security theories. They are not merely conceptual tools for studying security, but crucial participants in its intra-active materialisation

Composite solid propellant flame microstructure determination Annual report, 23 Jun. 1967 - 22 Jun. 1968

Composite solid propellant flame microstructure determination

Global Governance and the Limits of Health Security

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa has exposed the limits of the current approach to the global governance of infectious diseases, which mixes public health and security interests. International efforts to strengthen ‘health security’ quickly faltered when confronted with weak national health systems. Costly attempts by Western governments to strengthen global health security by developing new medical countermeasures, though important, did not yield a single, effective, widely available treatment or vaccine before the outbreak occurred. The World Health Organization (WHO), which had made strengthening global health security a strategic objective, was unable to marshal a rapid international response to the epidemic due to its institutional structure and recent cutbacks in its outbreak and emergency response department. In the end, governments could only try to get ‘ahead’ of the disease via a heavily militarised response that came too late for the thousands who have already died, that remains of uncertain sustainability, and that raises profound challenges for already stretched armed forces. The time has come to move from a focus on health security and international crisis response, to a system of global governance capable of addressing infectious disease outbreaks in an orderly, organised and sustainable manner.UK Department for International Developmen